When is a State Predatory?
James A. Robinsony
May 2001.
Abstract
I argue that the impact of development on the distribution of political
power in society may create an incentive for a state to become \predatory'
and fail to promote economic development. I develop a model of endogenous
policy choice where public investment, while socially productive, simultaneously increases the ability of agents outside the ruling group to contest
political power. The model shows that inecient underinvestment (predatory behavior) tends to arise in societies where, (1) there are large bene ts
to holding political power, and which are, (2) well endowed which natural resources, (3) badly endowed with factors which are complementary to
public investment, such as human capital, and (4) intrinsically unstable. I
document the importance of the mechanism I propose in accounting for the
behavior of actual predatory regimes.
Keywords: Development, Political Economy, Predatory State.
JEL CLassi cation: O, H1, H2.
I am grateful to the suggestions and comments of
- Daron Acemoglu,
- Pranab Bardhan,
- Kaushik Basu,
- Samuel Bowles,
- Richard Easterlin,
- James Fearon,
- James Mahon,
- Je rey Nugent,
- Jean-Philippe Platteau,
- Canice Prendergast,
- Maurice Schi ,
- Anand Swamy,
- Erik Thorbecke,
- David Weil and
- seminar participants at the
- Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
- Banco de laRepublica de Colombia,
- Columbia,
- Cornell,
- J.F.K School at Harvard,
- Hong Kong UST,
- Namur,
- the NBER,
- the NEUDC at Williams and Yale.
Harvard University, Department of Government, Littauer,
1875 Cambridge Street, Cambridge MA01238
e-mail: jrobinson@gov.harvard.edu.
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