Kasparov on the Kremlin
Europe’s Pearl Harbor Moment Might Come Too Late
Lithuanian Foreign Minister: The First Shots of the Next Great War Could Be Fired in My Country
Gabrielius Landsbergis
Jun 03, 2025
In 1917, after the sinking of the passenger ship Lusitania, the US finally intervened in what was up until then viewed as a “European” war. In 1941, the Second World War had been raging for two years before a direct attack on US territory forced the US to join the Allies.
In both cases it took a shocking act in order to wake up the slumbering United States and get it to bring its might to bear on conflicts that would define the 20th century.
A few days ago, Ukraine’s “Operation Spiderweb” struck Russia deep behind enemy lines in an impressively audacious attack that a number of Russian Military Bloggers called Russia’s “Pearl Harbor.” And it’s very clear that the entire Russian Federation is on war footing. But today, three years after Russia launched the greatest conflict in Europe since 1945, the West remains drowsy—unable or unwilling to make a decisive move towards Ukraine’s victory.
Russia’s aggression has not been subtle, but if the invasion of Ukraine and the hybrid attacks on NATO territory aren’t enough to trigger NATO’s Pearl Harbor alarm clock, we should ask ourselves a question—what would it take for the West to wake up?
In the classic British comedy series Yes, Prime Minister, an adviser describes a “salami tactics” scenario, whereby the Soviet Union gradually escalates hybrid attacks and launches special operations, slicing the European salami piece by piece. These tactics muddy the waters enough to make the Prime Minister of Great Britain doubt whether or not it’s worth nuclear escalation... until it’s too late. That fictional episode first aired in 1986. Today, I believe it may no longer be fictional.
Imagine: A cyber attack targets the transit train from Moscow to Kaliningrad. The train, carrying Russian citizens, is forced to stop in Lithuania. The incident coincides with Russian-Belarusian military exercises near Lithuania’s border.
Lithuanian authorities scramble to respond. The situation escalates: Russian passengers on the train are claiming they are under threat.
The president of Russia declares a humanitarian crisis, orders his army to “secure” the train and protect the passengers. Russian troops cross the border.
Lithuania resists. Shots are fired. Russia claims it is merely conducting a rescue operation and sends more troops.
Lithuania invokes Article 5 of the NATO Treaty—but not all member states agree that this constitutes an attack. Some call it a mishandled civilian incident and request more information.
The US, eager to reset relations with Russia, refuses to act.
While Lithuania’s allies hesitate, Russian forces pour in, protected by drones that strafe Lithuanian units. Reserves and paramilitaries engage bravely, fighting for every village. But eventually Russian troops establish control over chunks of Lithuania. NATO forces stationed in the country, fearing encirclement or capture, retreat to Poland to await further orders. Russia quickly achieves air supremacy, blocking any supply airlifts. Lithuania is cut off and indefensible short of a full-scale war with Russia. The Lithuanian government is accused of non-cooperation by Russia and ordered to dissolve itself. Lithuania’s independence is snuffed out yet again by Moscow.
After this, while allies are still discussing their next move, Putin will issue the tried-and-tested Kremlin threat that never fails to paralyze westerners: “NATO intervention would risk nuclear escalation.”
At this stage, I expect that there would be many statements about plans for meetings to draw up further plans for possible actions. And this diplomatic dithering could prove fatal. An unanswered attack on a NATO and EU member state would trigger cascading consequences that no strongly worded letter could undo. Alliances would still exist on paper, but their credibility, and therefore usefulness, would be shattered.
Only then, watching Putin's armies march westward, would the transatlantic coalition fully mobilize. The European economy would switch to a wartime footing: factories would start churning out ammunition, tanks, planes and drones. Mobilization would be the main way to deter Putin's march further, and would be started immediately. Discussions about spending 3 or 5 percent of GDP towards defense would evoke wry smiles and conjure up memories of past naivete.
Meanwhile, China seizes the moment. As parts of Europe burn, Beijing finally makes a move on Taiwan.
The United States, realizing that events are now becoming more serious than a sunken passenger ship or even a burning port in Hawaii—awakens from its deep slumber to protect its interests in the Indo-Pacific and repair the vital transatlantic partnership on which its security and prosperity now undeniably depend.
There would be a belated rush to restore the US presence in Europe and bring balance back to the Indo-Pacific. But, as it was for the sailors in Pearl Harbor, this reaction would come too late to save my country—Lithuania.
There would, of course, be many speeches and promises to reclaim the occupied territories, to never recognize the occupation. But Putin’s bet would be that with the passage of time, these promises would fade, and he would end up with most of what he really wanted. Indeed, when the USSR annexed my nation during World War II, the West made a similar vow of non-recognition—but for all intents and purposes, we spent the next half-century as a fully-integrated Soviet republic.
So is an attack on NATO unthinkable? Far from it.
In fact, Putin’s opportune moment could come sooner than we would hope. Ukraine has bought us time by sacrificing an incredible amount of blood and treasure. But Putin knows that the clock is ticking and Europe is slowly becoming more capable of repelling his aggression. Therefore, he will not wait 5–10 years for Germany, Poland, or the Baltic states to complete their rearmament. It makes sense to strike sooner—before Europe is ready. And the short-term situation just got even better for Putin, as the US reconsiders its position in Europe.
The invasion of Ukraine could have been a European Pearl Harbor—the rude awakening that puts us onto a war footing. Unfortunately, we did not take advantage of the opportunity.
Instead of waiting to be woken up by some new crisis, we should wake ourselves up now. Better late than even later.
This is not science fiction. This is our timeline; the trajectory that we are currently on because of our chosen policies. We still have time to rise to the challenge, change direction, and avoid tragedy, but right now, we’re procrastinating, waiting for a disaster to spur us into saving ourselves.
Gabrielius Landsbergis served as Lithuania's Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2020 to 2024.
Peter Burgess COMMENTARY
This is a hard read ... but a very useful read. I was born in the UK in 1940 and grew up in the UK. I only migrated to North America ... first Canada and then the United States in my late 20s ... in the 1960s.
My reading of history is that the United States arrived late for both WWI and WWII.
At its core, the US engages with the world to make money ... not so much as a matter pf any principle!
For Britain, WWI cost lives while WWII was very costly in national wealth. For the United States WWII was a profit bonanza. The wealth ... gold ... that was transferred from London to the United States during WWII was huge ... and continued for many years after the war ended in 1945 to repay the lend-lease debts. In 1913, the Britian Empire was the richest in history, and the same at the beginning of WWII in 1939.
The allies 'won' in WWII ... but the cost of winning was not spread evenly. The UK and the countries that made up the British Empire consumed military supplies in order to win the war. A big part of those military supplies were manufactured in the USA and either paid for in cash (gold) or on credit (Lend Lease) that was subsequently repaid! Net net, the United States was able to profit from the wars, and became richer during the wars. The United kingdom, on the other had became poorer and after WWII was deeply indebted.
Snce the end of WWII, the United States has been in a position of power with essentially veryone else in an economically subservient position.
This started to change in the 1970s. Two very big economic changes happened: (1) the Arab oil shock and (2) the emergence of China as a massive manufacturing economy.
At the time, I wrote that the Arab oill shock was the biggest economic event in all of history ... it would change everything. Fast forward fifty years and I think my projection was right.
Peter Burgess
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