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UKRAINE THE CRIMEA FRONT The Military Show: Derussification of Crimea Begins NOW… Russians Flee in Droves PLAY YOUTUBE VIDEO Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3lxjY6lJ4G8
Derussification of Crimea Begins NOW… Russians Flee in Droves The Military Show Sep 10, 2025 1.84M subscribers ... 314,754 views ... 8.6K likes #militarystrategy #militarydevelopments #militaryanalysis Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Agency confirmed September 9 strikes that destroyed two of Russia’s key radar systems in occupied Crimea: the Podlet and the Nebo-M. Coming just after Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Day on September 7, these precision hits crippled critical air defense assets. Only days earlier, Ukrainian forces had eliminated two Mi-8 helicopters and a BUK-2190 tugboat, further degrading Russian capabilities on the peninsula. This cycle of strikes fits into a broader strategy that analysts say is designed to weaken Russia’s grip on Crimea while bleeding Moscow’s resources. Since 2014, Russia has poured billions into fortifying the region, but Ukraine’s systematic attacks continue to dismantle defenses and reopen the skies to Bayraktar drones. The strategy, aimed at de-Russification, signals a long-term plan for retaking Crimea. Support us directly as we bring you independent, up-to-date reporting on military news and global conflicts by clicking here: / @themilitaryshow #militarystrategy #militarydevelopments #militaryanalysis #themilitaryshow SOURCES: https://pastebin.com/xYxRstgD How this content was made Auto-dubbed Audio tracks for some languages were automatically generated. Learn more The Military Show Peter Burgess COMMENTARY Peter Burgess Transcript Transcript 0:00 It seems that barely a week goes by that news doesn’t break about Ukraine launching a successful strike against Russian assets in the annexed territory of Crimea. This week is no different, as is about to become clear. However, what many don’t realize about these strikes is that Ukraine has a plan here. A plan that goes beyond opening up aerial corridors for further strikes into Crimea and into Ukraine retaking the peninsula altogether. 0:28 Eliminating all traces of Russian influence is the goal. Vladimir Putin is terrified as 0:34 Russia’s control over Crimea crumbles, and it’s all happening because Ukraine 0:39 is using a very intelligent two-pronged strategy. Keep watching to find out what that strategy is. 0:46 First, Ukraine’s latest Crimean strikes are doozies. 0:49 On September 9, The Kyiv Post reported that Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Agency, or HUR, 0:56 reported that its special forces had destroyed a pair of Russian radar systems inside occupied 1:02 Crimea. These two radar systems, the “Podlet” and the “Nebo-M,” were taken out just before HUR 1:09 celebrated Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Day on September 7, meaning Ukraine just 1:15 forced Russia into providing the fireworks it needed to ensure that day went off with a bang. 1:21 Both of the destroyed radar systems are among the most valuable air defense assets that 1:26 Russia has in Crimea due to both being used to detect the types of low-flying drones and 1:31 aircraft that Ukraine uses for many of its attacks on the peninsula. The Nebo-M strike 1:37 was especially impressive, with HUR reporting that it managed to take out the radar system 1:43 while it was on the move to a new location. “These were precision strikes against high-value 1:48 air defense targets of the occupiers in temporarily occupied Crimea,” Ukrainian 1:54 intelligence said in a statement in which it reported the strike. And this is far from the 1:59 first time that Russia has lost valuable assets in Crimea during the last few weeks. On September 1, 2:06 The Kyiv Independent reported that Ukrainian intelligence managed to destroy a pair of Mi-8 2:11 helicopters based at the Hvardiiske military air base in Crimea. Each of those choppers 2:17 costs Russia between $20 and $30 million, and it’s this destruction of assets that cost money, 2:23 rather than the loss of asset capability, that plays right into Ukraine’s strategy. 2:29 But more on that in a moment. On the same day, and within the 2:32 same series of strikes, Ukraine also destroyed a BUK-2190 tugboat, which United24 Media reports 2:40 belonged to Russia’s Underwater Sabotage Forces and Means unit. This elite unit is filled with 2:47 combat divers who use specialized gear, meaning the loss of their support vessel is expected to 2:52 degrade their operational capabilities. What’s clear here is a pattern emerging. 2:57 Ukraine conducts strikes against multiple targets in a single day, 3:01 then pauses for a while. A few days later, there are more strikes. Then, another pause. And so on, 3:07 and so on, which is why it’s starting to feel like every week brings with it fresh news of Russian 3:13 assets being destroyed in Crimea. Ukraine is achieving something 3:17 very practical here. It’s something that isn’t 3:19 part of the two-pronged strategy that will be discussed later, but it’s still important. 3:24 Each of these strikes is taking out Crimean radar systems that are linked to air defense units, 3:30 such as Russia’s S-300s and S-400s. The idea here is simple. Rather than always trying to take out 3:37 these air defense units directly with drones, a tactic that carries a high risk of those drones 3:42 being shot out of the sky, Ukraine often focuses on blinding them instead. By striking the radar 3:48 stations those units need to detect and fire on targets, Crimea’s air defenses can be left 3:54 degraded until the stations are restored. In the immediate sense, HUR’s latest strike, 4:00 along with those it’s been conducting in Crimea over the past few weeks, is opening the door for 4:06 more attacks in Crimea in the future. This fact is exemplified, Euromaidan Press says 4:11 in a September 8 report, by the re-emergence of the Bayraktar drone in Ukraine’s arsenal. 4:17 The Bayraktar drone was one of the early stalwarts of Ukraine’s evolving drone warfare strategy, 4:23 though the use of Bayraktar drones has slowed down because of vulnerability to Russian air 4:27 defense systems and electronic warfare. The War Zone explained that this forced 4:32 a retreat from strike roles, with Ukraine also focusing heavily on manufacturing other drones 4:38 domestically. The Bayraktar essentially went on a long hiatus, The War Zone said on September 4, 4:45 though it has recently re-emerged. Ukraine is once again using that drone 4:49 to target assets in Crimea. For instance, Ukraine used Bayraktar drones to destroy a 4:55 high-speed Russian boat that was part of the Black Sea Fleet in early September. 5:00 That boat was carrying members of an airborne unit that was en route to the contested Tendrivska 5:06 Spit. According to Ukraine’s navy, seven members of that unit died, with another four being 5:11 injured, thanks to Ukraine’s Bayraktar drones. “Here, Ukraine has reignited one of its most 5:17 iconic weapons campaigns, unleashing a wave of Bayraktar drone strikes after systematically 5:23 dismantling Russia’s air defenses,” Euromaidan Press said on September 8. 5:28 “With the skies cleared and the battlefield exposed, the return of these drones has already 5:33 cost Russia hundreds of troops and naval vessels.” So, in the immediate, and very practical, sense, 5:39 Ukraine’s repeated strikes in Crimea serve an important purpose. Ukraine takes out Russian 5:45 assets, often those related to air defense in Crimea. That opens the door for drone assaults 5:51 against more tangible targets, such as the Bayraktar attack that killed several Russian 5:56 soldiers that was just mentioned. Then, the cycle repeats. More air defenses go down. More targets 6:03 get destroyed. On the surface, that cycle appears to be the beginning and end of Ukraine’s strategy. 6:09 It keeps on hurting Russia and, in the process, creates chaos in Crimea and the Black Sea. 6:15 However, Ukraine’s strategy goes deeper. Much deeper. 6:20 And soon, the video will reveal how strikes like the ones just described are are all part 6:25 of a long-term Ukrainian plan to de-Russify Crimea so that Ukraine can retake the peninsula once and 6:31 for all. This plan undoes all of the complexity surrounding the peninsula and will eventually 6:36 lead to Ukraine retaking Crimea as long as it can hold the course and keep doing what it’s doing. 6:42 But first, some context. The man who has uncovered 6:45 Ukraine’s strategy is Paul Warburg, a geopolitical analyst who regularly publishes his commentaries 6:51 and theories about what Ukraine is trying to achieve in Crimea on YouTube. Warburg says that to 6:57 understand Ukraine’s two-pronged approach to the Crimean Peninsula, one must first consider what 7:02 that territory means to both Russia and Ukraine. “There’s a reason that this is a disputed piece 7:07 of territory in the first place, and that’s because both Ukrainians and Russians want it.” 7:13 In particular, Crimea holds as much symbolic importance to Russia as it does strategic, 7:18 to the point where retaining the peninsula is burned into the collective Russian mindset. 7:23 This was evident back in 2014, when Russia annexed the peninsula. According to Sky News, 7:29 the success of this annexation led to “Krym Nash,” which translates to “Crimea is ours,” 7:35 becoming a patriotic rallying cry in the country. Putin himself has called Crimea “a sacred place,” 7:41 the same outlet notes, again highlighting how important the peninsula is to him and 7:46 the Russian people, on a symbolic level. More evidence of this importance comes from 7:51 what Russia did in Crimea after the annexation. Putin had always argued that Crimea should have 7:56 always been Russian territory, and he set about making the peninsula as Russian as he 8:01 could possibly make it after 2014. Those actions are one of the things that make 8:06 retaking Crimea so complex, as Warburg points out. “The main complexity here comes down to the fact 8:12 that when Russia took Crimea from Ukraine back in 2014, they very intentionally moved a very 8:18 large group of ethnic Russians onto the Crimean Peninsula to make it a humanitarian crisis, 8:25 in the international perspective, if Ukraine ever took this piece of territory back.” 8:30 In other words, Ukraine going in all guns blazing to retake Crimea 8:34 would result in the deaths of ethnic Russians that Putin could use for propaganda purposes. 8:40 Warburg isn’t wrong about the mass movement of ethnic Russians to Crimea. Back in 2018, 8:46 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that around 247,000 Russians had moved to Crimea in the 8:53 four years since Russia annexed it. This influx was accompanied by the exits of 140,000 people 8:59 who used to live on the peninsula, most of whom were either Ukrainian or Crimean Tatars. Again, 9:05 this was all purposeful, both to reinforce Russia’s symbolic hold over Crimea and to create 9:11 the grounds for the crisis Warburg mentions should Ukraine ever try to take it back. 9:16 So, a direct assault isn’t possible for that reason alone. 9:20 However, another reason why Crimea is such a complex prospect for Ukraine comes from the 9:25 technical challenge involved in an assault. Even taking the peninsula’s Russification 9:31 out of the equation, the extremely narrow point of potential ingress 9:35 presents major problems, as Warburg observes. “Crimea, of course, for all intents and purposes, 9:40 might as well be an island. It is technically a peninsula, but it is 9:46 only barely a peninsula with a very small land bridge to the rest of the Ukrainian mainland.” 9:52 It’s this land bridge that creates problems, not due to its existence, but because it serves as a 9:57 chokepoint. Even assuming that Ukraine could spare the troops to launch a full-blown land assault on 10:03 Crimea, those soldiers would get stuck at this very narrow point of access. That assault would 10:08 turn into a grinding war of attrition, leading to Ukraine losing far more soldiers than it’s willing 10:13 to lose to retake the peninsula. As Warburg notes, “Really, there is only the Kerch Strait Bridge 10:20 in the east, and then the actual peninsula in the west. And these are chokepoints that make 10:26 it very easy for Russia to, for example, set up defenses here, set up mines, pre-target artillery, 10:33 things like that, and just rain hell on any army that is trying to cross over there.” 10:40 A ground assault would end up in the massacre of Ukrainian forces, 10:43 all while Putin pumped out the symbolic propaganda of Ukraine attempting to commit 10:48 a war crime by attacking a peninsula that is predominantly Russian, albeit by Putin’s design. 10:54 Russia has essentially turned Crimea into a trap for Ukraine. 10:58 There is no way to retake the peninsula with a direct attack because of its Russification 11:03 and the technical challenges inherent to such an attack. Admittedly, this is all very smart 11:08 on Russia’s part. However, if there is anything that Ukraine has proven during 11:13 its battle against Russia, it’s that it can come up with innovative strategies that nobody else, 11:18 particularly Russia, can see coming. And when it comes to Crimea, Warburg believes that Ukraine 11:23 has created a plan that will eventually wrest control of the peninsula out of Putin’s hands, 11:28 restoring it to Ukraine while overcoming the complexities Russia has created in the process. 11:34 This isn’t a short-term plan. It’s not something that Ukraine 11:38 can pull off in a matter of weeks or months, but that’s okay for Ukraine. While the country 11:43 would much prefer not to be fighting a war with Russia at all, it’s willing to bide its 11:47 time to implement the two-pronged strategy that Warburg says will see it win in the 11:52 end. And the first of those prongs is simple: Allow Russia to make mistakes by preying on 11:58 the nation’s psychological connection to Crimea. Warburg invites people to look at how Ukraine’s 12:04 approach to Crimea has evolved over the course of the war. 12:07 “Early on in the war, Crimea became a massive target for Ukraine. They started destroying 12:13 everything around Crimea that they could. Whether that be air defenses, whether that 12:17 be especially the Russian Navy, any types of military assets in and around Crimea, making 12:23 Russia really terrified that they may actually lose control of the peninsula in a lot of ways.” 12:29 Warburg’s point is perfectly demonstrated by the fate of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Once thought 12:35 to be critical to Putin’s plan to use the Black Sea, accessible for Crimea, to control Ukraine, 12:41 that fleet is now nearly irrelevant to the war. At least a third of it has been destroyed 12:45 by Ukraine’s missiles and drones, and, as The Atlantic Council said in July 2024, Ukraine has 12:52 forced the fleet’s complete withdrawal from Crimea in a series of actions that humiliated Putin and 12:58 rubbished his constant claims of escalation. More recent strikes, like those reported on in 13:04 this video, may seem like they follow the all-out template that Ukraine created earlier in the war. 13:09 But they don’t. And it’s the subtle shift in Ukraine’s 13:12 strategy that is causing Russia to make mistakes. Warburg says that Ukraine has shifted to a 13:18 big burst strategy that sees it take out a bunch of Russia's military assets in Crimea, 13:23 only to pause for a while. This is the cycle of strikes mentioned earlier in the video, 13:28 and the pauses are as much a part of Ukraine’s plan as the strikes themselves. These pauses are 13:34 intentional because they give Russia time to rebuild what Ukraine has destroyed. Once the 13:39 rebuilding work is complete, another big burst of strikes will follow, then a pause, and so on. 13:45 This seems counterintuitive, right? Why would Ukraine want to encourage 13:49 Russia to rebuild during its pauses? It all comes down to the fact that rebuilding 13:54 costs money that Russia can’t afford to spend, but Putin feels like he has to spend that money due to 13:59 the psychological and symbolic aspects of Russia’s connection to Crimea, as Warburg explains. 14:06 “Basically, because Crimea is seen as such an important piece of territory to the Russians, 14:10 they just can’t let it sit with the appearance of being undefended. And that means that every time 14:16 Ukraine destroys military fortifications here, they know that Russia will invest resources in 14:22 rebuilding those fortifications, even if, from a strategic perspective, it makes no sense.” 14:28 That’s the psychological play in action, as Ukraine is taking advantage of how vital it 14:33 is for the Kremlin to show the Russian people it has moved to Crimea that their government 14:38 is doing everything it can to protect them. If that protection isn’t there, 14:42 those ethnic Russians will want to leave, which feeds into the second prong of Ukraine’s strategy 14:48 that will be addressed in a moment. Of course, protection costs money. 14:52 Russia is no stranger to spending big to reinforce its hold on Crimea. Five years after Russia 14:57 annexed the peninsula, Russia Matters reported that the renowned Russian economist Sergei 15:03 Aleksashenko said that Russia has spent $10.6 billion in federal subsidies on Crimea between 15:10 2014 and 2019. State-owned Russian companies had poured another $9.1 billion into Crimea during 15:17 the same period, according to Aleksashenko, and that’s all without even considering the financial 15:23 impact of the sanctions and restrictions placed on Crimea in the wake of the annexation. Fast-forward 15:29 to 2025, and the Royal United Services Institute says that Russia has two state programs in place 15:36 to keep funding pouring into both Crimea and the occupied territories inside Ukraine. 15:41 Much of this money is for maintenance. Add the tremendous cost of the Ukraine war on top, 15:47 which some estimate to be costing Russia up to $1 billion per day. Then, add the financial 15:52 burden created by Ukraine taking out military assets that Russia needs to have in place for 15:57 Crimea to remain an attractive place to live, and the strategy becomes clearer. Ukraine just 16:03 needs to keep rinsing and repeating the big burst strategy, and it’s going to get results. Warburg 16:08 says that Ukraine knows it can bleed Russia dry with this cycle of attacks and rebuilding. 16:13 “And that, again, removes resources from the rest of the battlelines in Russia, 16:19 where they could potentially be used even more.” Ukraine has created a win-win situation. 16:24 Putin is being forced into choosing between spending on strategically important resources 16:29 or replacing lost assets in Crimea that don’t really matter in the wider context of the 16:34 Ukraine invasion, but are absolutely necessary for the ethnic Russians now living in Crimea 16:39 to feel at least somewhat safe. Something will have to give, 16:42 which leads to the second prong: Leave a golden bridge that allows 16:46 those living in Crimea to escape. When using the word “bridge” in the 16:50 context of Crimea, thoughts immediately turn to the Kerch Strait Bridge. In addition to being 16:55 another example of Russia’s massive investment into its annexation of Crimea, that bridge also 17:01 links Crimea to mainland Russia. Of course, that leads many to make the obvious call that Ukraine 17:07 should focus on destroying this bridge. It has certainly hit the bridge in the past, 17:11 most recently in June, when it damaged some of the bridge’s supports using underwater explosives. And 17:16 now, Ukraine is on the verge of mass-producing the new Flamingo missile, which will pack 17:21 a 2,500-pound warhead, which is roughly 1,135 kilograms of high explosives. That is more than 17:29 enough to cause such serious damage to the Kerch Strait Bridge to make it practically unusable. 17:35 But Ukraine won’t do that. Why? 17:38 Warburg explains: “Ukraine’s goal might not be to 17:41 actually take out the bridge, but merely to signal that they could take out the bridge. Because, 17:47 if you are a Russian who has been planted in Crimea by your government and you are now sensing, 17:55 for example, that Ukrainian forces might move on to Crimea very soon, and that your only lifeline 18:02 back to Russia without going through occupied territory that’s basically a military combat 18:06 zone is over this bridge. If that bridge keeps getting attacked to where you think it could 18:11 be destroyed any day, that is going to ramp up the speed that you actually leave Crimea.” 18:17 Creating fear is the point of the entire Crimea strategy for Ukraine. 18:22 The Kerch Strait Bridge has survived for so long not because Ukraine can’t destroy it, but because 18:27 many observers believe Ukraine may want the bridge to remain as an escape route. This is the genius 18:33 part of the Ukrainian strategy. The country knows that it can’t attack Crimea head-on for 18:38 the humanitarian and technical reasons discussed earlier in the video. But it can make the ethnic 18:43 Russians who live in Crimea feel unsafe. So unsafe that they start thinking about leaving 18:48 the peninsula. And if those thoughts about leaving are eventually combined with Russia no longer 18:53 being able to rebuild the military assets Ukraine is destroying, then Russia is in serious trouble. 18:59 The Kerch Strait Bridge transforms from a logistical artery into a lifeline for the Russians 19:04 living in Crimea. An escape route. A way out from the threat that Ukraine poses, even though Ukraine 19:10 isn’t attacking civilians directly. By keeping that lifeline open while repeatedly signaling 19:16 that it could be destroyed at any time, Ukraine may not have to force Russia out of Crimea. 19:21 The Russians living there will do that themselves. Then, all of Putin’s carefully laid plans for 19:27 keeping control over Crimea crumble, and Ukraine finally achieves a route back onto the peninsula. 19:34 The obvious downside to this Ukrainian plan is that it will take time, as Russia needs to be 19:39 bled dry of the financial resources it uses to support Crimea’s defenses. But Ukraine is 19:45 working on that. In August, it pulled off a Black Sea raid that obliterated everything in sight, 19:51 heaping yet more pressure onto Putin. Find out more about that raid in our video, and remember 19:56 to subscribe to The Military Show for more videos covering Ukraine’s attempts to retake Crimea.

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