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CANADA
CANADA CANCELS F-35 ... Tariff Point | Jimmy Kimmel

Trump COLLAPSES When Canada CANCELS The $12 Billion F-35 Fighter Jet Deal


Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Prpht1UbgmY
1 MIN AGO: Trump COLLAPSES When Canada CANCELS The $12 Billion F-35 Fighter Jet Deal | Jimmy Kimmel

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Dec 21, 2025

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1 MIN AGO: Trump COLLAPSES When Canada CANCELS The $12 Billion F-35 Fighter Jet Deal | Jimmy Kimmel

Just moments ago, the political and economic balance shifted when Canada signaled the cancellation of its $12 billion F-35 fighter jet deal with the United States. In this calm, analytical breakdown, Jimmy Kimmel walks you through why this decision matters far beyond military hardware. From trade leverage and sovereignty to supply chains and everyday economic pressure, Jimmy Kimmel explains how power is quietly exercised between allies. This isn’t about jets—it’s about dependence, control, and consequences. Watch as Jimmy Kimmel connects policy to real life, helping you slow down and see what headlines miss. If you value clarity over noise, this conversation with Jimmy Kimmel is for you. Stay thoughtful with Jimmy Kimmel.
  • 00:00 — Opening: A Quiet Christmas Warning
  • 02:35 — Trump Calls Canada the “51st State”
  • 05:50 — The U.S. Economic Shock: 290,000 Jobs at Risk
  • 10:45 — Canada Turns to Sweden & the Gripen E
  • 13:55 — Denmark’s Precedent & Canada’s Historic Choice
#jimmykimmel#jimmykimmellive#presidenttrump #donaldtrump #economy
  • More video: • Trump Faces COLLAPSE as U.S. Tomatoes ROT ...
  • Popular videos: • Trump Faces COLLAPSE as U.S. Tomatoes ROT ...
  • Contact Email:soljad123@gmail.com

Peter Burgess COMMENTARY



Peter Burgess
Transcript
  • 0:15
  • Locked in a trade fight with Donald
  • Trump, you may have heard that the Carne
  • government is reconsidering its
  • multi-billion dollar purchase of
  • American F-35 fighter jets.
  • The F-35 acquisition project continues.
  • Canada had agreed to buy 88 of these
  • fighter jets from the US to replace its
  • aging CF-18 fleet.
  • Merry Christmas. I hope you're spending
  • this moment in peace. I'm Jimmy Kimmel
  • and before we move forward, I want you
  • to pause with me and take a closer look
  • at what's really happening beneath the
  • headlines. Before we go any further, if
  • this channel helps you slow down, think
  • more clearly, and see what's shaping
  • everyday life beneath the noise, I
  • invite you to support it. Like the
  • video, share it with someone who values
  • calm analysis over headlines, and
  • subscribe so you don't miss the next

  • 1:01
  • chapter of what's quietly unfolding
  • around us. Donald Trump has not treated
  • Canada as an equal partner. On numerous
  • occasions, he has spoken of Canada as if
  • it were the 51st state of the United
  • States.
  • Frankly, Canada should be the 51st
  • state. Okay? It really should because uh
  • Canada relies entirely on the United
  • States. We don't rely on Canada.
  • These were not mere slips of the tongue.
  • They were statements that revealed his
  • perception of power and who he believed
  • should hold it. For years, Canada has
  • been heavily dependent on the United
  • States. Trade, security, defense
  • technology, supply chains. That
  • dependence created a sense of comfort,
  • but it also created vulnerability. And
  • vulnerability invites pressure. Now,
  • Canada is signaling that it may pause or
  • even cancel part of its F-35 fighter jet
  • contract. This is no small agreement.
  • Valued at approximately 12 billion. It
  • is Canada's largest defense contract in
  • decades. Under normal circumstances,
  • this would be a routine sovereign
  • decision. Countries regularly review and

  • 2:01
  • reassess major defense procurements. But
  • under Trump, it was never treated that
  • way. Instead of negotiation, Canada
  • faced threats. Instead of mutual
  • respect, it faced leverage. Because in
  • Trump's worldview, dependence is not
  • something to be protected. It is
  • something to be exploited.
  • Canada is a very tough country to deal
  • with. I will say that. And I love
  • Canada.
  • You have the USMCA in place.
  • I know, but you'll have to deal with
  • USMCA is no good if they cheat.
  • This is not simply a dispute over
  • aircraft. It is a test of whether Canada
  • is recognized as a nation with the right
  • to choose or treated as a territory
  • expected to comply. And that is why this
  • moment matters. Which country are you
  • watching this video from? Is your
  • country currently signed into a major
  • agreement with the United States? Let me
  • know in the comments below. I'd like to
  • hear your perspective. At first glance,
  • this appears to be a typical defense
  • debate. Canada is considering options to
  • replace its aging fighter jets. That's
  • what sovereign nations do. They compare
  • costs and assess long-term needs. They
  • ask themselves what will best protect
  • their people and territory. But then
  • something unusual happened. At an

  • 3:01
  • international security conference, the
  • US ambassador to Canada delivered a
  • public message that went far beyond
  • advice or coordination. The warning was
  • blunt. If Canada did not proceed with
  • its purchase of F-35 fighter jets, it
  • should not expect a future trade deal
  • with the United States. This was no
  • private conversation between allies.
  • This was a public ultimatum. In an
  • instant, military procurement decisions
  • became directly linked to economic
  • consequences. Defense was no longer
  • simply about aircraft. It became
  • leverage. Trade became pressure. For
  • many Canadians, this raised an
  • uncomfortable question. When an ally
  • links market access to arms purchases,
  • where is the line between cooperation
  • and coercion? Canada had ordered its
  • first batch of F-35s. But Prime Minister
  • Mark Carney signaled a pause, saying
  • Ottawa needed to ensure it was making
  • the best long-term choice for the
  • country. The response from Washington
  • wasn't negotiation, but escalation. And
  • that's where this story really begins.
  • Do you think Canada's decision to
  • consider cancelling the contract is the

  • 4:00
  • right move? Comment yes or no below and
  • let me know what you think.
  • At first glance, many people may assume
  • this is simply a tactic by the United
  • States to pressure Canada. But if Canada
  • were to truly pause or end its
  • cooperation, the consequences would not
  • fall on Canada alone. They would also
  • come back to the United States and to
  • ordinary Americans. If Canada decides
  • not to move forward with the F-35
  • purchase, the impact would extend far
  • beyond diplomatic discomfort. The F-35
  • program is no longer just a military
  • project. It has become one of the
  • largest economic pillars of the US
  • defense industry. Today, the program
  • supports nearly 290,000 American jobs
  • across dozens of states and contributes
  • roughly 72 billion a year to the US
  • economy. This includes manufacturing,
  • long-term maintenance, and a supply
  • chain made up of nearly 2,000 domestic
  • suppliers, many of them small and
  • medium-sized businesses that depend on
  • stable export contracts. If Canada and
  • other partners begin stepping away,
  • analysts estimate that the program could

  • 5:00
  • lose as much as $19 billion in export
  • orders. More importantly, it would
  • weaken the long-term maintenance and
  • support agreements that provide
  • financial stability for decades, not
  • just years. As international
  • participation shrinks, companies like
  • Loheed Martin face growing financial
  • pressure. Warning signs have already
  • appeared. In 2025, Loheed Martin
  • reported a pre-tax loss of $1.6 billion,
  • and its share price fell by 18%,
  • reflecting broader instability within
  • the defense sector. Reduced foreign
  • demand also pushes costs higher at home.
  • The global scale of the F-35 program
  • helps keep production costs per aircraft
  • down. When fewer countries share that
  • burden, the cost per jet rises, placing
  • additional strain on the US defense
  • budget and ultimately on taxpayers.
  • These pressures are not abstract.
  • Facilities producing aircraft components
  • in Texas, Florida, Connecticut, and
  • Georgia could face reduced output or
  • layoffs if orders decline further. For
  • communities that rely on advanced
  • manufacturing, this means lost jobs,
  • shrinking local economies, and growing

  • 6:01
  • uncertainty for families. Job losses in
  • aerospace rarely stop at the factory
  • gate. They ripple outward, affecting
  • suppliers, transport companies, local
  • services, and municipal budgets. When
  • defense contracts weaken, the result is
  • not only fewer aircraft, but wider
  • economic stress. And when federal
  • budgets tighten, cuts usually do not
  • start with weapon systems. They show up
  • elsewhere. Delayed infrastructure
  • repairs, reduced public programs, and
  • pressure on healthcare and education.
  • Most Americans may never see an F-35 in
  • the sky, but they will feel its absence
  • through job insecurity, slower local
  • growth, and the quiet strain placed on
  • everyday public services. If you believe
  • this could cause serious harm to the
  • United States, please share this video
  • with your friends so they can understand
  • what's at stake. Once Canada began
  • questioning the F-35 contract, a new
  • question naturally followed. If not this
  • system, then what? The answer did not
  • come from Washington. It came from
  • Northern Europe. Canada began looking
  • seriously at cooperation with Sweden
  • through the defense company Saab and its
  • Grapen E fighter jet. This was not

  • 7:01
  • simply about replacing one aircraft with
  • another. It was about changing the
  • relationship behind the purchase. Under
  • Saab's proposal, Canada would not just
  • buy planes. Sweden offered technology
  • transfer, local assembly, and long-term
  • industrial cooperation. The aircraft
  • would be built and maintained in Canada,
  • not abroad. This would allow Canada to
  • operate, repair, and upgrade its own
  • fleet without needing permission from
  • another country. There was also a clear
  • economic difference. Saab estimated that
  • this approach could create up to 10,000
  • jobs in Canada's aerospace sector.
  • Defense spending would circulate inside
  • the country, supporting workers,
  • engineers, and local supply chains.
  • Costs mattered as well. While the F-35
  • is often listed at around $85 million
  • per aircraft, its long-term expenses are
  • far higher. Canada's own estimates
  • suggest that operating 88 F-35s over 30
  • years could cost around $50 billion with
  • flight costs of $35,000 to $47,000 per
  • hour. By comparison, countries using the
  • Gripen report operating costs of roughly

  • 8:02
  • $8,000 per flight hour. Finally, there
  • was geography. Sweden designed the
  • Gripen to operate in cold climates from
  • short runways and with minimal
  • infrastructure conditions Canada
  • understands well. For Canada, Sweden's
  • offer represented more than a different
  • jet. It represented a different balance
  • of cost, control, and long-term
  • independence. If this part helped you
  • see why the choice isn't just about
  • aircraft, but about cost, control, and
  • long-term independence, please give the
  • video a like so more people can
  • understand the difference. For a long
  • time, the debate around control sounded
  • abstract. Questions about software
  • access, logistics systems, and supply
  • chains felt technical, important, but
  • distant from real world consequences.
  • Then Denmark happened. Denmark is not a
  • marginal partner. It is a long-standing
  • NATO ally, a stable democracy, and a
  • country that followed the rules.
  • Copenhagen joined the F-35 program,
  • believing it was purchasing advanced
  • aircraft to defend its own territory
  • under its own political authority. What

  • 9:00
  • Denmark learned instead was something
  • far more unsettling. In 2024, the United
  • States removed critical F-35 components
  • from Denmark's inventory and transferred
  • them to Israel. There was no request for
  • approval, no prior consultation with
  • Danish authorities, no parliamentary
  • vote in Copenhagen. The decision was
  • made unilaterally and Denmark could not
  • intervene. This was not a diplomatic
  • dispute that could be negotiated away.
  • It was the result of how the F-35 system
  • is designed. The United States controls
  • the aircraft's global supply chain,
  • spare parts distribution, and logistics
  • platform. Ownership of the airframe does
  • not include ownership of the system that
  • keeps it operational. In that moment,
  • Denmark discovered that possession did
  • not equal control. The consequences went
  • beyond embarrassment. The transfer
  • directly conflicted with Denmark's
  • foreign policy stance in the Middle
  • East. Yet, Danish lawmakers had no
  • mechanism to block the action. The jets
  • were physically Danish, but the
  • authority governing their sustainment

  • 10:00
  • was not. A Danish member of Parliament
  • who had supported the F-35 purchase
  • later admitted his regret. He described
  • the realization in stark terms. Denmark
  • had believed it was buying fighter jets.
  • Instead, it was effectively leasing them
  • while another country held the keys.
  • This is what makes the Danish case so
  • important. It was not about punishment.
  • It was not retaliation. It was not even
  • political hostility. The system
  • functioned exactly as intended. In
  • moments of strategic urgency, control
  • flows to the center. Smaller partners
  • adjust. That is the precedent. If
  • components can be removed from one
  • allies aircraft to serve another
  • conflict, then control over those
  • aircraft is conditional. It depends not
  • on ownership but on alignment with
  • priorities set elsewhere. For countries
  • watching closely, the implication is
  • unavoidable. A defense platform that can
  • be redirected without consent is not
  • fully sovereign. It operates under an
  • invisible hierarchy that only becomes
  • visible when it matters most. This is

  • 11:00
  • why the Danish experience resonates far
  • beyond Scandinavia. It shows that
  • sovereignty does not disappear with an
  • announcement. It erodess quietly through
  • systems that bypass national
  • decision-making. By the time a country
  • realizes what it has lost, the decision
  • has already been made somewhere else.
  • Denmark did not lose its alliance, but
  • it did lose control in a moment when
  • control was essential. And once that
  • line is crossed, it cannot be uncrossed.
  • Because the lesson of Denmark is not
  • about one transfer of parts. It is about
  • a structural reality. When critical
  • defense systems are controlled
  • externally, sovereignty exists only as
  • long as it is convenient. If stories
  • like Denmarks help you see how power
  • really works behind modern defense
  • systems, consider subscribing to the
  • channel so you don't miss the next
  • chapter of what Quietly Shapes National
  • Sovereignty. Canada has reached a moment
  • it cannot delay or disguise. This is no
  • longer a routine defense procurement and
  • it is no longer a debate about aircraft
  • performance. It is a structural choice
  • about the future of Canadian
  • sovereignty. And like most historic

  • 12:01
  • decisions, it does not arrive with
  • ceremony. It arrives quietly, wrapped in
  • contracts and timelines that stretch
  • decades into the future. The choice
  • facing Canada is stark. One path is
  • familiar. Accept the pressure, proceed
  • with the F-35, and trust that relations
  • with the United States will remain
  • stable for the next 30 years. It is the
  • path of continuity. The path that avoids
  • immediate friction. The path that
  • assumes tomorrow will resemble
  • yesterday. The other path is more
  • uncertain. It requires Canada to build
  • independent defense capacity, to accept
  • short-term trade tension, and to protect
  • long-term control over its own security.
  • It carries risk, but it also carries
  • clarity. This crossroads would already
  • be serious on its own. What makes it
  • historic is who has spoken up.
  • Lieutenant General Andre Dashamp,
  • retired, was not a critic from the
  • outside. He was the architect. He was
  • the senior commander who first proposed
  • that Canada should join the F-35
  • program. For years, he was one of its
  • strongest advocates, publicly defending

  • 13:01
  • the aircraft and the partnership it
  • represented. When someone like that
  • changes position, it matters. Desamps
  • did not reverse course because the F-35
  • failed to fly. He did not point to
  • speed, stealth, or weapon systems. His
  • concern was not technical. It was
  • structural. He acknowledged that the
  • United States controls too much of the
  • system. The software, the spare parts,
  • the upgrades, the logistics pipeline,
  • every critical function that determines
  • whether the aircraft can operate
  • effectively sits outside Canadian
  • authority. In practical terms, Canada
  • would not truly operate the F-35 on its
  • own terms. It would require continuous
  • approval from Washington, not just
  • during crisis, but throughout the
  • aircraft's entire lifespan. That
  • realization changed everything because a
  • defense system that cannot be
  • maintained, upgraded, or sustained
  • independently is not just a military
  • tool. It is a point of leverage. And
  • leverage does not need to be used loudly
  • to be effective. It only needs to exist.

  • 14:01
  • Damps understood what this meant in a
  • world where political stability can no
  • longer be assumed. Governments change,
  • priorities shift, alliances harden and
  • soften. What looks cooperative today can
  • become conditional tomorrow. Once
  • control is surrendered, it cannot be
  • reclaimed by goodwill. This is why
  • Canada's choice is no longer about
  • avoiding short-term discomfort. It is
  • about preventing long-term
  • vulnerability. Trade friction can be
  • negotiated. Tariffs can be revisited.
  • Diplomatic tension rises and falls. But
  • dependence embedded in critical systems
  • endures. Canada now must decide what
  • kind of country it intends to be over
  • the next generation. One that accepts
  • external control in exchange for
  • convenience or one that absorbs
  • short-term pressure to preserve
  • long-term autonomy. History rarely
  • announces itself. It waits for moments
  • like this when a nation must choose
  • between comfort and control. And once
  • the choice is made, it shapes everything
  • that follows. If you believe this choice
  • matters, not just for Canada, but for

  • 15:00
  • how sovereignty is shaped in the modern
  • world, please share this video so others
  • can see what's quietly at stake.
  • This story was never really about
  • fighter jets. Aircraft are just
  • hardware. They age, they are replaced,
  • and eventually they disappear from
  • service. What lasts much longer are the
  • structures built around them, the
  • contracts, the dependencies, the
  • assumptions about who decides and who
  • follows. Canada now stands at a moment
  • that will not feel dramatic to most
  • people. There will be no sirens, no
  • immediate disruption to daily life.
  • Grocery stores will open, streets will
  • look the same. But beneath that normal
  • surface, a long-term direction is being
  • set. If Canada accepts external pressure
  • today, it sends a quiet signal about how
  • future decisions will be made, not just
  • in defense, but in trade, technology,
  • and national planning. Each choice
  • becomes easier to influence once the
  • precedent is set. If Canada chooses
  • independence, the cost will not be zero.
  • There may be trade tension. There may be
  • economic discomfort. There may be

  • 16:00
  • criticism from allies who prefer
  • predictability over autonomy. But those
  • costs are visible. They can be debated,
  • negotiated, and eventually resolved.
  • What cannot be easily resolved is
  • dependence built into critical systems.
  • When a country does not control the
  • software that runs its defenses, the
  • parts that keep them operational or the
  • upgrades that determine their future
  • capability, sovereignty becomes
  • conditional. It exists only as long as
  • it aligns with someone else's
  • priorities. And that condition does not
  • just affect governments. It affects
  • workers whose jobs depend on domestic
  • industry. It affects taxpayers whose
  • money flows abroad instead of
  • circulating at home. It affects families
  • who rely on public services shaped by
  • long-term budget choices. and it affects
  • the quiet sense of security people carry
  • when they believe their country can
  • stand on its own. History often looks
  • dramatic in hindsight. In reality, it
  • unfolds through moments that feel
  • technical and procedural. A contract
  • signed, a review delayed, a choice
  • framed as temporary, but temporary

  • 17:00
  • decisions have a way of becoming
  • permanent. Canada still has a choice,
  • not an easy one, not a comfortable one,
  • but a clear one. Because in the end, the
  • question is not whether Canada can
  • afford independence. It is whether
  • Canada can afford to lose it slowly,
  • without noticing, without debate, and
  • without the chance to turn back. And
  • once that line is crossed, the future is
  • no longer chosen. It is inherited. If
  • this channel helps you slow down, think
  • more clearly, and understand how
  • decisions made far from everyday life
  • eventually shape it. I invite you to
  • support the work, subscribe, share, or
  • simply stay with us for the next chapter
  • of stories that are rarely told, but
  • quietly matter.


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