
The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon

How the U.S. and the international community will block all of Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon



After many months of principled diplomacy, the P5+1 -- the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Germany -- along with the European Union, have achieved a long-term comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran that will verifiably prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful going forward.

This deal stands on the foundation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), achieved in November of 2013, and the framework for this Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), announced in Lausanne on April 2, 2015 that set the requirements for the deal with the P5+ 1 and Iran, alongside the European Union announced today.

Now, with this deal in place, the U.S., our allies, and the international community can know that tough, new requirements will keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Here's how:

Blocking the Four Pathways to a Nuclear Weapon

Building a nuclear bomb requires either uranium or plutonium. But thanks to this deal, Iran's four possible ways to leverage those fissile materials are blocked.



The Uranium pathways at Natanz and Fordow

Iran would needs two key elements to construct a uranium bomb: tens of thousands of centrifuges and enough highly enriched uranium to produce enough material to construct a uranium bomb.

There are currently two uranium enrichment facilities in the country: the Natanz facility


and the Fordow facility.

Let's take a look at Iran's uranium stockpile first. Currently, Iran has a uranium stockpile to create 8 to ten nuclear bombs.

But thanks to this nuclear deal, Iran must reduce its stockpile of uranium by 98%, and will keep its level of uranium enrichment at 3.67% -- significantly below the enrichment level needed to create a bomb.

Iran also needs tens of thousands of centrifuges to create highly enriched uranium for a bomb. Right now, Iran has nearly 20,000 centrifuges between their Natanz and Fordow facilities. But under this deal, Iran must reduce its centrifuges to 6,104 for the next ten years. No enrichment will be allowed at the Fordow facility at all, and the only centrifuges Iran will be allowed to use are their oldest and least efficient models.

In short, here's the difference this historic deal will make:



The Plutonium pathway at the Arak reactor


The third way Iran could build a nuclear weapon is by using weapons-grade plutonium. The only site where Iran could accomplish this is the Arak reactor, a heavy-water nuclear reactor. Right now, this reactor could be used in a weapons program, but under this deal, the Arak reactor will be redesigned so it cannot produce any weapons-grade plutonium. And all the spent fuel rods (which could also be source material for weapons-grade plutonium) will be sent out of the country as long as this reactor exists. What's more, Iran will not be able to build a single heavy-water reactor for at least 15 years. That means, because of this deal, Iran will no longer have a source for

weapons-grade plutonium.

A covert pathway to building a secret nuclear program

The previous three pathways occur at facilities that Iran has declared. But what if they try to build a nuclear program in secret? That's why this deal is so important. Under the new nuclear deal, Iran has committed to extraordinary and robust monitoring, verification, and inspection. International inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will not only be continuously monitoring every element of Iran's declared nuclear program, but they will also be verifying that no fissile material is covertly carted off to a secret location to build a bomb. And if IAEA inspectors become aware of a suspicious location, Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol to their IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which will allow inspectors to access and inspect any site they deem suspicious. Such suspicions can be triggered by holes in the ground that could be uranium mines, intelligence reports, unexplained purchases, or isotope alarms.

Basically, from the minute materials that could be used for a weapon comes out of the ground to the minute it is shipped out of the country, the IAEA will have eyes on it and anywhere Iran could try and take it:



What Iran's Nuclear Program Would Look Like Without This Deal

As it stands today, Iran has a large stockpile of enriched uranium and nearly 20,000 centrifuges, enough to create 8 to 10 bombs. If Iran decided to rush to make a bomb

without the deal in place, it would take them 2 to 3 months until they had enough weapon-ready uranium (or highly enriched uranium) to build their first nuclear weapon. Left unchecked, that stockpile and that number of centrifuges would grow exponentially, practically guaranteeing that Iran could create a bomb—and create one quickly – if it so chose.

This deal removes the key elements needed to create a bomb and prolongs Iran's breakout time from 2-3 months to 1 year or more if Iran broke its commitments. Importantly, Iran won't garner any new sanctions relief until the IAEA confirms that Iran has followed through with its end of the deal. And should Iran violate any aspect of this deal, the U.N., U.S., and E.U. can snap the sanctions that have crippled Iran's economy back into place.

Here's what Iran has committed to:



The difference this deal is significant. Take a look at exactly what Iran's nuclear program will look like now under this deal:



(JAVASCRIPT://)

JUMP TO A SECTION

ENRICHMENT LIMITS

Iran's breakout timeline to enough enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon pushed from 2-3 months to 1 year if Iran breaks its commitments under the deal

ENRICHMENT LIMITS

No uranium enriched above 3.67% and stockpile capped at 300kg

R&D LIMITS

Uranium research and development limited to Natanz facility

FORDOW LIMITS

No enrichment at Fordow facility

LIMITS ON REACTORS

No new heavy water reactors or heavy water accumulation

SHIP OUT SPENT FUEL

Arak reactor re-designed and spent fuel shipped out of Iran

ACCESS & VERIFICATION

IAEA access and modern monitoring technology will verify all elements of Iran's nuclear program

ACCESS & VERIFICATION

IAEA will monitor and contain the production, assembly, and storage of centrifuges

ACCESS & VERIFICATION

IAEA access and monitoring for all uranium mines and mills to ensure no covert diversion

ACCESS & VERIFICATION

IAEA containment and surveillance of the production, supply, and storage of centrifuges

• U.N. SANCTIONS

If Iran violates deal, U.N. sanctions automatically snap back for a decade with the possibility of re-imposing sanctions for another 5 years if deemed necessary

U.S. AND E.U. SANCTIONS

If Iran violates any aspect of this deal, the U.S. and E.U. can snap sanctions back in place

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