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Date: 2026-03-03 Page is: DBtxt003.php txt00029211
RAIL
MAJOR BRITISH RAIL ACCIDENT

Tom Macklaw: The Train Crash That Brought Down a Bridge | Lewisham 1957


Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=byf0V1oEUpM
The Train Crash That Brought Down a Bridge | Lewisham 1957

Tom Macklaw


Premiered Nov 11, 2025

17.8K subscribers ... 42,661 views ... 2.2K likes

LEWISHAM

On the evening of 4 December 1957, two packed commuter trains collided in thick fog at St Johns, Lewisham — and then the railway bridge above them collapsed onto the wreckage. This was one of the worst rail disasters in British history.

In this video I’m on location at Lewisham / St Johns where the 1957 rail crash happened, to explain exactly what went wrong on the Southern Region of British Railways that night — the missed signal, the signalling layout, the conditions London commuters were travelling through — and how the aftermath of this disaster changed rail safety and British law.

I'll also explain my close personal connection to this disaster that I only discovered in recent years.

This wasn’t just a collision — it was a mass-casualty event that triggered major discussions about AWS (Automatic Warning System), signalling sighting, and fog working on British Rail. And legally, the Lewisham Disaster led to the important case of Chadwick v British Railways Board (1967) — a key precedent in the way English law treats psychiatric injury suffered by rescuers.

► You can also support the channel by giving a little each month: Patreon/Tom Macklaw 🔗 / tommacklaw

Chapters
  • 00:00 Intro at St Johns
  • 00:45 The Southern Region in the 1950s
  • 04:37 The crowded commuter trains involved
  • 07:13 What happened and how the collision occurred
  • 09:11 The bridge collapse and casualties
  • 19:30 The official inquiry & AWS
  • 29:02 The legal aftermath – Chadwick v BRB
  • 35:58 Legacy and what changed in rail safety
If you enjoy UK history, forgotten disasters, British Railways, railway signalling, true crime, & on-location investigations — please subscribe.

#history #disaster #traincrash #lewisham #shortdocumentary
Peter Burgess COMMENTARY

I was 17 years old and at boarding school when this event actually happened. I did not have any access to TV at school, but read all about the crash in the newspapers.

While this was a terrible accident, the British rail system has been surprisingly safe over the years. As roads get more and more congested, it is to be expected that passenger rail will become a more and more attractive alternative for passenger travel in both the UK and in other parts of the world including the USA!

Peter Burgess
Transcript
  • 0:00
  • Intro at St Johns
  • On a foggy December night in 1957, one of the worst rail disasters
  • in British history happened in London. And it happened right where I'm standing.
  • It was early evening. And a packed commuter train carrying about 1500 people
  • was waiting at a signal underneath that bridge. And what happened next became the third worst rail disaster
  • in British history, but led to some important changes. and what's extra interesting about this disaster,
  • is I only found out this year that I have a very close personal connection to some of the people that were involved.
  • This is the Lewisham train crash. So first let's paint a little picture of the scene we're stepping into.

  • 0:50
  • The Southern Region in the 1950s
  • In 1957, British Railways had been nationalized for around a decade, and the area that Lewisham fell into was the southern region.
  • Which is one of the country's busiest electrified commuter networks. it had incredibly dense timetables.
  • Remember, this is London. It's bad today. It was bad then. I mean, worse now.
  • There are more people than ever. But it was still bad back in the 50s. And so like today, there were really heavy loads of commuters during peak hours.
  • and to mix it all up a little bit more during this period, during this transition from the older trains to the newer trains,
  • There were a mix of electric trains, EMUs Diesel trains. and steam hauled mainline expresses.
  • The older fashioned trains. All basically sharing the same tracks. So even though it's 1957, these trains are still busy
  • and there's a lot of them running all the time. And to preempt what was about to happen a little bit.
  • A national automatic warning control system Or AWS program
  • had just been approved in around late 1956. It been fitted in some trains
  • throughout the country, but not everywhere and not here. And this is something that we will go on to see

  • 2:02
  • had a huge impact on what went on to happen. So that's the situation with the railways.
  • which leads us to the 4th of December 1957.
  • Britain was obviously well and truly into winter at this point. And the conditions on the 4th of December really showed that.
  • This is from the report into this accident itself, saying that mist and fog
  • had been continuous in the south east of England throughout the entire day. and as the day had gone on into the evening,
  • the fog had just become thicker and thicker. And by the time the sun had set and it was dark.
  • The fog was extraordinarily thick. And it was also frosty. And remember the great.
  • London smog was only a few years before this. Which killed thousands. this wasn't just your run of the mill winter fog.
  • between New Cross and Saint John Station. where? Today's story is about to take place.
  • was a three quarter mile section of railway cutting, where of course, being a in somewhat of a dip, the fog was much, much worse.

  • 3:06
  • and at the same time, there was very little wind, which meant that fog was just hanging there.
  • Now, you might think, well, if you could see 50 yards ahead of you, that's absolutely fine.
  • It is. Unless you're driving a train. In which case, and obviously especially back in the 50s, before
  • certain safety measures came into practice. Visibility and reaction speed were quite important.
  • And had a huge impact on the signaling around the Southern Railway network. Which chiefly used color light signaling.
  • And of course, in the fog It became slightly more difficult to see what color the signal was, or to see it at all.
  • And the fog, as it tends to, although slightly less these days, Had caused major disruption to the train schedule.
  • Again, the report into the incident describes crowds at all of the London terminals, all of the London stations being huge.

  • 4:01
  • Thousands and thousands of people trying to get onto trains that had been reduced or were running off schedule, or it was chaos.
  • And that is very much still the case sometimes at the London stations today on. God knows I've been stuck at stations like Victoria for hours
  • in huge crowds of people. So this is a very familiar sounding scenario to me.
  • So we find ourselves in a situation where the conditions are not good and it's slowing everything down.
  • It's confusing the systems that are in place and the schedule's thrown off. So already things are not running smoothly.

  • 4:38
  • The crowded commuter trains involved
  • And that brings us to the first train involved in this incident. which was an EMU or electric multiple unit.
  • So an electric train which consisted of ten coaches. And this was the 5:18 p.m.
  • Charing Cross to haz service. The Hay's train had been stopped at a red signal
  • at the Parkes Bridge junction, just beyond Saint John station. And again, the conditions on board are something that I am unfortunately

  • 5:05
  • very familiar with. Apparently it was packed shoulder to shoulder in this ten coach train.
  • Apparently there were about one. That's only an estimate. We don't have any exact figures, but apparently about
  • 1500 people were crammed onto this ten coach train.
  • So it's winter. It's the evening is horribly foggy. You can't see anything. It's frosty.
  • So it's freezing cold as well. We're a matter of weeks away from Christmas, And everybody is crammed into this sardine can, like, train.
  • and being stopped at a signal. I'm sure nobody on that train was having a good time, but unfortunately it was only going to get worse.
  • Much worse. And here enters train number two. This was before 50 6 p.m.
  • Cannon Street to Ramsgate Express. An 11 coach Battle of Britain class Pacific steam locomotive,

  • 6:00
  • specifically the number 34066 Spitfire. Of course, named after the most famous Battle of Britain playing.
  • The driver of the Ramsgate train was Mr. Jay True, a 62 year old with about 40 years worth of experience
  • on the railways and about 18 to 20 of those being as a driver.
  • And aboard this 11 coach express, it's estimated there were about 700 passengers.
  • And again it was packed full with commuters on their way home. Up front, it was just true.
  • And his fireman. As the Ramsgate Express approached Saint John station With the Hays train waiting just on the other side.
  • It passed a red caution signal at the Saint John's signal box. Instead of slowing down and stopping.
  • So, Charing Cross to service would have come through Saint John station passed me here and come to a stop down there
  • underneath the bridge waiting for the signal. 620 The Ramsgate service came thundering

  • 7:03
  • past this same line at about 30 miles an hour. And of course, at this point, coming through Saint John station,
  • it was just too late to slow down. In the dense freezing fog, it then traveled the next 138

  • 7:19
  • What happened and how the collision occurred
  • yards separating it from the Hays train until it collided
  • into the back of the Hays train at about 30mph. Construction.
  • this was a bad situation, of course, it's never a good situation when one train has been rear ended by another.
  • But what made this situation so much worse were two things.
  • The Hays train had been sat waiting at its red signal. With its airbrake applied as it should,
  • to avoid rolling back down the slight incline, it was now on. But what this meant was, Is that instead

  • 8:04
  • of moving with the momentum of the train, that it hit, it. Which would have served to lessen some of the force of that impact.
  • The Ramsgate Express hit the 10th coach of the Hays Train. Which in turn forced the ninth coach forwards.
  • Which was then. forced over and through the eighth coach.
  • Which is rather accurately, if not insensitively. Described as telescoping.
  • The entire ninth coach was telescoped through the eighth. Destroying it in its entirety.
  • And unfortunately, anybody who happened to be in that coach.
  • And the second thing that made this accident so much worse. was what happened to the Ramsgate Express after it collided
  • with the back of the Hays train. The rear of the engine tender and the front of the leading coach

  • 9:01
  • behind it were crushed together by the impact. And rather than staying on the tracks and continuing to plow through the Hays train.
  • Were thrown off the tracks and to the left. and unfortunately, rather than just derailing and coming to a stop.
  • 9:16
  • The bridge collapse and casualties
  • It came off the tracks and immediately struck the steel middle column Supporting the bridge above.
  • that also happened to carry the None Head in Lewisham line over the tracks. The bridge was a lattice girder type in two spans across the railway below,
  • and it weighed about 350 tons. Two of the four huge girders
  • that made up the bridge crossing the tracks immediately crashed down Onto the Ramsgate train below as it continued to move forwards.
  • the leading coach, which had already been crushed up against the locomotive. Was completely destroyed Along with the second coach behind it
  • and the first half of the third coach behind that. all three completely crushed by the steel bridge

  • 10:01
  • that had just been dumped down on top of them. and things almost became even worse than that.
  • As two minutes following this initial collision, the 5:22 p.m. eight coach electric train from Holbrook Viaduct, Dartford.
  • Which was moving towards the bridge that had just collapsed, was stopped just in time by the motor man in charge,
  • when he noticed that the girders of the bridge had subsided at an angle. And because the brakes were applied in time,
  • The train avoided being derailed or damaged at all, And stopped with just a slight tilt to the leading coach, which had just about reached the bridge.
  • If it had been 1 to 2 minutes earlier, it would have taken the plunge with the bridge down onto the tracks and the other two trains below.
  • but fortunately escaped entirely undamaged with no injuries,
  • The same, unfortunately, could not be said for those in the Ramsgate and Hayes trains.
  • In the immediate aftermath, the first emergency call was made to the London Ambulance Service at 622

  • 11:03
  • by someone who lived in a house by the side of the line. The police were then also called about a minute later.
  • Immediately a major emergency plan went into action. And the first ambulance was on the scene at 6:25 p.m..
  • and thankfully the emergency services, despite the horrible conditions and the terrible visibility, were able to get to the scene.
  • Incredibly quickly. What this did mean, though, was that when they first arrived on the scene,
  • it was incredibly hard to tell just how bad the accident was. But as more and more emergency services and more and more locals
  • who'd come to see if they could help in any way arrived on the scene, the magnitude of the disaster became clear,
  • and more and more emergency services were deployed. All in all, there were ambulance, police, fire services,
  • Members of the Saint John's Ambulance Brigade, the Women's Voluntary Service and the Salvation Army all showed up to help out in any way they could, along with so many members

  • 12:03
  • of the public who'd heard it happen or who lived alongside the tracks. and the work to begin saving whoever they could began.
  • There are actually pictures of some of the people who helped out walking down these tracks behind me, to the bridge to and from bringing medicine supplies,
  • whatever they could to help the injured and those who needed rescuing
  • You can understand why there was such a huge response to this accident,
  • because obviously where we are, like most train stations in London, we're nestled right in the middle of Lewisham.
  • There are houses that would have been here immediately on either side of the station, right next to the tracks.
  • Everyone would have heard this and remember this wasn't just a train hitting a train and derailing.
  • this was a steel bridge collapsing on top of a train. Like the noise of this accident would have been insane.
  • And then followed, obviously, by the shouts and screams of those who were still trapped inside, like,

  • 13:05
  • you can't imagine how awful this must have sounded. And in the foggy conditions that were here on that day,
  • no classic London pea soup. It just must have been the most
  • haunting scene imaginable. during the evening, 109 people with very serious
  • injuries were removed to local hospitals, with another 67 sustaining minor injuries or simply being in shock from what had happened.
  • Amongst the seriously injured were the firemen on board the Ramsgate train and two locomotive drivers who were also aboard.
  • The driver of the Ramsgate train, WJ, who was not physically injured but suffered from severe shock.
  • But of course, in an accident this severe, and with this many people aboard these trains. there were always going to be some unfortunate people who didn't make it.

  • 14:00
  • And by the time the dust had settled, it was found that 90 people had lost their lives,
  • 88 passengers and the guard on board the electric train Were killed.
  • with only one passenger making it out and later succumbing to his injuries. And it was found that 37 of those who died had been aboard the electric train,
  • with 49 in the steam train. Unfortunately, we don't have a full and accurate list
  • of all those who died, and the list that we do have is compiled with the names we were given, along with names
  • that were found in reports and different accounts from this disaster. We do, however, know that the youngest victim of this
  • disaster was three year old Graham Freeman, who had spent the afternoon visiting Father Christmas on Oxford Street
  • and was found deceased next to a crushed toy drum. When he was found, he was still clutching a soft toy.

  • 15:02
  • All right. I am now under the bridge or a section just down from where the section of collapsed is.
  • As you can see, actually, the trains passing the time that. But this just gives you an idea standing under this
  • slightly smaller section of bridge. And wouldn't much like the idea of that falling on me
  • now, as is and even worse if I was also sat in a train with no way out.
  • That. Despite being a smaller section of bridge than the section that actually collapsed is a lot of steel.
  • Steel that you do not want falling on top of you. It's funny, there's
  • nothing much more intimidating than the sound of a train rumbling over a bridge directly above you, but in this context,
  • it's all the more terrifying. in the aftermath of the accident, it became clear just how much damage

  • 16:00
  • the eighth coach of the haze train had taken. From the report. It was described the rear half of the coupler
  • between the eighth and ninth coaches was broken. and pushed into the headstock of the eighth coach to form a kind of ramp.
  • And it was this ramp that helped the body and under frame of the ninth coach. To go up and through the eighth coach in its entirety.
  • And afterwards it was discovered that the Hayes train had only actually moved forwards a few meters after the collision.
  • And it was found that this was ultimately because that eighth coach had taken almost the entire force of the impact.
  • To the extent that the coach in front of it was barely damaged and there was no damage to any of the other carriages ahead of that.
  • what it did mean, unfortunately, though, was that the majority of the casualties on that Hayes train were in that eighth coach.
  • And afterwards it was found that the eighth and ninth coaches were essentially occupying the space of just one coach.

  • 17:07
  • now, by that evening, once all of the dead and injured had been removed from the train, The clean up began.
  • This is always the part that fills in sensitive, but unfortunately necessary when it comes to accidents
  • like this is yes, investigations need to take place, but also. things need to keep moving And if the Southern Region rail service
  • wasn't already disrupted by the fog, the conditions, the time of year, this stopped everything dead.
  • And so all around this accident, emergency replacement services to get people home were immediately put into action.
  • But of course, you can imagine that wasn't particularly quick or anywhere near enough to convey thousands of people home.
  • the leading six coaches of the Hayes electric train, which were not derailed or particularly badly damaged, were moved forward to the Hither Green sidings.
  • And the same goes for the seven rear coaches of the Ramsgate steam train, which were moved back to Saint John station.

  • 18:06
  • and of course the Dartford train, which was due to go over the bridge was moved back undamaged. The following days then involved a lot of work disentangling the damage.
  • Coaches from the trains. And removing the fallen bridge, which of course was a lot of work
  • and a lot of heavy steel and wood to move and so much of it had to be cut up where it lay.
  • Once everything that was damaged had been removed and the damaged bridge section had been taken out. a temporary section of bridge to replace
  • it was constructed and opened by the 13th of January. And hilariously, it reads in the report that this bridge
  • will serve until a new permanent bridge can be constructed. And yet here today, We still see
  • the quote unquote temporary bridge. Now when the bridge was rebuilt or replaced, it was placed with
  • what was supposed to be a temporary kind of military trestle structured bridge. And what you can see still here today is

  • 19:02
  • you can see the old section of the bridge that survives. That was left there. They didn't rebuild the entire thing, just the section that collapsed
  • because I guess everything else was still kind of structurally sound. and that sat there for the last, you know, 60, 70 years.
  • Sorry to interrupt the video. This is just a quick reminder that if you are enjoying what you're watching so far, then remember to hit that like button.
  • Subscribe to the channel for more videos like this. And it really helps me out and helps me keep making stuff like this.
  • 19:31
  • The official inquiry & AWS
  • back to the video. In the inquiry after the accident, the facts were laid bare. It was found when looking at the situation just before the accident.
  • That the electric Hayes train had actually been stopped at a signal by mistake.
  • The disruption caused by the fog meant that the Hayes train had actually switched places in the schedule, with the train before it.
  • Meaning that there was some confusion from the signalman who was expecting a different train.
  • and it was of course, whilst the Hayes train was stopped at this mistaken signal that the accident occurred.

  • 20:04
  • It was also found that because of the color signal system on this section of railway.
  • Special fog signaling measures were not in place. We've covered this before in certain videos like the the Dickens staple Hurst train crash.
  • Where things like small explosive charges were used when visibility was not good. None of that was in use here.
  • It was also discovered in tests afterwards that visibility from the driver's position on the Ramsgate train was not good.
  • And in clear conditions, the driver actually didn't have as good a view for as long of signals in this section of railway
  • as the fireman on the other side would have. But it was also found that Driver True had not asked
  • the fireman to keep an eye on the signals when he could no longer see them. But then, taking into account the poor visibility in this fog.
  • It was established that even with a better view from the cab. Driver. True. Still probably wouldn't have been able to see The two yellow signals,

  • 21:04
  • warning him to slow down before the final red signal. The signalman at Saint John's at the time of the accident.
  • Noted that as the Ramsgate train passed through the station, it was too loud due to another train passing at the same time
  • to hear anything of the steam train, But they did say that they didn't think it was traveling at a very fast speed.
  • and was in fact possibly moving slower than usual due to the weather. So they couldn't tell whether the brakes had actually been applied.
  • Though Sigmund did also note that they could just about see the glow of the carriage lights through the fog from about 15 yards away.
  • So that tells you just how bad the fog was at this point. And they said that it had been drifting in and out.
  • Drivers of other trains in the area also confirmed that they'd barely been able to see the signals around this kind of time, some saying
  • that they'd barely seen a signal until it was about five yards in front of them. The driver of the Hayes electric train also confirmed that visibility

  • 22:03
  • had been about 5 to 8 yards at the time of the accident. and when describing the accident itself, claimed that he felt a jolt.
  • Which did suggest to him that his train have probably been struck by a following train,
  • but it wasn't severe and he only discovered how bad things were. When he walked back up the line and discovered the wreckage
  • of the eighth coach. Driver Crane also said that after they'd smothered the fire from the engine of the Ramsgate train.
  • They found Driver True on the footplate and helped him off of the train and into a nearby house.
  • he said that they couldn't get a single thing out of him, and that he was suffering from severe shock.
  • Through was taken to a nearby hospital afterwards And after spending the night in Lewisham was allowed to make his way home the following day.
  • Where he was then interviewed in bed. Apparently it was very, very difficult to get any kind of coherent statement

  • 23:00
  • out of him. What they did manage to work out is that he said he had applied the brake fully as he ran into Saint John station.
  • But that he then realized that he wasn't going to stop in time to meet this red signal.
  • The interview then broke down because true didn't seem to be able to continue on. But this backed up what he'd also told others earlier at the scene.
  • When he was interviewed later in January, after he'd recovered somewhat from what had happened.
  • he claimed that he'd been looking out through the front portal of the train the entire time, but that the signals had been very hard to see until
  • you were right on top of them, and even then you could just see a glimmer of them. During further evidence.
  • He claimed that he did not think he'd been going that fast through Saint John's Station, and that he had applied the brake before they entered it.
  • But that usually you would not expect a red signal, and that he didn't recall ever having stopped at Saint John's.
  • even in a fog like there was on the day. True. Also couldn't explain why he hadn't asked Fireman

  • 24:02
  • Haw next to him on the other side, to observe the signals for him. When it came down to his health and well-being.
  • He claimed that he was suffering from no ill health on the day, although he was a little anxious to make as good a run out
  • to Sevenoaks as possible, where they needed to top up with water. And when asked whether this anxiety may have thrown him off
  • somewhat, he replied that he did not think so. Fireman haw, who was 32 with 12 years of railway service.
  • Was quite severely injured, but by the 6th of December he was able to make a short statement from hospital.
  • The weather was very foggy, it being variable. Passing New cross. The new cross down through stars and signal was showing a green aspect
  • and then started to fire until my driver asked me to look out for the next signal. I immediately did so prior to entering Saint John Station, and when the Saint
  • John's down through starter came into view, it was a red light. I told my driver immediately and he made a brake application.

  • 25:00
  • There was little reduction in speed prior to the impact. I estimate the speed at Saint John's about 40mph.
  • Ho also confirmed that after he told true about the red signal, He'd seen true pull the brake handle down.
  • But also reported that he'd felt barely any reduction in speed.
  • What he was sure of, though, was that the train definitely was traveling slower than usual, usual speed through here being between 40 and 50mph.
  • What he did confirm, though, was that he was immediately worried, knowing that having seen the red signal, the train would probably not have enough time
  • to slow down for whatever was in front of it. Others who were interviewed, including passengers and guards, More or less confirmed the speed
  • and also all confirmed That they hadn't felt like the brake had been applied.
  • Afterwards, the inquiry concluded. That the fog must have been incredibly dense at the time of the accident, and even directly afterwards,
  • it wasn't even clear to people who were arriving on the scene exactly what had happened, because they couldn't see that the bridge had collapsed

  • 26:06
  • And visibility was estimated to be at about ten yards. The signals along the route were also tested and confirmed to be in full working order.
  • The brakes of the Ramsgate train were tested exhaustively. Even the sections that had been destroyed.
  • And again everything was found to be in good working order. The conclusions of the inquiry.
  • Were that the Hayes electric train did not need to be stopped where it was, due to the confusion of the signalman.
  • It was confirmed that there was no way that Driver true would have been able to see the signals, until his fireman noted that final red signal.
  • They also confirmed that they believed Fireman Hoare, when he'd said that he'd seen true apply the brake, but also concluded
  • that true must not have applied it until after the train had already passed. and that traveling at 30mph, the 10s
  • it would have taken to travel the next 138 yards to the Hayes train, would have been too long for there to be any effect.

  • 27:02
  • In fact, the brakes would have only really started having an effect at the point of impact.
  • the inquiry found. That having missed the two signals before the red because he couldn't see them, he'd not already attempted to slow down the train.
  • And so by the time they did see the final red signal, it was too late. The inquiry therefore held driver WJ true.
  • solely responsible for the accident. The inquiry also went on to conclude.
  • that an AWS system on board would likely have prevented the collision. the AWS system consists of magnets that are positioned along the track
  • about 180m before the actual signal. If the train passes over the magnets and the magnet is energized,
  • an alarm is triggered in the cab. Alerting the driver to either a clear or unclear signal.
  • If the next signal is clear, the driver will hear the sound of the bell. If, however, the signal is not clear, a horn will sound in the cab

  • 28:00
  • until a button is pressed to acknowledge the alarm. There is also a light inside the cab, known as a sunflower,
  • because it looks like a sunflower, which will remain illuminated even after the alarm has been acknowledged.
  • to remind the driver of the situation. If the driver fails to acknowledge that alarm, the emergency brakes
  • will be applied after 2 to 3 seconds and bring the train to a complete stop. They also took into account the fact that clearer signal visibility
  • from Battle of Britain class cabs could have made a big difference here, stopping the driver from in poor visibility.
  • relying on his fireman, who also had his tasks to complete. To see certain signals.
  • Now, obviously listening to the conclusions of that inquiry. It clearly initially indicated a charge of gross negligence for the driver.
  • But the coroner substituted that for a charge of accidental death. The driver, WJ true, was eventually charged with manslaughter.
  • But the first Old Bailey trial in April 1958 ended without a verdict.
  • And at a second trial, he was acquitted. Another fascinating but

  • 29:00
  • The legal aftermath – Chadwick v BRB
  • tragic twist to come after this incident. Was the case of Chadwick versus the British Railways Board.
  • Henry and Ellen Chadwick lived not very far from where the accident occurred. In fact, there were about 180m away from the crash site itself.
  • Henry himself was described as a a small, enthusiastic window cleaner. And upon hearing the news of the accident, Henry rushed to the scene
  • to do what he could. And because of his smaller stature, ended up actually being able to crawl into the wreckage and help some of those inside.
  • here. Henry spent about nine hours helping the injured. With one trapped woman. Explaining how he got inside and gave her a painkilling injection.
  • The problem here, of course, was as well as putting himself in physical danger by going into the remains of this wrecked carriage.
  • Henry had no choice but to come into contact with the remains of the deceased. And it's difficult to even imagine the horrible scenes that must have

  • 30:03
  • been inside those carriages. at about 3:00 in the morning.
  • Henry returned home to his wife. He was covered in mud and blood. And he handed her a small brooch which he'd found on a young boy
  • who'd been killed. The following morning he continued to help and do what he could. But in evidence provided by his wife.
  • In the days, weeks, months and years that followed, he completely changed.
  • He had difficulty sleeping, became completely disinterested in everything,
  • could barely work, and apparently woke up often in the middle of the night having had nightmares about that young boy he'd seen in the wreckage.
  • And in 1962, five years after the accident, he died of an unrelated illness.
  • But before he died, he had actually started legal proceedings against the British Transport Commission.
  • His argument being that he'd suffered severe trauma from what he'd experienced.
  • And after he died, his wife continued to fight this claim in his name. The British Transport Commission, however, denied that

  • 31:06
  • they had a duty of care for Henry Chadwick. Saying that he had voluntarily thrown himself into a dangerous situation.
  • But the English High Court concluded that it was foreseeable that in an accident or disaster
  • such as this, that members of the public would jump in and attempt to help. And it was concluded that rescuers in situations like this.
  • Who suffered from severe trauma afterwards, could be treated as primary victims. In this case, remaining authority on rescuers suffering from nervous shock
  • for decades. And it's here, reading this account of. Henry Chadwick and, what he went through in the aftermath of this event.
  • That we get into how this particular disaster has a very real and personal connection
  • to me, which I actually only discovered in the last couple of years. And that is that one of the people helping in the aftermath

  • 32:01
  • of this horrible, horrible disaster was my grandfather. He was a police officer on duty in the area at the time,
  • and was called to the scene with his colleagues in the immediate aftermath of the accident. and though he never said anything in detail about what he experienced.
  • We do know from the little that he told my mum. That his role was to essentially.
  • Help with the cleanup of whatever was left of those unfortunate enough not to make it out alive.
  • I do find it interesting that my granddad never actually spoke to us about this.
  • I mean, not surprising because obviously we were children. So he's not going to tell us about the time he was clearing up.
  • You know, body parts and debris from one of the worst train crashes in British history. But.
  • I think it's it's a sign, isn't it, of, you know, that generation or the generation that followed,

  • 33:00
  • those who fought in the war and who didn't necessarily get that. My granddad never actually went out and fought in the Second World War.
  • He was too young. But obviously, that generation that followed immediately. Never had that direct trauma from events like this.
  • They had indirect emergency from family members coming back and what they experienced back at home.
  • And obviously some people during the Blitz did experience some really awful things, but a lot
  • were removed from that. And so something like this was their only real experience
  • of something this catastrophic and this, this large. And that was the case for my granddad.
  • And the way they had experienced people talking about traumatic events was from
  • the generation who fought in the war and who generally did not discuss it. You know, it was a horrible thing.
  • We don't talk about that. We just carry on. And so that was that was what they had to go on.
  • And so it's probably no surprise that people like my granddad never spoke about this. But obviously from the precedent that this event set,

  • 34:08
  • we know the trauma suffered by not even people that were directly involved, but those who
  • arrive in the aftermath, those who witnessed everything that went down afterwards.
  • Like we we know the effect that can have on people now. And this was one of the first events that really kind of like brought
  • people more awareness of that second hand trauma. And it's a shame my granddad never really discussed it properly with with anyone.
  • Although, I mean, as much as it would have helped my granddad to actually probably talk about this and some of the other things that he witnessed in the police force.
  • It didn't really seem to be game. He wasn't exactly, you know, like suffering from shellshock for the rest of his life. He was he was fine.
  • And the only thing that my my mum, who obviously only got little bits and pieces,

  • 35:01
  • really recalls from what he told her about it, was the fog was the fact that the conditions
  • were so bad and made it so much more difficult.
  • As with a lot of disasters like this, there were a lot of cases of people just avoiding disaster.
  • A Melvin Newell, who was 16 years old at the time, explained how they heard about the accident
  • and knew that that was the train that their father would have been on. After waiting anxiously at home, he arrived back at midnight.
  • Having had the charring Cross platform gates closed against him. A Tony Jones, he explained how his father
  • got the same train like clockwork. even if it meant running to Charing Cross station.
  • On the 4th of December, he found himself running for the train. But for the first time ever stopped and decided to get the next train.
  • Meaning he just missed the 518 Hayes electric train.

  • 36:01
  • Legacy and what changed in rail safety
  • The positive outcomes from this terrible, terrible disaster were the fact that the inquiry's strong endorsement of the ORS system.
  • is often cited as what caused the acceleration of ORS across lots of key routes across the country.
  • Visibility in cabs and windscreen improvements were made for certain locomotives that needed it.
  • And there was a doubling down in practice and training when it came to operating under fog conditions.
  • On that note, thanks for watching today's video. I hope you enjoyed it as much as that's not already possible.
  • I hope you found it interesting. If you did like subscribe, all that good stuff, leave a comment
  • if you really enjoyed the video, if you really hated it, I don't know because that stuff actually really does help out my videos on the channel.
  • Any of that engagement is good and helps me keep this going. So thanks for watching and I'll see you in the next one.


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