HOPE FOR BUILDING A COLLECTIVE PEACE MOVEMENT

Lessons Learned from Developing Collective Impact Networks in Nigeria and Sri Lanka

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CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA)

January 2019

CDA PRACTICAL LEARNING for INTERNATIONAL ACTION

HUMANITY UNITED

Acknowledgments

CDA wishes to extend its sincere gratitude to the Search for Common Ground staff both at its headquarters and at the relevant country offices for being trusted learning partners in this exercise, and for their candid reflections throughout the collaboration — from which we continue to learn lessons for effective peacebuilding practice. We are also grateful for key Search for Common Ground staff from Sri Lanka and Nigeria, namely Pwakim Jacob Choji and Nirmani Liyanage, who contributed to the collection of data from the respective stakeholders in each location.

Thanks to all interviewees for generously giving up their time to share their views and experiences.

Special thanks to Peter Woodrow, Saji Prelis, and Rachel Walsh Taza for critically reviewing drafts of this case study.

The funding for the production of this document was provided by Humanity United, and we are grateful for its commitment to promoting innovative approaches in peacebuilding and making both the Collective Impact in Peacebuilding — Testing a New Framework Project and this case study possible. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Search for Common Ground or Humanity United.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acronyms

CDA	CDA Collaborative Learning Projects
PWL	Peace Writ Large
Search	Search for Common Ground
UDA	Urban Development Authority
WBCT	We Build Colombo Together
I/NGO	International/Non-Governmental Organization
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
JSCP	Jos Stakeholders Centre for Peace

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The collective impact lessons learned from Nigeria and Sri Lanka are built on the Framework for Collective Impact in Peacebuilding, published in 2017. The Framework drew lessons from CDA's 16 "cumulative impact" case studies conducted between 2007–12 that investigated how multiple peacebuilding efforts "add up" to progress toward sustainable peace, as well as by adapting existing resources by FSG.

The Framework provides the following five core conditions for collective impact in peacebuilding:

1. Collective & Emergent Understanding (conflict analysis, degree of progress, who is doing what)
2. Collective Intention & Action (common agenda, scope of action, mutually reinforcing activities, division of labor, common measures)
3. Collective Learning & Adaptive Management (regular feedback, adjusting accordingly, mutual learning)
4. Continuous Communication & Accountability (continuous sharing, exchange of experiences, reflection)
5. Sufficient Support Structures ("backbone" support)

Apart from the above, the Framework also presented three preliminary considerations for organizations engaging in collective action and eleven fundamental principles underlying collective impact in peacebuilding.

The Framework was field-tested in partnership with Search for Common Ground in Jos, Nigeria, and Colombo, Sri Lanka, where CDA provided technical support toward the development of locally driven, multi-stakeholder collective impact networks targeting local-level conflicts. Both networks are in their infancy and in varying stages of evolution toward becoming fully fledged collective impact networks. The objective of this paper is to learn from the experience of bringing together diverse stakeholders toward the deliberate establishment of a network for a shared peacebuilding goal, using the fundamental principles of collective impact in peacebuilding as markers, as outlined in the Framework.

The methodology for this paper was rooted in the Framework. The author and other interviewers used the Framework to design open-ended questions to guide interviews with stakeholders. In addition, reflections on an ongoing basis throughout the initiatives by key Search for Common Ground staff in Jos, Colombo, and headquarters, as well as the reflections of the author of the case study, informed this paper.

The ongoing lessons from the experience of Nigeria and Sri Lanka as outlined in the paper covered issues of time, resources, and flexibility needed for trust building and coming together for a shared goal; the utility value of joint visioning exercise and analysis as a process as

well as a product for developing shared understanding; the role of identity of the convening organization and individuals; staff composition and skill set in convening roles; challenges to ensuring participation by government and private sector actors; usefulness of robust information channels; and definition and scope of accountability.

The experience of bringing together stakeholders across sectors, developing shared goals, and sustaining momentum toward the creation of deliberate collective impact networks has yielded the following recommendations for practitioners, policy makers, and donors on the role of collective impact in enhancing peacebuilding effectiveness.

- Resources should be made available for extensive intra-group mobilization efforts to help think and act together, in order to recognize the usefulness of collective action, before bringing stakeholders together. Expertise and resources should also be considered for guiding the stakeholders in how to work together.
- Collective impact efforts, especially at the inception stage, should be given flexibility to try new approaches, adapt, and convene without the restrictions of log frames and set project deliverables. The traditional project management and communication practices, such as monthly and quarterly targets, action plans, and newsletters, seem to be less productive.
- Developing shared analysis should be recognized as a valuable process as well as a product. While the use of systems methodology is useful to develop shared analysis, in contexts fraught with competing interests and perceptions, intra-group analysis exercises followed by a joint analysis are likely to be more effective. This intra-group analysis should focus on a common agenda for that particular group before developing a common agenda across multiple groups.
- Strategies for ensuring momentum (through quick-win activities and making resources available for it), sustained participation by actors with some degree of decision-making ability, and expectation management should be considered from the outset.
- The role and identity of facilitators and outsiders involved should be given careful consideration, and strategies should be in place to manage them proactively. Similarly, the risk of the role and perception of outsiders being co-opted by some stakeholders needs to be managed. Means for ensuring transparency in relationships, decisions taken, reasons for delays, and compromises made along the way would help manage this.
- Coordinators and facilitators should internalize and embody the values of local ownership, collaboration, and collective action that should guide the ways that they relate to the network and its members.

1. BACKGROUND

The project Collective Impact in Peacebuilding — Testing a New Framework and the consequent Framework for Collective Impact in Peacebuilding[1] (referred to as the Framework) was developed by adapting existing resources by FSG.[2] It seeks to identify salient features for effective collective action in peacebuilding. The Framework also drew lessons from CDA's 16 "cumulative impact" case studies conducted between 2007–12, which investigated how multiple peacebuilding efforts "add up" to progress toward sustainable peace.[3] The overarching objective of the project is to understand how peacebuilding networks, consortia, coalitions, and alliances (referred to as networks henceforth) contribute to impact at the Peace Writ Large (PWL) level by gathering evidence from the field, thus providing guidance to practitioners and policy makers who seek to improve peacebuilding effectiveness through multi-stakeholder networks.

As evident from the desk research conducted in the initial stage of this project,[4] there is some published information from which common themes and lessons can be gleaned about the effectiveness of collective action. However, there is little or no shared understanding of the definition of collective impact that is specific to peacebuilding. With the increase in donors' preference for consortium models for funding in international assistance, most consortia and networks in peacebuilding comprise international and local NGOs operating through formalized mechanisms. This poses the question of how to define collective impact/action and who can be part of this action. To address the challenge of not having a universal definition for collective action in peacebuilding, CDA established a set of definitions and parameters. Collective action is defined as an initiative that is:

- established through an intentional effort by a group of stakeholders/multiple actors who proactively work together,
- based on a shared peacebuilding agenda, and
- aims to deliberately affect the dynamics of conflict and peace with discernible outcomes.

The Framework provides the following five core conditions for collective impact in peacebuilding that this paper is mainly focused on:

1. Collective & Emergent Understanding (conflict analysis, degree of progress, who is doing what)

1 http://live-cdacollaborative.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Framework-for-Collective-Impact-in-Peacebuilding.pdf.
2 Kania, John and Mark Kramer, "Collective Impact." Stanford Social Innovation Review: 36–41, 2011. Fay Hanleybrown, John Kania, and Mark Kramer, "Channeling Change: Making Collective Impact Work," Stanford Social Innovation Review, January 2013. Kania, John and Mark Kramer, "Embracing Emergence: How Collective Impact Addresses Complexity," Stanford Innovation Review, January 2012.
3 The learning from these case studies is presented in Adding Up to Peace: Cumulative Impacts of Peace Programming, Diana Chigas and Peter Woodrow, CDA Collaborative Learning, 2018. Available for download at https://www.cdacollaborative.org/publication/adding-peace-cumulative-impacts-peace-initiatives/ and as a hard copy at Amazon books-on-demand.
4 Marin O'Brien Belhoussein, "Developing a Model for Collective Impact for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: Summary of Initial Findings," CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, May 2016.

2. Collective Intention & Action (common agenda, level/scope of action, core strategy, mutually reinforcing activities, division of labor, common measures)
3. Collective Learning & Adaptive Management (seek regular feedback, adjust actions accordingly, emphasize mutual learning)
4. Continuous Communication & Accountability (continuous data sharing, exchange of experiences, reflection)
5. Sufficient Support Structures ("backbone" support)

Apart from the above stated core conditions, this paper also considers and reflects on the following fundamental principles underlying collective impact in peacebuilding, which are derived from a consultation with practitioners and academics on collective impact in peacebuilding in July 2016:

1. *Local actors and organizations* must drive and control collective impact efforts. The role of external organizations is to provide support and reflections from other experiences. Pay attention to *issues of power, privilege, and control*.
2. *All organizations, and especially "outsiders," must recognize their own motivations and agendas — and be as transparent as possible about them.*
3. *Bottom-up processes* — rather than initiatives driven from the top or externally — are more likely to achieve sustained successes.
4. *Vertical and horizontal linkages* must be built into peacebuilding initiatives.
5. *Learning processes* must provide the core of collective impact processes. Flows of information, analyses, and responses are crucial activities across participating organizations.
6. How *funding* is provided and how *accountability* is structured influence the ability to promote collective impact; accountability should generally be to those most affected by war and violence. *Longer-term commitments* to key issues are important.
7. *Inclusivity* must be a consideration from the outset — balanced with the need to be able to act and achieve a "sufficient" group of organizations operating from a common agenda.
8. *Participatory analysis* must include as many perspectives as practical — using systems tools and supporting an *adaptive and learning approach* to programming. Analysis and learning are *iterative processes*.
9. Efforts must be motivated by a sense of the *importance* of the issues, *durability*, and *sustainability* — rather than "urgency," which can lead to short-term and transitory efforts with no lasting effects on fundamental drivers of conflict.
10. *Incremental building* of the collective action is advised — with room for *reconfiguring* (adding and dropping organizations) over time and phases of action.
11. The *incentives* for participating in collective impact for peacebuilding must be considered.

The framework further outlines some preliminary considerations for organizations engaging in collective action in peacebuilding, which this paper refers to throughout. These are:

- Overall Approach: a systemic understanding of conflict dynamics and systems change; an adaptive management approach to program planning and implementation
- Initial Assessment and Strategy Development: initial stakeholder mapping; identification or convening of a "sufficient" network or coalition of interested groups; preliminary conflict analysis; decision regarding the level of collective action; preliminary determination of focus and scope; and "Go/No Go" decision
- Permissive Environment for Collective Impact: leadership, funding, and sense of importance

Since the development of the Framework, a two-pronged approach has been underway to distill learning about how networks and consortia with shared peacebuilding goals contribute to those goals. The first approach has been to learn from existing multi-stakeholder peacebuilding networks that have been set up with (often loosely defined) common peacebuilding goal(s), and the lessons emerging from those. The second approach is to support the intentional establishment of new collective impact networks based on shared peacebuilding needs and goals, and to learn from that experience. This paper documents the lessons learned from the process of bringing together stakeholders, developing shared goals, and sustaining momentum toward the creation of deliberate collective impact networks in Sri Lanka and Nigeria.

2. INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the efforts facilitated by Search for Common Ground (Search) in Jos North, Nigeria, and Kompannavidiya, Colombo, Sri Lanka, to work collaboratively with a range of stakeholders to identify local level conflicts faced by groups of actors, and their attempt to identify entry points and joint initiatives for resolving those conflicts.

It should be noted that the initiatives in Jos North and Kompannavidiya - Colombo are in their infancy, as they were both initiated in 2017. At the time this paper was written, the two initiatives were at different stages of evolution, had encountered context-specific challenges, and were being driven by local actors to different degrees. Given this early stage of development, this paper does not attempt to assess the success of the initiatives, Search's role, or the stakeholders it works with, nor does it seek to assess the contribution to changes at the PWL level at this stage.

The objective of this paper, in relation to the other case studies conducted under this project, is to learn from the experience of bringing together diverse stakeholders toward the deliberate establishment of a network for a shared peacebuilding goal, using the fundamental principles of collective impact in peacebuilding as markers (as outlined in the Framework). The two initiatives discussed in this paper are distinctly different from those of other peacebuilding networks examined under this project:

- First, they were each set up intentionally as a collective impact network, initiated and facilitated by an outsider (Search).
- Second, in an effort to build and promote local ownership and organic growth, no long-term funding promises were made to the networks for the collective actions they identified to pursue in either of these initiatives. However, in these early stages of the initiatives Search has had funding to serve as a backbone support structure to convene and coordinate the networks.

In the process of facilitating the establishment of these two networks, CDA provided Search and the stakeholders in Colombo and Jos North with technical support. CDA staff co-facilitated systems conflict analysis workshops in order to develop a shared analysis and understanding of needs, followed by validation exercises, and provided ad hoc advice to the Search teams.

3. METHODOLOGY

The methodology for this lessons-learned paper was, to some extent, similar to that of the other three case studies under this project, in that the overall methodology was guided by the Framework for Collective Impacts in Peacebuilding. As their primary data collection method, the author and other interviewers used the Framework to design open-ended questions to guide interviews with stakeholders involved in the project. This methodology differed from the other case studies by recording, on an ongoing basis throughout the initiatives, the reflections of key Search staff in Jos, Colombo, and headquarters, as well as the reflections of the author of the case study (as an insider-outsider).

The key lines of inquiry for this paper and the wider selection of case studies were:

- The extent to which there is a joint and emerging understanding of the conflict and of "peace" among and within the peacebuilding networks (joint understanding of conflict analysis, degree of progress toward societal peace, who is doing what)
- Details of collective intention and action (common peacebuilding agenda, level/scope of action, joint strategy, mutually reinforcing activities, division of labor, common measures/M&E)
- The space for and details of collective learning and adaptive management within the network (seek regular feedback, adjust actions accordingly, emphasize mutual learning)
- The extent of continuous communication and accountability (continuous data sharing, exchange of experiences, reflection)
- The details of the architecture of support structures, and its merits ("backbone" support)
- The factors that appear to support successful consortia/platforms/multi-stakeholder fora in peacebuilding
- The issues and barriers encountered and how groups tried to overcome them
- How peacebuilding networks adapt to changing political situations and keep long-term strategy in mind while daily dynamics change quickly
- Where groups included both "insiders" and "outsiders," how those relationships were managed and the useful division of efforts between them

The data gathering began with the review of background documents produced for the two initiatives, as well as the systems analyses, reports, and the associated workshop notes. Network coordinators conducted interviews and focus group discussions with stakeholders in Jos and Colombo. In order to capture valuable information and institutional memory, the author in turn interviewed the coordinators and Search's HQ staff. A breakdown of the interviews conducted is set out below:

Place	Number of Interviewees	Period
Jos, external stakeholders	16	Aug. 7–24, 2018
Colombo, internal and external stakeholders	8	Aug. 15–25, 2018
Search, national and HQ	3	Aug. 20–Sept. 5, 2018

The methodology recognized that the academic nature of the language used in the key lines of inquiry would not be conducive for the stakeholders to share their lessons learned and insights. Therefore, the two coordinators were given the freedom to adapt and reframe the questions to best fit the context and the target group.

Given the ongoing complexities faced by the team in Colombo regarding access, trust, and time constraints, a stratified random sample of members representing different sectors (i.e., state, community, researchers) was selected for interviews. In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted by the coordinator in the form of joint explorations of strengths and weaknesses of the initiative so far and suggestions for strengthening of the network in the future. This particular approach was deliberately chosen to avoid misperceptions of the potential outcomes of the initiative and to manage expectations about the interviews. In addition, notes and reports maintained by the previous project team at Search and the research partner, informal personal communication with members, and the observations of the coordinator contributed to the data gathering.

a. Challenges

As mentioned above, the networks in Sri Lanka and Nigeria are both in their infancy and, as a result, it is too early to assess their contribution to PWL. Therefore, this paper will not provide lessons comparable with those of the other three case studies. Instead, it will present insights on the role of intentionality in setting up collective impact networks, and how this intentionality plays out in relation to the preconditions for establishing a viable network/consortium and the five dimensions of collective impact as outlined in the Framework.

Primary data collection was conducted by Search and the analysis conducted by CDA, while the two organizations were also involved in setting up the initiatives, thus causing concerns of potential bias in these preliminary findings. To overcome this challenge, information gathering related closely to Search (for example: intention, impact) was carried out by CDA. In addition, CDA involved two external reviewers to provide quality assurance. Furthermore, this challenge was offset by the fact that this paper is not an assessment or evaluation of the efforts, and instead seeks to document lessons learned during the process of establishing collective impact networks.

4. COLLECTIVE IMPACT APPROACH IN NIGERIA AND SRI LANKA

The desire to initiate a collective impact approach at Search emerged from its experience employing a similar approach with relative success at the Inter-Agency Working Group on Youth and Peacebuilding[5] (now known as the Global Coalition on Youth, Peace and Security). Initial research conducted by Search indicated that sustainable, large-scale social change on complex issues requires local, inclusive ownership and broad cross-sector collaboration,[6] and that the inclusion of young people is critical to long-term peace and prosperity. Building on this understanding, Search devised an "innovative approach that combines and integrates elements of systems thinking,[7] collective impact,[8] positive youth development,[9] and asset-based development[10] into a locally led and locally owned "Collaborative."[11]

> The Collaborative not only aims to mitigate and prevent violence and marginalization but also seeks to create a healthy system of attitudes, relationships, processes, and structures that builds resilience to stresses and shocks. This prepares the community and private and public sector institutions to collaborate and respond to emergencies more effectively and efficiently, and helps sustain inclusive, positive peace and prosperity over the long term. — Concept note for the Collaborative

As articulated in Search's concept note for the Collaborative (quoted in the box above), as urban populations grow and become younger,[12] violence and social inequality and marginalization prevent cities from reaching their full economic potential. The total economic impact of violence to the world economy in 2016 was $14.3 trillion.[13] At the same time, economic progress tends to exclude ethnic minorities and religious groups facing discrimination,[14] and public trust in the institutions supporting and driving that progress — from government and business to NGOs and media — is also in crisis. Young people represent the largest generation the world has ever seen, with one in every six people falling between the ages of 15 and 24.[15]Yet they remain underrepresented and excluded from discourse and decision-making on issues that affect their lives. Countries with burgeoning youth populations typically view this demographic as a burden or a threat (also known as "youth bulge"), and often fail to activate their positive potential or respond to their needs. This is the same demographic that violent political and extremist groups often target for recruitment.

5 https://www.youth4peace.info/About_WGYPB
6 According to the UN Peacebuilding architecture review in 2010 and John Kania and Mark Kramer's 2011 article "Collective Impact" in the Stanford Social Innovation Review.
7 https://www.cdacollaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Conflict-Systems-Analysis-Benefits-and-Practical-Application.pdf.
8 https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/316071/Events/Multi-Day%20Events/Community%20Change%20Institute%20-%20CCI/2016%20CCI%20Toronto/CCI_Publications/Collective%20Impact%203.0%20Liz%20Weaver%20Mark%20Cabaj%20Paper.pdf.
9 http://www.youthpower.org/positive-youth-development-pyd-framework.
10 https://resources.depaul.edu/abcd-institute/publications/publications-by-topic/Documents/Bergdall%20-%20Reflections%20on%20the%20Catalytic%20Role%20of%20an%20Outsider%20in%20ABCD.pdf.
11 See "The Peace and Prosperity Collaborative" at https://Kompannavidiya.Search .org/peace-and-prosperity-collaborative/.
12 The UN-Habitat estimates that 60 percent of urban populations will be under the age of 18 by 2030.
13 Institute for Economics and Peace, "Global Peace Index 2017."
14 Overseas Development Institute and Danida, "Inclusive and sustainable development: challenges, opportunities, policies, and partnerships," 2012.
15 The UN Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2015 revision.

a. Country and location context: Jos North, Nigeria

Nigeria, oil-rich and the most populous sub-Saharan African country, has ongoing ethnic and religious conflicts. Nigeria is confronted by multiple security challenges, notably the resilient Boko Haram Islamist insurgency in the northeast, long-running discontent and militancy in the Niger Delta, increasing violence between herders and farming communities spreading from the central belt southward, and periodic resurfacing of separatist Biafra agitation in the southeast.[16] Since September 2017, at least 1,500 people have been killed, more than 1,300 of them from January to June 2018, an estimated six times the number of civilians killed by Boko Haram over the same period.[17] The ongoing violence and instability continue to undermine the country's economic development. The economic cost of violence in Nigeria for 2016 was $109.5 billion, or more than 11 percent of the country's GDP.[18]

Jos is the administrative capital of Plateau State, located in the Middle Belt of Nigeria, which is also regarded as central Nigeria, as it serves as a divide between the South and North. The roots of the region's conflict are hard to pinpoint, as they have political, economic, and resource-competition aspects, together with a religious dimension, and weak institutions and governance. This complexity, as reflected in the systems analysis conducted by the stakeholders, generates political and, more important, economic and social impacts, especially on the youth. Plateau State, at the time of beginning the pilot initiative, had been relatively peaceful in comparison with the violence of 2010 and 2015. However, since 2017, it has witnessed renewed confrontations between herders and farmers and reprisal attacks. According to reports gathered by the International Crisis Group, at least 75 people are claimed to have been killed, some 13,726 displaced, and 489 houses burned down, largely in the Bassa local government area, from September 8 to October 17, 2017.[19] The violence continued into 2018. According one research in July 2015, the Government of Plateau State, where interreligious violence is high, lost up to 75 percent of its potential tax revenue collection due to conflict, and farmer-herder conflicts in the Middle Belt prevent the region from gaining as much as $13.7 billion annually in macroeconomic progress.[20]

16 https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria
17 See ICG report and associated footnote on Boko Haram casualty rate. https://Kompannavidiya.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence.
18 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Peace Index Report 2017.
19 https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/262-stopping-nigerias-spiralling-farmer-herder-violence.
20 Mercy Corps, "The Economic Cost of Conflict: Evidence on violence, livelihoods, and resilience in Nigeria's Middle Belt," July 2015.

Between 2001 and 2017, the area has experienced periodic violence, most notably in 2001, 2008, and 2010, leading to the imposition of a state of emergency at both state- and local-government levels. The causes of conflict in Jos are not only related to economic and political control between predominantly Muslim Hausa-Fulani and the largely Christian Afizere, Anaguta, and Berom. The potential for violence also stems from the emergence of criminal gangs, known by different names, which operate in different localities. The activities of these groups are linked to drug peddling and abuse, rape, armed robbery, petty theft, and other forms of intimidation, and their targets are mostly young people between the ages of 13 and 35. The gangs are able to exercise power and control through their access to light weapons, which have been used during violence in the past, the resources generated through the sale of drugs, and the inability of weak state institutions to contain the situation.

The violent conflicts in Jos have led to mistrust among people and have weakened solidarity against violence and other drivers of conflict, making law enforcement challenging. Noncompliance with metropolitan development laws are a serious concern. Houses are built without planning permission from relevant authorities, and vendors set up shop on pedestrian and major roads. Enforcement agencies are often unable to enforce compliance due to fear of reprisals. This has resulted in expanded urban slums, thereby creating a conducive environment for criminal activities. Unemployment among youth contributes to the overall level of poverty in Jos North. The causes of unemployment include the following factors: a) Youth have acquired formal education but are unable to find suitable jobs; b) some with artisan skills are unable to find opportunities in the market to use those skills; and c) others have not had the opportunity to acquire skills that can result in income generation.

The system of social and economic exclusion, the level of violence, and the perceived sense of injustice acutely affect youth in Jos and over time contributes to their further marginalization and and increases their exposure to violence.

b. Country and location context: Kompannavidiya, Colombo, Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka historically benefited from its geographical position along the Silk Route and as a result, became a key export and import hub. Today, Sri Lanka is a lower-middle-income country of 21.4 million people with per capita GDP in 2017 of $4,065.[21] Since the civil war ended in 2009, the economy has grown on average at a rate of 5.8 percent a year.[22] The economy is transitioning from a predominantly rural-based economy toward a more urbanized economy, with towering skyscrapers and a changing urban landscape, thus putting enormous pressure especially on low-income urban populations. Sri Lanka boasts good socioeconomic and human development indicators, where extreme poverty is rare or is confined to small pockets, while a significant portion of the population sits slightly above the extreme poverty line.

Sri Lanka is home to diverse religious and ethnic groups as well as languages, and while this rich diversity is a source of great potential, it also fuels deep societal divisions. Nine years have passed since the end of the war. It is also three years since the new regime was voted into office on ambitious promises to improve the economy, eliminate corruption, restore the rule of law,

21 http://worldbank.org/en/country/srilanka/overview.
22 http://worldbank.org/en/country/srilanka/overview.

and address the legacy of war. Yet the potential prospects of peace and the promises of the new regime remain largely unrealized.[23] Despite some progress on accountability and political reconciliation, tensions and mistrust between ethnic communities and social classes remain volatile in several areas throughout the country.[24] Youth under 24 make up 40 percent of the population[25] and have been at the forefront of social and political movements and struggles throughout the country's history.

Kompannavidiya is a key neighborhood in the city of Colombo. Declared a "concentrated development zone" by the Urban Development Authority (UDA), which in the past few years has been at the center of much debate concerning large-scale infrastructure projects and large-scale (sometimes forced) evictions and relocation of urban poor.[26] Communities living in the area view the plans for rapid expansion with concern and fear of eviction, homelessness, and loss of income-generation opportunities, as well as loss of access to basic services and social connections. In addition to the geographic centrality that attracts market and state interests, the area is a dynamic social mix of multiple ethnic groups who mostly belong to urban lower-middle and poor classes who have, for the most part, coexisted peacefully.

Location Map



The UDA has a direct and heavy footprint in everyday life and with respect to questions of land ownership within the site. The Urban Regeneration Project, the Project Management Unit, and the Western Province Division of the UDA have a direct connection with the area through projects such as the Metro-Colombo Development project, the Colombo City Development Plan 2008–20, various city beautification projects, and the Western Region Megapolis Plan.[27] The UDA is tasked with providing guidelines and seeks to pave the way for investors to build on public and private land in the area. There are several ongoing and planned large-scale development projects led by the private sector in and around the area, mostly luxury hotels, apartment blocks, and office complexes.

23 https://crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/286-sri-lanka-s-transition-nowhere.
24 https://www.economist.com/asia/2018/03/08/anti-muslim-riots-in-sri-lanka-signal-a-new-social-fissure.
25 The UN Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2015 revision.
26 We Build Colombo Together, First Report. "Kompannyveedia (Slave Island) Case Study" by CEPA and Search.
27 We Build Colombo Together, First Report. "Kompannyveedia (Slave Island) Case Study" by CEPA and Search

Fear of large-scale evictions has been reported in the past, along with land grabbing from locals and a prevalence of land brokers acting with political clout. Apart from housing needs, this fear is caused by the unpredictability of access to income sources and services (health, education) in the new locations and the disruption of daily life and the social fabric of the community, including the loss of local networks. Under the strain of current economic performance, the government continues to seek investors interested in underutilized prime government lands. As a result, communities must deal with the powerful state and private sector. In this context, more collaborative and multi-stakeholder efforts would help foster peaceful relationships among stakeholders to effectively resolve conflicts.

5. OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NETWORKS

As mentioned previously, the two networks are in different stages of formation and vary with respect to consolidating their membership. Throughout this paper, references to the "coordinator" relate to the key staff at Search in Sri Lanka and Nigeria who are facilitating and mobilizing the networks. In both cases, the coordinators and Search are playing a convening role. Furthermore, there is a strong emphasis on the initiatives remaining locally owned and driven. Thus, Search and its staff identify themselves mostly as "insider-outsiders,"[28] especially since the coordinator in Jos is a local community member.

a. Jos Stakeholders Centre for Peace, Nigeria[29]

In 2017, Search recruited a community mobilizer with wide personal networks and trust within the community to drive an extensive consultation process. At the heart of this process were the notions, made explicit from the outset, that this was a stakeholder-owned process (bottom up) and that there was to be no significant funding attached to it; those engaged in it should be motivated by the desire to positively contribute to the situation in Jos North. Through an iterative process of identifying and engaging new stakeholders, the degree to which violence and exclusion affecting youth and how it manifests in Jos was identified to be a significant issue that needed to be addressed. It should be noted that the coordinator leveraged both the trust and reputation he held, and maintained the personal belief that this effort should not become "projectized." Rather, the stakeholders should be continuously and consistently engaged, so that they would recognize the need for such an initiative and jointly shape its trajectory.

The subsequent step brought together the stakeholders to participate in development of a shared systems-based analysis of the driving factors of violence as it relates to youth. The resulting analysis permitted the network members to identify entry points for intervention to positively affect the conflict dynamics. At this stage, the network also tried to identify groups whose voices had been excluded or ignored but could contribute to the network's mandate, to establish modes of information sharing among them and to formulate basic guiding principles that the group would adhere to, with a view to maintaining focus on the objectives of the initiative. In the spirit of collaboration and ownership, the product of the analysis process was taken back to the stakeholder groups (both those who participated in the analysis and those

28 Insiders usually live in the area, experience the conflict, and suffer its consequences personally, therefore are vulnerable to the conflict. They include activists and agencies from the area, local NGOs, governments, church groups, and local staff of outside or foreign NGOs and agencies. Outsiders choose to become involved in a conflict context. They may live in the setting for extended periods but can leave. Foreigners, members of the diaspora, and co-nationals from areas of a country not directly affected by violence are all seen as outsiders. More on the role of insiders and outsiders in conflict contexts can be found in RPP Handbook of 2014: http://local.conflictsensitivity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Reflecting_on_Peace_Practice.pdf.

29 The name of the network was developed by the members themselves at the later stage of registering as a nonprofit entity.

who had not) to share the findings and to get their additional input to refine the joint analysis. Through this process and a validation exercise, additional stakeholders were engaged and entry points for each organization involved were identified.

In the period since the analysis and the validation exercises were conducted, Jos has witnessed a sharp rise in violence and instability, largely associated with farmer-herder conflicts in parts of the state. Against this backdrop, at the time of writing this paper the network membership and structures had evolved and grown organically. Some challenges notwithstanding, the network has developed a formal structure, undertaken efforts to register as a legal entity, engaged in activities that de-escalate violence (in the current context), and sought to build trust among communities and between state and non-state actors.

The following list shows the scope of the stakeholders who were consulted and/or involved at different stages of the initiative, and who are involved in formal and informal capacities in the network.

Category	Actors
Community	Religious leaders Religious associations Community youth movements/associations Youth religious groups Vigilante Group of Nigeria *Consulted at a certain point but not active as members:* Community development leaders District heads/ward heads/tribal association leaders Appointed local government representatives
Civil Society	Community and faith-based organizations Human rights organizations Peacebuilding organizations Youth-focused and youth-led organizations Plateau Youth Council — Jos North National Association of Women Journalists Community Peace Partnerships (CPP) International Federation of Women Lawyers Plateau Peace Practitioners Network Women Peace & Security Network — Plateau State

Civil Society *(Continued)*	*Consulted at a certain point but not active members:* Nexus Funds representative (Nigeria field coordinator) Student Union Government — University of Jos
Academia	Centre for Conflict Management & Peace Studies — University of Jos Conflict Management Department — Plateau State Polytechnic Peace Training Centre — Jos *Consulted but not members:* Department of Sociology — University of Jos
Government	National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Department of State Security (DSS) National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) National Orientation Agency (NOA) Plateau Peacebuilding Agency (PPBA) Operation Rainbow (early warning security outfit) Nigeria Security & Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) Plateau State Ministry of Justice *Consulted at a certain point but not active as members:* Office of the Secretary to the state government Nigeria Police Force — Plateau State command Operation Safe Haven (joint security task force)
Private Sector	Nigeria Association of Small-Scale Industrialists Plateau Marketers & Traders Association National Union of Road Transport Workers — Jos division Petty Traders Association, Jos main market *Consulted at a certain point but not active as members:* Plateau Chamber of Commerce, mines and industry Market Women Association

b. We Build Colombo Together, Sri Lanka

In April 2017, the Search office in Sri Lanka, through internal team consultations, decided to tackle the issue of violence prevention in the urban setting of Colombo as its focus area for the Collaborative, called We Build Colombo Together (WBCT). Similar to the experience in Nigeria, the coordinator began by consulting individual key actors in the Kompannavidiya community, primarily religious leaders and community elders, leveraging his own religious and masculine identities, and residence in the vicinity. While the initial trust-building exercise enabled the coordinator and the team to identify other stakeholder groups, it quickly became apparent that there was a deep mistrust of external actors. This was driven by a combination of factors, including the perception of non-governmental organizations as organizations with vested interests — stemming from demonization of NGOs during the war in Sri Lanka — and/or as entities able to provide ready solutions. Many had also experienced unfair treatment by state institutions and/or encroachment by private sector actors. An added complexity was the need to deal with numerous government institutions that often coexisted with similar or, at times, unclear mandates. This complexity of issues prompted Search to commission deeper background research by a local think tank to inform the way forward.

Based on the findings of the research, the coordinator and other Search staff engaged in additional rounds of consultations with community groups, numerous government institutions, and private sector actors, many of whom had not had opportunities to hear each other's grievances, concerns, or plans (or wishes) for the future. As an initial step in bringing together this diverse group of actors, Search convened a first "public consultation" as an opportunity for stakeholders to meet each other, introduce Search's efforts and WBCT, gain clarity on the development plans for the area, and discuss concerns and priority issues for the various actors. The discussion focused on immediate needs that included housing and related infrastructure, safety and security, and economic development, based on prior consultations and background research. The Search team saw this public consultation as an important preliminary step for navigating the issues of trust, improving perceptions of others, and ensuring open dialogue among stakeholders. However, the different groups of stakeholders were not prepared or willing to openly discuss the concerns over competing interests, indicating the need for additional consultations with individual groups.

Building on the public consultation and additional ongoing bilateral consultations, Search and CDA facilitated a systems-based analysis workshop. The analysis focused primarily on the issue of housing and well-being, to develop a shared understanding of key drivers of the issue and to identify entry points to intervene positively to affect housing. The challenges of continuing mistrust and lack of participation by certain stakeholder groups notwithstanding, the shared analysis provided a starting point that would support further consultations and engagement with actors involved in Kompannavidiya particularly on housing and development issues.

The product that emerged from the joint analysis and the additional consultations prompted the team to further narrow the geographical scope of the initiative to the locality of Wekanda,[30] thus making it more manageable in the initial phase. Stakeholders who participated in the systems analysis reconvened to validate the findings and engaged a set of new stakeholders.

30 See locality map on page 16.

This space empowered pockets of actors to become proactive in refining the analysis, as well as to identify some short-term solutions — what they perceived to be easy to achieve for the problems faced by the community. It should be noted that while the range of stakeholders engaged in the validation exercise expanded to include some new actors, at the same time, government participation declined, especially at the mid-level and in terms of the range of actors playing a role in housing and urban development issues.

At the time of gathering data and reflections for this paper, following staffing changes, the Search team began the process of reengaging the stakeholders, mainly community groups, government institutions, the private sector, and civil society organizations. The aim of this renewed consultation was to reestablish trust, generate visibility for bottom-up consultative urban development planning, identify and complete "quick-win" activities, and identify champions within different stakeholder groups. Over the long term, WBCT aims to find alternative ways for urban planning in Sri Lanka to reframe the conflict between developers and residents as an opportunity to address deeper issues of marginalization of urban communities. It is hoped that with this aim and approach, the diverse stakeholders involved in Wekanda and Kompannavidiya will, over time, shift from confrontational to collaborative and consultative approaches to meeting their needs.

The following is an indicative list of the stakeholders consulted and involved in different stages of the WBCT to date.

Category	Actors
State Institutions	Urban Development Authority/Megapolis National Housing Development Authority Colombo Municipal Council Divisional Secretariat/Grama Niladhari (local-level administrative bodies) Sri Lanka Land Reclamation & Development Corporation National Dangerous Drugs Control Board Police
Community	Masjid Federation Artists Community Development Councils Tenement representatives Women, children, and youth residing in the community Religious leaders

Market Actors	Shangri-la hotel chain John Keells Foundation John Keells Holdings Nations Trust Bank Surrounding small businesses in the area Paint companies
Civil Society	Centre for Poverty Analysis The Asia Foundation Scholars and policy experts Community mobilizers

6. ONGOING LEARNING

The following section does not provide comprehensive information on what and how the five core conditions[31] of the Framework were met or not met. Instead it attempts to extract lessons from such efforts to identify what aspects of the dimensions were useful, how they were adapted to suit the context, and what could have been done differently. The key lessons and some crosscutting lessons are captured in the subsequent section. Because the network in Nigeria is somewhat more advanced, relative to the network in Sri Lanka, throughout this section more information about Nigeria is presented to provide perspectives on how the network is operating.

a. Motivation

For Search, the desire to utilize a collective impact model to meet the needs of youth, particularly as they relate to violence, emerged from a process of strategic review and from the experience of using similar methodology in the Inter-Agency Working Group on Youth and Peacebuilding. Both in Nigeria and Sri Lanka, the Collaborative seeks to engage young people as partners and co-leaders, instead of as beneficiaries, victims, or threats, in addressing the causes of violence, exclusion, and marginalization in partnership with other stakeholders.

For this lessons paper, a cross-section of the stakeholders interviewed in Jos North attributed their motivation and inspiration for engaging in this new process to their genuine desire for peace. A wide variety of stakeholders came together with different experience, expertise and perspectives for this locally driven, problem-solving initiative. This is remarkable, given that there was no clear road map for action at the outset and no significant funding allocated to the initiative. There is a shared recognition that proactive action is necessary to mitigate violence and conflict, even if the network cannot completely prevent it. There is also, at this stage, a shared belief that injecting the initiative with large amounts of external funding might undermine the peacebuilding efforts.

> ***"I am not motivated by money in the job but by the desire for voluntary service to support my society and the need to help others to do the same."***
>
> — Coordinator, Jos

In Kompannavidiya, the information available indicates less of a natural inclination to readily engage in participatory processes such as WBCT. Instead, most stakeholders required additional effort (in comparison with Nigeria) to recognize the potential value. For example, in general, the community members were interested in participating to gain clarity on the status of different development projects and their potential impacts on the community. However, the government stakeholders appreciated the facilitated space for dialogue between government

31 Collective and emergent understanding; collective Intention and action; collective learning and adaptive management; continuous communication and accountability; sufficient support structures.

and the community, while private sector actors identified the opportunities for dialogue toward cooperation on infrastructure projects and to scale up their corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects as incentives.

As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, and articulated as Fundamental Principles in the Framework, at the core of the Collaborative is the belief that the impetus and ownership for the Collaborative must rest with **local actors and organizations** and that it must be a **bottom-up process.** This was embodied in the way the facilitators related to the networks, the role they played in supporting and guiding the networks, and how transparent they were in their **motivation**. In Jos North, particular attention was paid to ensuring no single person or organization was able to exercise power and control; instead every decision was participatory in nature. In Kompannavidiya, enabling local ownership was more challenging due to the level of mistrust (caused largely by past traumatic experiences and memories of forced evictions) between the various stakeholders, existing gaps in information on development plans, the urgency with which the community needed its immediate needs met, and Search's identity as an I/NGO. This also meant that continuous communication with each stakeholder group was needed to reiterate the purpose of the initiative, its benefits, and Search's intentions.

b. Joint and emerging understanding of the conflict

The process of conducting the systems analysis exercise to find the shared understanding of the conflict in Nigeria was helpful in bringing together different actors with different perspectives to jointly identify the key driving factors for violence affecting youth in Jos North. It served as a useful confidence-building process in a context where there exists a perception of saturation of aid-driven activities. The tool of systems analysis widened the groups' perspectives and helped recognize the interconnectedness and the importance of some aspects that were previously ignored. In a large and diverse community such as Jos North, arriving at a common understanding is difficult, and with more time, a much more nuanced understanding with granular details could have been developed.

Conflict analyses provide a snapshot in time of the conflict, and do not represent the way in which these dynamics manifest from one day to another, as seen in Jos. The stakeholders felt a sense of urgency to move from analysis to action, both to respond to the emerging needs on the ground and to build on the momentum created within the group to act collectively, although the network members needed additional support to transition from analysis to action. However, with encouragement and guidance from the coordinator, the network found natural entry points for action.

In this regard, conflict analysis served its purpose as a pathway to create a shared understanding of the conflict, a common vision, and identification of who was best placed to respond to it and how. Moving forward, in the short to medium term, the process of maintaining a joint and emerging understanding of the conflict will take the form of regular meetings of the members and leadership group (steering committee), issue-specific or role-specific subcommittees, as well as the use of communication and social media channels, such as carefully moderated WhatsApp and Facebook groups.

Spotlight: The network in Jos uses the WhatsApp platform as an information-gathering and communication tool for understanding conflict dynamics and to address gaps in communication. Reports of violence, both confirmed and unconfirmed, are shared and discussed regularly. For specific events, committees are set up to look into them. For example, when Sara-suka[32] group (an organized crime group) engaged in violence and property damage in 2018, members of the network nominated a committee on WhatsApp, held a meeting, and then set up a subcommittee to find out more and develop a report on how network members could intervene. The report also developed a blueprint for recognizing, through appreciation events, the efforts by communities to resist and de-escalate violence. (For example: In a particular farmer-herder conflict, a Muslim community resisted reprisal attacks.)

In Sri Lanka, the three joint exercises — the initial public consultation, the systems analysis, and the validation exercise — were seen as useful activities in setting up the network. The initial research commissioned by Search produced very similar findings to the systems analysis. However, the stakeholder-centered effort to develop the shared analysis was helpful, not only in bringing the stakeholders to the table but also in developing, to some extent, a shared understanding, recognizing the interconnectedness of issues at play and providing the space for different stakeholders to be heard. The process also helped build ownership and reminded people to exercise their agency. Nevertheless, the level of impact of this process on different stakeholder groups varied due to the reasons presented below.

The lack of a shared understanding across the different sectors of members (for example state versus community), based on their expectations, priorities, and mandates, was a challenge to the emergence of a common agenda/intention or action. In a highly polarized context, such as Kompannavidiya, characterized by mistrust and ambiguity toward the involvement of outsiders (politically motivated actors, land brokers, etc.), the analysis needed to be carefully facilitated to avoid people listening and responding only to what resonated with their fears, concerns, and perceptions. In this regard, the attempt to conduct a systems analysis over a short period of time was not conducive to building trust and opening dialogue. Recognizing the need to prioritize process (enabling dialogue, trust, and shared understanding of the issues) over the delivery of a product (the analysis), the conflict analysis exercise was adapted throughout its course, to place greater emphasis on dialogue over developing the most accurate or refined analysis.

In the context of Sri Lanka, the systems analysis was repeatedly delayed in order to build sufficient trust and ensure readiness among the group before the stakeholders were brought together for the workshop. Nevertheless, the assumption that stakeholders engaged in WBCT would readily think and act collectively proved to be a major obstacle. In hindsight, the team underestimated the amount of time and effort it would require to prepare each group before interacting with one another. . This could have been overcome by dedicating more time at the outset to jointly developing a greater purpose or vision that transcended all stakeholder groups, by individually preparing them to think and act collectively before they were brought together as a collective.

Both networks faced the following dilemmas to varying degrees:

- **Inclusivity** is a key consideration that was and still is achieved by ongoing consultation and bringing on board new stakeholders. However, it has been a challenge to determine when the network has obtained the buy-in of "sufficient" groups or organizations to work toward a shared peacebuilding agenda. In Kompannavidiya, this dilemma to a large extent was

32 Sara-suka is an organized crime group that operates in different areas of Jos North and Kaduna State. It mostly operates in the night and in groups, victimizing, intimidating, and terrorizing people.

driven by the need for Search to remain (and be seen as) a neutral actor, and to ensure there is enough trust within the group to move to the next stage of WBCT's work. The consideration for potential risks (reputational and excluding groups) of "starting too soon" without enough actors on board was more important than beginning with a "sufficient" group of actors. In Jos North, this dilemma was less prominent, and JSCP was able to begin working collectively more quickly. In hindsight, the time that was used to ensure inclusivity and participation by different actors contributed to the organic growth of JSCP. Both networks struggled to integrate youth participation and leadership until recently, in part due to social and cultural perceptions on the role of youth in decision-making and in part because there were not specific efforts to ensure their inclusion.

- The Framework discusses the need for collective efforts to be motivated by a sense of the **importance** of the issues, and the **durability** and **sustainability** ***of the initiative,*** over "urgency." In both Jos North and in Kompannavidiya, the most important issues were selected through initial consultations and shared analysis, since durability and sustainability of efforts has been a clear consideration for how the Collaborative would operate. However, in Kompannavidiya, acting on the urgent needs faced by one of the stakeholder groups (the community) was critical to breaking some of the impasse experienced in WBCT. Although they were short term and transitory, these urgent needs are key to addressing the drivers of conflict in Kompannavidiya. Similarly, in Jos North, the JSCP tackles violent incidents that are not necessarily only related to youth, as it sees the need for urgency with which addressing them will have an impact on youth.
- Search, the members of both networks, and CDA have had to remind themselves of the need to adapt the approach to allow for **incremental building** of the collective action. In an environment of bottom-up coalition building, extensive consultation, and the absence of externally imposed deadlines and reporting requirements, different actors, including Search and CDA, needed to be reminded and reassured of the need for flexibility to change the approach, reconfigure the membership, adjust the scope of peacebuilding ambition, and pause when needed. Based on the Framework, it was unclear when either Search, as an outsider, or the network members themselves could decide that the network is no longer a viable entity — to make a **"go/no-go" decision.** Nor is it clear how such a decision would be made. Due to the need to dedicate a generous amount of time at the beginning of the process to build these networks, determining a set of markers to guide the process at the outset of a go/no-go decision would have been useful. Search used other Collective Impact resources to develop its own markers for making internal go/no-go decisions.

c. Details of collective intention and action, and space for learning and adaptive management

Understandably, this aspect of the collective impact model is still emerging in both networks. In Jos North, the collective intention is broadly defined as addressing the issue of a culture of violence and the associated issue of substance abuse. A consultative process through the Steering Committee (more on this in the section below on continuous communication and accountability) determines the actions to be taken by the network as a collective body. As a new network with few resources and little experience working collectively for violence prevention, taking an incremental approach of trying one solution or entry point, assessing its

effectiveness, and then either repeating or adapting as needed, has proven to be a helpful way to navigate the complexities. This is the essence of **adaptive management**. The network continues to organize and design activities in ways that leverage members' areas of expertise, thereby addressing the issues from multiple perspectives. The facilitative role played by the coordinator as an insider has been an important contributing factor, as he guides the process and provides a "sounding board" in defining the scope of interventions, determining how realistic they are, and helping the group clarify what they want to achieve.

> *"Act as a shepherd and, at times, as devil's advocate."*
>
> — Coordinator, Jos

Independently, the constituent organizations have the freedom to act within their mandates, using existing resources to address the issues highlighted within the network. For example, following the systems analysis, the Federation of Women Lawyers incorporated new activities into its annual work plan, including a peace component (specifically the issues of violence, peaceful behavior, and substance abuse), during its annual career awareness visits to secondary and high schools.

For Sri Lanka, in contrast, attempting to establish collective intention and action through balanced ethnic and religious representation of the community in Kompannavidiya, together with the involvement of a cross-section of state and private sector actors, did not immediately yield the intended results. The attempt to establish collective intention did not transcend the existing fault lines and mistrust. It is clear that the stakeholders did not readily recognise the meaning and value of collective action, which is an assumption the Search team could have assessed at the outset of the work in Kompannavidiya.

> *"Indecisiveness and ambiguity is part of the process of building a common agenda. We cannot control all parts of the process or the work of all the actors."*
>
> — Coordinator, Colombo

Furthermore, it is challenging to establish broader or more generic collective action while immediate needs remain unacknowledged or unaddressed — in this case, the urgent needs, concerned fears, and uncertainty regarding development projects and what that means to residents in the area who fear eviction. Any attempts to project ahead were seen as unnecessary and nonresponsive to local needs, and it was, therefore, harder to create a movement around such future-oriented plans. It was also hard to ignore the impact of Search's identity as an outsider and as an I/NGO, where there have been hostile or unfavorable views toward I/NGOs in the past. This dynamic presented a challenge for Search in facilitating a collective impact model and identifying roles for different stakeholders. In Kompannavidiya, there is general recognition across all stakeholders that any development activity should be led by the state. Therefore, there is a clear need for state buy-in and leadership in shaping WBCT's peacebuilding agenda, establishing the strategy, and consequently developing mutually reinforcing activities.

The need for and the extent to which **vertical and horizontal linkages** have been built has varied between the two networks. In Jos, there have been horizontal (strongly observed across civil society organizations) and vertical linkages with business and government actors. It deliberately engaged the government institutions and the business community with the view to inform, influence, and build on the mandate and work of all the stakeholders. In Kompannavidiya, the process of building vertical linkages made apparent the need to place equal emphasis on building horizontal linkages within the community, the state institutions, and the private sector. All three stakeholder groups had uneasy relationships within themselves as well

as with other groups. For example, within the community group, discussions did not immediately transcend ethnic lines, there were few signs of the various state institutions collaborating outside of WBCT-facilitated discussions, and the CSR teams of private companies continued to work in silo. In general, there was little discussion outside of WBCT-facilitated events and consultations.

d. Extent of continuous communication and accountability

In the absence of donor requirements for compliance, stakeholders in Jos North recognize the need for strong accountability downward to the community and the constituencies they represent, as well as laterally to their peers and members of the network.

> *"I have a responsibility to share information and represent the voice of the people whom I represent. At any point I begin to project my own voice and personal interest, I have automatically failed to be accountable."*
>
> — Stakeholder in Jos

Members also associate accountability with the mandate of the network by expecting members to respect the group ethics, vision, and legal mandate. Transparency emerged as an integral part of accountability — for example, provision of timely information to all members and ensuring equal opportunity to take decisions. Accountability also includes maintaining opportunities for members to provide feedback to other members. Furthermore, the opportunity for everyone to make decisions within the network helps the network to become more accountable to its members and the purpose it serves. The fact that almost none of the interviews with the members revealed any reference to accountability to Search indicates the level of success in ensuring that this is a locally led process.

Spotlight: Accountability is built on transparency and trust. Following an outbreak of violence in Jos in 2018, through the establishment of a committee, Muslim members embarked on a fact-finding mission to investigate the Muslim community. The outcome of the mission and the report was similar to the one produced by the security agency. This further built confidence in the network by the members that the network can work beyond individual identities and interests toward a shared goal.

The continuous communication in Jos takes place primarily through the WhatsApp group created for this network, which allows members to access important information. The Search coordinator (along with the secretary of the Steering Committee) is the administrator of the group and, in this capacity, clarifies the information shared. If any red flags are raised with regard to the type of information shared, it is then taken up bilaterally with the member involved. This access to information, the emphasis on verification, and the role of the moderator in ensuring accountability following basic guiding principles (adopted during the systems analysis) has helped build confidence among the members and improve overall communication and group dynamics. The network's Facebook page and Twitter accounts are intended to highlight the work of the network and individual members, to demonstrate collective intention to the public and to avoid its work being manipulated or perceived negatively by outsiders.

Currently in Kompannavidiya, communications and accountability function very differently than in Jos North. There appears to be communication among and between stakeholder groups in spaces that are facilitated by Search. However, there is little evidence that communication continues when Search is not brokering the conversation. There is, however, trust in the

Search coordinator built on an incremental and at times transactional basis. For example, she has brokered relationships beyond the immediate requirements of WBCT and sourced information for different parties. The group follows what could be defined as an "unwritten social contract," but beyond this, it is challenging to demonstrate that accountability mechanisms are in place.

e. Details of the architecture of support structures, and its merits ("backbone" support)

Given the emphasis placed on local ownership of both WBCT and JSCP, the development of a backbone structure has been deliberately slow. In Jos, the role of the network coordinator can, to some extent, be seen as providing backbone organization. However, it is clear to the network that he is not Search staff, and instead is a youth and social mobilizer working on behalf of Search. The coordinator and Search made it clear from the outset that Search is only facilitating the gathering of local actors, and that it is not a donor or a permanent backbone organization. At the time of data gathering for this paper, the network had begun the process of registering as a legal nonprofit organization under the name Jos Stakeholder Centre for Peace.

The leadership model consists of five members nominated from different sectors (business, government, civil society, community, and academia), who are responsible for moving the network's collective agenda and action forward. Within the leadership group, the roles of coordinator, secretary, treasurer, and two other members are assigned by the members of the network during a general meeting. The term of the leadership body is initially six months, and when members are not performing to the satisfaction of others, there is a mechanism that allows for a natural transition for revolving leadership roles. There are two standing subcommittees: one performing research and the other addressing issues arising from the activities of Sara-suka. The network is also discussing an additional mechanism of an advisory team, to which the leadership would be ultimately accountable. The network members have the freedom to develop sub-movements on any of the issues identified as key driving factors of conflict in Jos.

In Sri Lanka, Search has been required to drive the process so far. It continues to broker relationships between stakeholders, to work toward dispelling mistrust and to inspire them to become active members of WBCT.

7. KEY LESSONS LEARNED

Key lessons learned: Extent to which there is joint and emerging understanding of the conflict.

- In polarized contexts, investing time and resources in motivating and sustaining engagement with a variety of stakeholders is a precondition for ensuring their active involvement. This also requires staff with an appropriate skill set for convening and building consensus among disparate groups (engaging private sector actors often requires a different skill-set than engaging community members). External actors and facilitators must be prepared to invest significant time and resources at the beginning, and throughout the process, to build trust before reaching a joint understanding of the conflict and creating a shared vision. In this regard, the flexibility of not having predetermined timelines as well as building the capacity and confidence of facilitators will lend well to the need to be adaptive.
- It is important to prioritize process over product when developing a shared understanding of the conflict while not compromising the quality of the analysis. Furthermore, the shared analysis is an instrument for developing a shared vision or understanding. Stakeholders and any outsiders facilitating the process must connect the intellectual exercise of the analysis with the more human question of "Now, how do we take action?" — thus "connecting the head and the heart." As seen in Jos North, humanizing the needs and the solutions helped build a stronger joint vision for what needed to be addressed.
- Linked to the above, co-creating a bold joint vision for the network (after taking into account political and security sensitivities) can help create a sense of unity that supersedes the divisions and tensions that have previously prevented the stakeholders from working together. Opportunities for visibility, and a sense of excitement and achievement (a "buzz" around the initiative) are also helpful in building a coalition. Highlighting the role of different stakeholders toward the collective action and agenda helps create ownership, momentum, and visibility and enables them to exercise their agency. These are particular roles for outsiders, facilitators, donors, and/or backbone organizations.
- It is important to recognize that insiders to a context understand conflict and violence differently, largely based on how it affects them on a day-to-day basis. In some places a shared (and generic) understanding of violence prevention can be reached with relative ease (as in Jos North), while in other places the language of conflict, violence, and peacebuilding is difficult to relate to and comes with historically negative connotations that could lead to further divisions between stakeholders (as in Kompannavidiya). It is important to choose context-specific language for collective action that resonates with all stakeholders.
- Generating a shared and emerging understanding of the conflict need not start with analysis. In many cases, an important first step is for spaces of small intra-group and inter-group exchanges to positively affect the perception of the different stakeholders and perspectives of the drivers of conflict.

Key lessons learned: Details of collective intention and action, and space for learning and adaptive management

- Maintain a flexible approach and avoid predetermining activities and interventions that are guided by an outsider, a donor, or a program document. This supports the ability to respond and adapt to emerging needs and to work collectively and collaboratively across the network. However, outsiders must also be prepared to support rapid unplanned actions taken by the networks in response to emerging conflict needs, even if the network has not yet explicitly articulated its agenda. This will help the network remain relevant and influence the conflict dynamics.
- In terms of government and private sector stakeholders, securing buy-in at the senior level followed by participation of (at a minimum) mid-level officials with some degree of decision-making capacity facilitates joint action and the space for shared learning. Engagement with state actors also requires dedicating time and staffing resources by the facilitators, donors, and/or backbone organizations to ensure consistency and continuity through turnover at these institutions. When dealing with institutions with clear hierarchies, it should not be assumed that information about the network and its activities is shared across the different levels of the organization. Instead, communication with such entities should be deliberate, continuous, and consistent.
- Partnering with other civil society organizations that have credibility and technical expertise in strengthening the capacities of different institutions, in particular state institutions within existing legal and administrative frameworks, is a useful strategy — for example, in this case The Asia Foundation in Sri Lanka.
- In polarized contexts where stakeholders do not readily view the problems through a similar lens, providing safe spaces for building trust, and, more importantly empathy is key to bringing people together, developing joint understanding, and enabling actors to generate a shared peacebuilding agenda. Furthermore, highlighting the common challenges faced by all of the actors and demonstrating the value of collective action in addressing these challenges is key to progress.
- Networks and outsiders should be mindful that it is not only network-wide actions that matter. The network's collective action is complemented by the members' individual actions, which contribute to the common intention.

Key lessons learned: Extent of continuous communication and accountability

- While a locally led, loosely organized network recognizes its lines of accountability to be with its members and the communities they serve, this needs to be balanced with institutional processes, such as documentation or reporting the work that is carried out. This allows the members to maintain trust in the network and its work, maintain institutional memory, and assist in establishing a track record, especially for the purposes of fundraising in the future.
- Internet-based communication is recognized as enormously helpful in maintaining relationships and sharing critical information, particularly when communities are segregated from one another, as is often the case in areas of conflict. However, this should be balanced with in-person meetings and sharing of experience and reflections. Online platforms do not provide reflective spaces, which are necessary as the networks grow and undertake

more complex activities. Furthermore, when choosing communication methods, different groups' receptiveness and the ability to use a method within technological and institutional constraints must be considered. For example, in Sri Lanka, most of the community group responded best to phone and in-person conversations (which also has time implications), and the youth used WhatsApp; the private sector actors largely relied on emails and text messages; and the government actors expected hard copies of letters and written instructions from their supervisors.

- Robust information channels and spaces for communication are critical for reaching collective impact. However, careful consideration must be placed on preventing some groups from using this space to further individual or group agendas. Furthermore, allowing or providing the space for divisive speech within the networks can further damage relationships between groups that are beginning to come together, and in society in general.
- As with all peacebuilding initiatives, selection and representation of network members and leadership groups should actively seek to inhibit groups or individuals from exercising power, privilege and control, thereby replicating societal divisions.

Key lessons learned: Backbone organization

- Meetings held by the outsider/donor/backbone organization with stakeholders who are not part of the network (in this case, senior government officials and experts), in an attempt to influence policies that will create an enabling environment for the network, should be communicated to the network. These are valuable sources of energy that help maintain momentum. In dealing with institutions with clear hierarchies, it should not be assumed that information about the networks and its activities are shared across the levels; communications with such entities should be deliberate, continuous, and consistent.
- Facilitating communication is not the sole responsibility of the outsider/donor/backbone organization. The importance of and the responsibility to effectively communicate about their own roles and responsibilities must be internalized in each network member's organization from the outset.
- As outsiders to the process, donors, facilitators, and backbone organizations should be mindful of perception management and their own identity to ensure not to be associated with or perceived to be taking positions with any single stakeholder.
- Members of the backbone organization and/or the facilitators coming from the locality, in other words being insiders, is more effective in understanding the context, interpersonal and power dynamics among the stakeholders as well as in establishing trust and access to different actors. It lends credibility to the initiative and helps to grow the network more organically.

8. CROSSCUTTING LESSONS LEARNED

Apart from the lessons learned under the Framework's five core conditions for collective impact in peacebuilding, this section captures some of the crosscutting lessons that cannot be placed under any one of the core conditions or the underlying principles.

In the context of NGO fatigue, a lack of constructive communication, or mistrust among stakeholders, those initiating a collective effort must undertake extensive bilateral and small-group consultations at the early stages, to create a bold shared vision for the future among individual groups. This ongoing consultative process, driven by values of local ownership, transparency, and accountability, helps to generate interest in trying something new, even if the road ahead is unclear.

For the external actors facilitating such a process (whether as a backbone organization or as donors or supporters of the process), a robust conceptual understanding of the issues being tackled by the network is key. In addition, the ability to take a macro look at the issues and actors at play, and leveraging private connections held by key staff to build momentum and influence the trajectory are helpful ways that can increase the effectiveness of their role. Visible, tangible quick-win activities that meet the immediate needs of stakeholders (small-scale infrastructure, training opportunities, access to information, brokering of relationships), in addition to being incentives for collective action, go a long way to build confidence and to support coalition building and ensure sustainability. Leveraging both the private connections and the resources available within the (emerging) network is a possible opportunity to materialize the quick-win activities.

Encountering challenges (internally and externally) and adapting the approach when attempting a new mode of working in dynamic conflict contexts is natural and to be expected. Internally, the facilitating organization(s) must maintain clear lines of communication and provide support for key staff as they undertake an iterative process of building a network that does not follow standard project-cycle templates. This process of developing a network may at times appear not to be yielding results. To address these challenges, there should be staffing and financial resources (even at a minimal level) available, along with strong internal support systems for long-term engagement to bring together diverse groups of actors, some with competing interests.

Ethnic, religious, gender, and insider-outsider identities of the organizations and staff involved are key factors in determining the extent to which they can effectively play the roles of convener, facilitator, backbone, or enabler/supporter. As seen in Sri Lanka, the (I/NGO and outsider) identity may impede the ability to play a convener role and may be seen as contradicting the commitment to promoting a locally driven and owned process. Measures should be in place to manage this dichotomy and to manage any fallout from it.

Building the leadership within the network should be an organic process, where the convener/outsider can and should play a facilitative role in ensuring transparency, fairness, and accountability. The leadership should be dynamic, be able to inspire the membership, and have the confidence of the membership.

There is recognition within Search and CDA, as organizations that have attempted to facilitate the creation of collective impact networks, that the approach of the organization and the ability of key staff involved to embody the values of collective impact is perhaps the single most important factor in mobilizing diverse groups of actors, especially at early stages. Collective impact framework requires one to think outside of the restrictive confines of a project mindset and to persevere through competing interests and positions. The organization and the staff must be able to speak the language of different actors and find "hooks" and incentives that interest them in working together. In other words, the team should be nimble enough to adapt its approach in relation to each stakeholder and unfolding dynamics.

In addition to the issues of trust building and transparency, as well as the "quick-win" discussed above, sustaining the network involves ensuring durability and inclusivity. Additional strategies include (1) frequently and openly recognizing the work of the members; (2) continuously promoting local ownership; and (3) incentivizing collaboration without the promise of funding. The ability to function independently from the beginning is important for a new network, to create a shared agenda and to maintain momentum towards that agenda. However, as outsiders and enablers, those facilitating the formation of the network have an important role to play in carefully managing this process to ensure creativity while maintaining focus.

9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The existence of peacebuilding networks and consortia is not a new phenomenon. The Collective Impact in Peacebuilding —Testing a New Framework Project and these particular engagements in Nigeria and Sri Lanka, shed light on the key lessons learned through bringing together diverse stakeholders toward a shared peacebuilding goal, which is expected, eventually, to make an impact at the PWL level.

The lessons learned and potential recommendations for practitioners, policy makers, and donors interested in supporting collective approaches are presented throughout this paper. A few issues that are worth highlighting as recommendations for any actors in future efforts in this area are set out below. (These should be viewed in conjunction with the lessons discussed in Sections 7 and 8.)

- Network coordinators and facilitators and facilitators should internalize and embody the values of local ownership, collaboration, and collective action that should guide the ways that they relate to the network and its members.
- Resources should be made available for extensive intra-group mobilization efforts to help think and act together, to understand the usefulness of collective action, before bringing stakeholders together. Expertise and resources should also be considered for guiding the stakeholders in how to work together.
- Collective impact efforts, especially at the inception stage, should be given flexibility to try new approaches, adapt, and convene without the restrictions of log frames and set project deliverables. The traditional project management and communication practices, such as monthly and quarterly targets, action plans and newsletters, seem to be less productive.
- Developing shared analysis should be recognized as a valuable process as well as a product. While the use of systems methodology is useful, in contexts fraught with competing interests and perceptions, intra-group analysis exercises followed by a joint analysis are likely to be more effective. This intra-group analysis should focus on a common agenda for that group before developing a common agenda across multiple groups.
- Strategies for ensuring momentum (through quick-win activities and available resources for it), sustained participation by actors with some degree of decision-making ability, and expectation management should be considered from the outset.
- The role and identity of facilitators and outsiders involved should be given careful consideration, and strategies should be in place to manage them proactively. Similarly, the perception that outsiders may be co-opted by certain stakeholders is a real challenge. Means for ensuring transparency in relationships, decisions taken, reasons for delays, and compromises made along the way would help manage this.

The one lesson that stands out from the two experiences is that there is no one-size-fits-all model in developing collective impact networks or in the strategies to be used. Collective impact efforts must be grounded in the local context, harness the desire for change, build on good relationships, and support the work of champions at the local level.

ANNEX 1:

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ANNEX 2

Key Lines of Inquiry for the Interviews

Extent to which there is joint & emerging understanding of the conflict	How is the joint initiative conceived? What was the motivation for collective action? There was a joint conflict analysis conducted at the outset. How useful was this to generating a shared understanding of the issues and as a process of coming together? How else could this have been achieved? In the future, what are the ways in which you can ensure the different network members have shared understanding of emerging dynamics? To what extent did the understanding/framing of the conflict change following the joint analysis?
Details of collective intention & action	What and how is the peacebuilding outcome articulated? What is the scope of activities by individual network members (description and details of activities)? How were these decisions made? What process or processes are undertaken to develop network-wide strategies? How do individual network members (organizations) ensure this strategy is in line with their own organizational strategies or vision? How does the network ensure that the activities are mutually reinforcing? Where relevant, what progress toward the peacebuilding outcome has been made to date? How is this/will it be measured? What key lessons and insights can be shared for future endeavors?
Space for and details of collective learning & adaptive management within the network	How does the network ensure it is learning from its engagements and activities? Are there any formal and informal learning spaces available within the network? Does the network or individual organizations/members seek regular feedback from each other? How is the learning used to adapt the initiative or plans made? What key lessons and insights can be shared for future endeavors?

Extent of continuous communication & accountability	What types of communication system(s) exist within the network to ensure free flow of information? What significant challenges and successes have been encountered? How is accountability understood by the networks and network members? If/how do the network members hold each other accountable, and accountable to their constituency?
Details or the architecture of support structures, and its merits ("backbone" support)	How is the network set up? What is the architecture of it? How was this decision made? How does the architecture contribute to/hinder the progress toward the specific peacebuilding goal? Is there a backbone (main/lead) organization? How was it identified? What are the desirable attributes of this backbone organization? What kind of vertical and horizontal linkages exist within the network? Where relevant, how does the architecture support/hinder fundraising efforts? What key lessons and insights can be shared for future endeavors?
What other factors have supported the successful setting up and operationalizing of the network?	
What issues and barriers were encountered in setting up and operationalizing, and how did groups try to overcome them?	
Where both "insiders" and "outsiders" (SFCG, CDA, private sector organizations) were involved, what dynamics were observed? How were those relationships managed? Are there any insights from how issues of power, privilege, and control played out within the network?	
How is longer-term commitment by the network maintained? What drives (incentivizes) the network members to stay engaged (durability, sustainability issues)?	
Inclusivity: How has the network ensured inclusivity from the outset — having a coalition of actors working toward a common agenda? What scope exists for new members to join and existing ones to phase out?	