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UKRAINE MISSILES AND DRONES The Military Show: Ukraine's New FLAMINGO Missile Will Send Russia Back to STONE AGE PLAY YOUTUBE VIDEO Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUBOwcYknUM
Ukraine's New FLAMINGO Missile Will Send Russia Back to STONE AGE The Military Show Sep 7, 2025 1.84M subscribers ... 407,970 views ... 11K likes #themilitaryshow #militarydevelopments #militaryanalysis Ukraine has unveiled the Flamingo cruise missile — a powerful new weapon with extraordinary range and payload. Built to strike deep inside Russia, it marks a major leap in Ukraine’s long-range capabilities and could redefine the balance of the war. Combining advanced engineering with battlefield necessity, the Flamingo stands out as one of the most formidable systems yet revealed. Support us directly as we bring you independent, up-to-date reporting on military news and global conflicts by clicking here: / @themilitaryshow #militarystrategy #militarydevelopments #militaryanalysis #themilitaryshow SOURCES: https://pastebin.com/rLkSVBcF How this content was made Auto-dubbed Audio tracks for some languages were automatically generated. Learn more The Military Show 1.84M subscribers Peter Burgess COMMENTARY The number of different models of drone now available for use by Ukriane in its war against Russia is impressive ... but probably something of a nightmare to manage effectively. The Ukraine military os probably a lot more adept at deploying a wide range of different munitions than most militaries ... but it stiall must be something of a constraint Some of these drones and some of this offensive rockets are very expensive ... but how much of this number of profiteering by manufacturers and suppliers and how much is the 'cost' is not clear. Over the years, I have been exposed to both cost and price in an industrial setting. I was ttrained as an engineer. an economist and an accountant before working in corporate managementin the United States and workding on national level planning with the UN and the World Bank. In a variety of roles, I have been shocked at the lack of competent cost and profit analysis at a high level in decision making, especially related to military procurement. In a war setting, manufacturers and suppliers essentially control the price ... nad gives them impressive profits. This applied in WWII and is happening now with military supplies for Ukraine. In my view this was wrong post WWII and is wrong with respect to the war in Ukraine! Why does nobody care ... and do the accounting! Peter Burgess Transcript 0:00 It’s big. It’s fast. It packs a devastating punch. And it can travel much deeper inside Russia than anything else in Ukraine’s arsenal. It’s Ukraine’s newly unveiled cruise missile, the Flamingo, and it could be about to give Ukraine a decisive edge in its war of long-range strikes against targets deep inside Russia. Let’s take a deep dive into Ukraine’s latest battlefield innovation and what it might mean for the outcome of the war. The existence of the Flamingo was first revealed in a post on Facebook by Associated Press photojournalist Efrem Lukatsky. The timing of the reveal was particularly pertinent. The following day, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was due to arrive in Washington, D.C. for crucial talks with U.S. President Donald Trump, who had held historic but controversial talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin a few days earlier. Zelenskyy was accompanied by a posse of European leaders, including NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, European Commission Chairwoman Ursula von der Leyen, British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and Italian 1:01 Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. Their intention was to convince Trump to maintain support for Ukraine and to demonstrate that Ukraine still had the wherewithal to continue resisting Russia’s invasion and take the fight back to them. So, the unveiling of a potentially game-changing new weapon on the eve of this important summit certainly strengthened the hand of the so-called “Coalition of the Willing.” Over the following week, more details about the Flamingo emerged, and it certainly appears to have increased the scope of Ukraine’s offensive capabilities. The Flamingo reportedly has a range of around 1,864 miles and packs a warhead weighing around 2,535 pounds. It’s a land-based cruise missile, with videos showing Flamingos being launched from rails mounted on two two-axle trailers, then climbing sharply right after launch. Both in terms of range and explosive power, it’s a substantial upgrade on the long-range attack weapons currently being used by Ukraine. That’s crucial because it enables Ukraine to strike deeper inside Russia and with much more deadly consequences. Outmanned and outgunned on the battlefield, Ukraine is 2:01 bravely resisting Russian advances all along the frontline, with little evidence that it has the manpower or firepower to force the Russians out of the territories it has occupied through ground battles alone. However, Ukraine’s nightly mass drone and missile attacks deep inside Russia have become much more than just a pain in the backside for Russia. In particular, a series of strikes on Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure during August have reportedly shut down the Druzhba pipeline that transports Russian gas to Hungary and Slovakia, and reduced its overall oil output by 13.5 percent. Given that oil and gas make up at least 20 percent of the revenues Russia needs to fund its war machine, that’s got to hurt. And yet, until now, the amount of damage that Ukraine can do has been limited by the range and payload of its current fleet of attack drones and missiles. The Flamingo threatens to change that equation dramatically. In terms of longer-range missiles, Ukraine only really had two Soviet-era Russian missiles in its arsenal when Russia invaded in February 2022 – the SS-21 SCARAB, aka Tochka, and the Tu-143 Reys, along with some of the similar 3:01 but older Tu-141 Strizh. The Reys and Strizh are actually jet-powered reconnaissance drones that were converted into rudimentary cruise missiles by the wily Ukrainians. The Tochka was the backbone of Ukraine's tactical ballistic missile forces at the outbreak of the war, and scored some notable successes, including the sinking of the landing ship Saratov in Berdyansk on the Sea of Azov in March 2022 – the first major Russian naval loss of the war. However, stockpiles of these missiles seem to have been depleted, with very little heard about them in 2025. In any event, with a range of between nine and 75 miles, depending on the variant, and a circular error probability of up to 500 feet, the impact of these missiles was limited. Following the outbreak of the war, Ukraine then introduced the Neptune – a subsonic anti-ship missile based on the Soviet-era SS-N-25 SWITCHBLADE, or Kh-35, missile adapted for use from the land. The Neptune is a close analog of the U.S.-made RGM-84 Harpoon missile, which has also been used effectively by Ukraine in strikes against Russian sea- and land-based assets. For example, on June 17, 2022, Ukraine sank 4:03 the Russian navy ship Spasatel Vasily Bekh off Snake Island with two RGM-84 Harpoon missiles, although some sources claimed they were actually Neptunes. But again, with a range of over 180 miles and a warhead weighing 330 pounds, its scope and destructive power are restricted. With limited stocks of the Neptune and dwindling stocks of its older Soviet missiles, for most of 2023 and 2024, Ukraine was reliant on NATO supplies for the bulk of its missile stock. Most notable of those are the HIMARS, which have become one of the iconic weapons of the war. To be more precise, Ukraine typically uses the M-31 GLMRS, or guided multiple launch rocket system variant of the system, which can be fired by Ukraine's tracked M270 MLRS vehicles. HIMARS technically refers to the variant fired from wheeled vehicles. The M31 rocket has a minimum engagement range of 9.3 miles and can strike targets up to 43 miles away, with its 200-pound high-explosive warhead impacting at a speed of Mach 2.5. They’ve been highly effective at eliminating Russian equipment, radar stations, 5:03 command posts, and logistics in the immediate rear, but don’t have the range to threaten targets deeper inside Russia. France’s Hammer or AASM, short for Armement Air-Sol Modulaire, which has also been supplied to Ukraine in significant numbers, also has a range of around 43 miles. Although it’s technically a guided 550-pound bomb with a small rocket motor rather than a missile per se, it does the same job. Similarly, the U.S.’s AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon, or JSOW, is another glide bomb Ukraine uses as a missile. The JSOW is unpowered, has a low-altitude range of 12 nautical miles and a high-altitude range of 63 nautical miles. It also packs a much heavier warhead of either 500 or 1,000 pounds, depending on the variant. But, again, it’s not really a missile, and can’t strike deep inside Russia. The British Storm Shadow and French analog SCALP-EG, which have also been extensively used by Ukraine, are bona fide missiles and have definitely given Ukraine an extended scope for more powerful and precise long-distance strikes. They boast an operational range of between 150 and 340 miles, and carry a 1,000-pound multistage 6:05 BROACH penetration warhead payload. Another very effective imported missile is the U.S.-made M-39 ATACMS. Introduced into Ukraine in late 2023, it has an operational range of up to 190 miles and carries a payload of 470 to 560 pounds or up to 950 M74 bomblets, depending on the variant. These imported missiles have undoubtedly played a major role in the Ukrainian war effort to date, helping Ukraine to destroy countless Russian equipment and troops, damage logistics and infrastructure in the rear, and force the Black Sea Fleet to flee from Crimea, among other successes. However, Russia is not exactly the smallest nation in the world, and as it has pulled more and more of its resources outside the range of Ukraine’s missiles, the need for longer-range strike weapons has become more of an imperative for Ukraine. Missiles are typically very expensive, costing hundreds of thousands of dollars each to make, if not millions. All of Ukraine’s state revenues are already being applied towards the war effort, leaving the nation entirely dependent on foreign 7:01 aid and loans to pay its civilian bills, salaries, and pensions. So, primarily, Ukraine has developed long-range strike drones to meet its needs as opposed to missiles, because they’re much cheaper to produce, especially to scale. This drone arsenal is impressive – arguably the best in the world – especially given the constrained, wartime circumstances in which they were developed. And their range keeps improving – although they’re constrained by the payload they can carry. This is particularly true over very long distances, where the weight of the payload can impact the speed and accuracy of the drones, increasing the risk of malfunction and making them easier to shoot down. There are a few imported drones in the Ukrainian arsenal, such as the British Dart 250, with a payload of 55 pounds and a range of over 155 miles, and the Banshee Jet 80-plus aerial target drone, used as a kamikaze drone. Turkish-Pakistani Y-III drones are also known to have been used by Ukraine to attack targets inside Russia, although the payload and range specs are not clear. The imported drone with the longest range is probably the Swiss-made Destinus Lord, with a payload of up 8:02 to 55 pounds and a range of between 465 and 1,240 miles. These imported drones have all reportedly been shot down inside Russia, but many others probably found their mark. But the vast majority of the long-range strike drones that Ukraine is using inside Russia are Ukrainian-designed and produced. There are at least a dozen different long-range attack drones that have been identified, and several others that seem to be prototypes or special one-off creations. Some of them, like the Ukrjet UJ-22 Airborne, have a traditional light aircraft layout with a tractor propeller at the front and simple straight wings and fixed undercarriage. With a payload of up to 44 pounds, these large drones have a range of around 500 miles. Similarly, the Aeroprakt A-22 Foxbat UAV is a Ukrainian two-seat, high-wing, tricycle landing gear ultralight aircraft that has been converted by the Ukrainian Armed Forces into a loitering munition for long-range strikes. With an estimated range of 620 miles and an adjustable payload, it’s been used for various strikes deep 9:00 inside Russia. Notably, it was identified as the drone responsible for hitting the major Russian Geran-drone manufacturing facility in Yelabuga, Tatarstan, in April 2024. That’s over 800 miles from the Ukrainian-Russian border, suggesting that either the drone has a longer range than has been estimated, or was possibly smuggled into Russia and launched from there. So clearly, these aircraft drones can be highly effective. But their relatively large size, slow speeds, and noisy approach make them somewhat easier to identify and shoot down, even when they fly at lower altitudes. That’s why most of Ukraine’s long-range attack drones are of the jet-powered variety. The UJ-25 Skyline, for example, is a jet-powered loitering munition developed by Ukrjet as a weaponized version of the UJ-23 Topaz target drone. It has a potential strike range of around 500 miles, and reportedly carries a 22-pound explosive warhead. The UJ-26 Bober, or Beaver, is another well-known jet-powered UAV that has reportedly entered mass production and has been used to attack Moscow. Featuring a distinctive canard layout with a sleek fuselage and inverted tail, the Beaver has a range of around 620 miles and a payload of around 44 pounds. Arguably, 10:05 the most important Ukrainian long-range strike drone is the An-196 Liutyi, which translates as “fierce.” It has a reported operational range of 620 to 1,240 miles, with the extended range achievable through increased fuel capacity or lighter payloads. Its payload capacity has been upgraded from an initial 110 pounds to a maximum of around 165 pounds, with the enhanced version successfully used to strike targets over 375 miles away from the Ukrainian border. On July 26, Liutyi drones slammed into the Signal plant in Stavropol, which manufactures radar and electronic warfare systems. The Liutyi is also one of Ukraine’s most expensive drones to manufacture, coming in at around $200,000 each. However, underscoring its importance for the Ukrainian Defense Forces, in July, Germany announced that it would be funding the production of as many as 500 of them. At the same time, Germany will also be funding the Bars, Ukraine’s first mass-producible cruise missile. That process may already be underway. According to the pro-Ukraine Conflict Intelligence 11:04 Team, by July, both the Liutyi and the Bars were “being deployed on the front line with increasing frequency.” Indeed, a photo of the Stavropol attack seems to show the first visuals of a downed Bars missile. Not too much is known yet about the Bars, although it’s estimated to have a similar range to the Liutyi, while packing a much bigger warhead and traveling at least twice as fast as the Liutyi’s 199 miles per hour. So, there’s at least one other advanced Ukrainian missile besides the Flamingo seemingly ready for mass production – albeit with only around one-third of the range in its extended-range version. There was another – the Sapsan ballistic missile system, also known by its export designation Hrim-2. However, a week before the unveiling of the Flamingo, Russia’s Federal Security Service, the FSB, claimed it had destroyed existing stockpiles of the Sapsan, plus the “technical base” for the missile’s production capacity. The FSB said it had discovered the locations of buildings and air defense systems involved in the production and protection of the Sapsan ballistic missile system in the Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk regions, 12:01 and destroyed them. Objective control footage released by the FSB certainly shows several industrial enterprises being devastated, although whether these were actually the facilities the FSB claims they were is an open question. The Sapsan had entered serial production, was being actively used, and was even available for export. Officially announced in June, it has an operational range of 435 miles and has already been used to attack targets inside Russia. It carries a warhead of around 1,050 pounds, but what sets it apart among Ukraine’s other missiles and drones is its phenomenal speed – over 3,000 miles per hour. That makes it impervious to all but Russia’s most advanced air defense systems. And it’s anticipated that the same will apply to the Flamingo. The Flamingo, a product of Kyiv-based manufacturer Fire Point, is significantly slower than the Sapsan, with a cruise speed of around 590 miles per hour. That’s in part down to its weight. At over 13,000 pounds – four times that of the American Tomahawk cruise missile – that weight might reduce its speed somewhat, but it’s also what enables the Flamingo to lug such a heavy 13:01 warhead over such great distances. To an extent, the Flamingo can indeed be compared like-for-like with the Tomahawk. In fact, Fire Point has gone so far as to claim that the Flamingo is a substantial improvement on the U.S.’s legendary sea-launched missile. “(Tomahawks), firstly, are outdated; secondly, they are much worse in terms of technical characteristics. They have absolutely everything worse than today’s Flamingos. …,” a company representative claimed, adding that Tomahawks are also “five times more expensive.” The total cost of a single Tomahawk missile, including development, procurement, operational, and maintenance expenses, starts at around $1.87 million, but can be as high as $2 million. Assuming Fire Point’s math is correct, that puts the unit cost of a Flamingo anywhere between $350,000 and $2 million each. So, given Ukraine’s stretched budget, it’s likely that a production partnership similar to the German Bars arrangement will be required to properly ramp up production to the numbers Ukraine needs. Perhaps that partnership already exists, to an extent. Observers like defense industry website The War Zone, or TWZ, have pointed out that the Flamingo is “extremely similar, if not 14:03 identical,” to the FP-5 missile made by UAE-based Milanion. Its design and specifications align almost exactly with Milanion’s brochure. The exact nature of the relationship between Fire Point and Milanion – if any – isn’t clear. However, it is possible that through Milanion’s British links, the UK might already be surreptitiously fueling the Flamingo’s development. Besides the cost, in most other respects, Fire Point’s claim about the Flamingo being superior to the Tomahawk may be exaggerated, but not to a significant extent. The Tomahawk remains a devastating weapon, as evidenced during the U.S.’s bombing of Iran’s nuclear sites in June with 30 submarine-launched Tomahawks. On paper, the Flamingo outranges most Tomahawk versions, carries more than double the payload, and flies slightly faster. Where Tomahawk still holds an edge is in its proven TERCOM guidance system, which allows it to resist GPS jamming — a crucial factor in Ukraine’s electronic warfare environment. By contrast, the Flamingo is understood to use more vulnerable inertial and satellite guidance. The Flamingo’s massive size – a 19.7-foot wingspan 15:03 and six-ton launch weight – coupled with its simple, straight wing design, is what gives it its exceptional range and payload-carrying capacity, and makes it cheaper to produce than most of its peers. However, these features also make it much easier to detect, especially since, again according to TWZ, with “what looks like zero attempts at signature control, the Flamingo is far from immune to interception.” True, Ukraine has achieved, and continues to achieve considerable success at striking Russian facilities with drones and missiles with inferior detection and prevention than the Flamingo. But the more expensive the missiles are, the less impressed Ukraine will be watching them being shot down. The Flamingo is poised to play a crucial role in Ukraine’s ongoing war of long-range strikes against Russian targets. Ukraine’s long-range drones and other missiles have proven highly effective at hitting Russian targets. However, with most of them packing warheads at least five times less powerful than the Flamingo, they’re limited in how much damage they can do. Ukraine can hit sensitive items like the distillation tower at an oil refinery, causing production at the refinery to stop while 16:02 repairs are carried out. But they just aren’t powerful enough to take out the entire refinery, as heavy Russian missile barrages did during August in Kremenchug and near Odessa. Similarly, Ukraine has hit the massive Geran drone factory in Yelabuga, Tatarstan at least once, disrupting production in one of the workshops. But within months of the strike, the facility had expanded to a massive 525,000-square-foot facility, reportedly producing 5,000 Gerans monthly. It would probably take dozens, if not hundreds, of drones to destroy the facility completely, whereas just a handful of Flamingos could likely do the job quickly and super-effectively. The most effective way to use them is likely to be in combination strikes using a variety of attack and decoy drones, along with Flamingos and possibly other, less valuable missiles. The decoys draw air defense fire, and the drones target air defense systems and poignant, smaller targets. That clears the way for the heavy Flamingos to wreak havoc on large targets such as airfields and industrial factories like Yelabuga. For now, although Ukraine claims the Flamingo has already been used in combat, 17:00 we wait for more information on how many exist, how many are being produced, how they’re being used, and what damage they’re inflicting. But one thing’s for sure – if the Flamingo lives up to its potential, Putin will have a whole new set of highly destructive problems to lose sleep over. We’ll definitely keep you updated on the progress here on the Military Show, so make sure to smash that Subscribe button so you don’t miss out. Thanks for watching.

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