TrueValueMetrics ... Impact Accounting for the 21st Century

Date: 2025-10-14 Page is: DBtxt003.php txt00029114

RUSSIA SERIOUS WAR SHORTAGES Moscow Streets Brink of Chaos—Russian Workers Turn on Putin as Gasoline Crisis Hits Factories PLAY YOUTUBE VIDEO Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkN-9LZ6u7o
Moscow Streets Brink of Chaos—Russian Workers Turn on Putin as Gasoline Crisis Hits Factories PPR GLOBAL Sep 2, 2025 774K subscribers ... 270,528 views ... 5.4K likes #militarydevelopments #ukrainewarupdate #ukrainewar #ukrainewar #ukrainewarupdate #military #militarydevelopments #militarystrategy A summer export ban couldn’t stop Russia’s fuel crunch. Wholesale A‑95 set fresh records on SPIMEX while long queues and 10‑liter limits appeared in Far Eastern regions. The proximate cause isn’t demand—it’s supply friction: repeated Ukrainian strikes on refineries and pumping nodes, maintenance delays under sanctions, and stretched rail/pipeline logistics. The Unecha (Druzhba) disruption briefly cut flows to EU neighbors, highlighting how external commitments collide with domestic scarcity. Moscow redirected barrels inward, but that shrinks export revenue just as repair, insurance, and defense bills rise. Meanwhile, EU “Package 18” tightens pressure on shadow fleets and bars refined products made from Russian crude via third countries—further squeezing flexibility. The result: a war economy juggling rationed pumps, pricier wholesale, and refinery downtime. If refinery “uptime” doesn’t recover into winter, controlled sales could become routine across northern and eastern regions. And here are the links for Fundraiser #2 — a joint campaign by UNITED24 and Saint Javelin to raise $150,000 for an AI-controlled turret: 🔗 https://u24.gov.ua/news/saint-sentine... ALLIES OF STEEL: Fundraiser for lifesaving ground robots 🔗 https://u24.gov.ua/allies-of-steel?ut... Sources: [1]: https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-sto... 'Russia extends permission for producers to export ...' [2]: https://commersant.ge/en/news/busines... 'Russian gasoline prices hit record high' [3]: https://www.reuters.com/business/ener... 'Russia could face gasoline shortages despite export ban ...' [4]: https://www.perezllorca.com/wp-conten... 'The European Union adopts the 18th package of restrictive measures ...' [5]: https://caliber.az/en/post/ai-95-petr... 'Ai-95 petrol breaks all-time record in Russia' [6]: https://www.bundle.app/tr/gundem/regu... 'Regular gasoline prices record high on SPIMEX' How this content was made Auto-dubbed Audio tracks for some languages were automatically generated. Learn more Peter Burgess COMMENTARY Peter Burgess Transcript 0:00 [Music] These massive columns of people and cars you see are not fleeing from a catastrophic disaster. This is the image of the Kremlin's new desperation, reminiscent of the Soviet collapse in the early 1990s. Millions of Russians are now waiting angrily at gas stations. Production lines are halted and thousands of workers are on permanent vacation. The oligarchs are looking for a way out. And now Russia is fighting its own invisible enemy, fuel shortages. What follows is much darker for the Kremlin. In Russia, everything depends on oil. From the state coffers to the front lines, from the oligarch's luxury yachts to the civilian kitchen, everything runs on oil. Throughout Putin's 25 years in power, the public has always been promised, 'We are an energy superpower. Our gas and oil are unlimited.' But for the first time, ordinary Russian citizens are seeing the collapse of this lie with their own 1:00 eyes. But now these veins are being cut off one by one. Ukraine's refinery attacks in recent months are dealing blow after blow to Putin's fuel empire. Riyazan, Sizan, Vulgrad, Samara, Lennengrad. The giant refineries once the pride of the Kremlin are now reduced to piles of ash. According to Washington, Russian oil capacity has fallen by 20%. White House press secretary Caroline Leit made the announcement on August 28th. Ukraine recently dialed a blow to Russia's oil refineries. They have taken out, as a matter of fact, 20% of Russia's oil refinery capacity over the course of their attacks throughout the month of August. Now, gas station pumps are empty. The public is silent. Production lines are shut down. And thousands of workers have been placed on indefinite leave. Russians can no longer fill their cars with gas. Farmers cannot plow their fields. and truck drivers cannot transport their cargo. And this time, the people waiting in line are not just impatient. They are also angry and 2:01 helpless. The oligarch's profit channels have narrowed. Shadow fleet insurance has become more expensive and profit margins have shrunk. The structure Putin called an invincible war economy is now crumbling under the feet of people searching for gasoline in cans. This is not just a domestic consumption problem. Russia's oil and gas commitments to China and India are about to go up in smoke. The evidence of the breakdown can be seen in the fires and bans at refineries. The Russian government announced Wednesday that the temporary ban on gasoline exports first imposed in late July will now run until October 31. The Russian government restricted gasoline exports at the end of July and tightened the ban. Yet cues in the domestic market grew longer. Increases of nearly 50% since the beginning of the year were reported on the A95 line and sales were reduced or halted at some stations in the south, in the occupied territories and in the Far East. Days 3:00 when the pumps ran dry followed one after another. The shortage is not only explained by seasonal tourism and harvest demand. The blow to the supply side creates a permanent risk. The export ban fixes the window dressing in the short term, but in the background, stock shortages and repair delays are growing. All this combined with the decision to prioritize domestic fuel is also eroding export revenues as capacity losses coincide with seasonal demand. Buffers are eroding and politics leaves little room for maneuver. The Kremlin is engaged in a daily balancing act between keeping retail prices stable and maintaining supply. The political face of the pressure is felt by the elite whose income flows from oil and gas. Restrictions imposed to maintain domestic prices are narrowing export margins and eating into the exchange rate price balance. From an investor's perspective, the risk premium is increasing. Insurance conditions are becoming more difficult and the supply 4:00 repair cycle is lengthening. This scenario means a top-down cut in the cash flow financing the war. In Moscow's elite circles, the question extension strategy or return to the table is being whispered more frequently. There is even talk of seeking political concessions in exchange for the release of frozen assets. As the war budget grows, income elasticity is falling and domestic demand is becoming strained. High interest rates are blocking investments and stress is becoming apparent in company balance sheets. The Kremlin is getting closer every day to budget cuts or new tax discussions. International press has published analyses voicing the elitees concerns about the sustainability of the current line. Profit losses at the company level are adding to revenue losses at the country level. Giants such as Lucille and Ross Nef are facing simultaneous pressures both in the field and in the market. Ross Neft led by Igor Setchin 5:01 has been forced into more expensive supply channels under the shadow of sanctions for process catalysts and spare parts. Novatek's liqufied gas and condensate chain through Leonid Mickelson and Gennady Timchenko faced margin pressure as insurance and logistics costs increased. Stakeholders in Lucille's top management were forced to walk an increasingly narrow corridor between domestic market imperatives and profitability. Gasprom Neft's regional refinery operations struggled to ensure uninterrupted production due to the risk of repeated attacks. The shift of capital expenditures to defenseoriented consolidation items forced a rewrite of investment plans. Delays in export flows are disrupting the cash cycle. Prioritizing the domestic market is dragging down unit profitability. As insurance and freight premiums rise, each barrel yields less profit. This scenario delays investment plans and 6:00 postpones modernization. Delayed modernization increases vulnerability and magnifies the impact of the next attack. Financial negotiations between companies and the state are becoming tougher. The triangle of taxes, price caps, and quotas imposes a set of preferences on management. Agencies have reported that large refineries have suffered damage in successive weeks, with some of this overlapping with military supply disruptions. For those working on the ground, the face of the crisis is more stark. Extended shifts, risky restarts on hot processing lines, and delayed spare parts are increasing tension with management. Reports are leaking out that wages are being delayed and temporary stoppages are being extended in some areas. On the station side, rationing and limited sales practices are creating tension between employees and customers. Drivers in remote areas describe supply disruptions during the agricultural season as a problem that stops work. Urban legends 7:02 are lengthening cues and management is being forced into new restrictions. As long as this cycle continues, worker morale is rapidly deteriorating. The same nightmare is repeating itself across Russia. Instead of engine sounds, you now hear coughing exhausts and cues stretching for miles. From Prim to Tataran, from Zabikski to the frozen towns of Siberia, one question echoes. Where is the fuel? People are rushing to gas stations with cans and empty bottles. Some are pushing their vehicles. Others are waiting in line with their children in the cold morning air, but more often than not, when they reach the pump, an attendant shouts in a dry voice, 'It's gone.' The scene is reminiscent of ration days in the Soviet Union. In some regions, people can only get 10 L of fuel with a paper coupon. Not enough for a tractor. Impossible for a family. The elderly say it was like this in the 1980s. While the young vent 8:00 their anger, saying, 'This isn't history class. We're in a gas line. And the lines, they are no longer just cars waiting for gas. Nerves afraid. Drivers are attacking each other. Videos circulating on social media show fists flying. And in some areas, stations are being attacked. Even though state television still says there is no problem with supply, the people are experiencing their own reality. Vehicles are not running. Cities are at a standstill. Bus services are being cancelled. Diesel is unavailable and even getting to school or work has become a luxury. A tank of gasoline in Moscow now costs as much as a month's worth of groceries. And this is not just an individual crisis. Combine harvesters in the fields are left unfinished. Wheat ears bend in the wind in the fertile lands of southern Russia, but there is no one to harvest them. Because there is no diesel in the depots, farmers cannot start their engines. Tons of grain are rotting in 9:02 the fields. Trucks are stuck on the roads. Trains can't move. Logistics have collapsed. Russia's grain weapon can't even be loaded into the barrel. Now, the situation is no different in industry. Steel factories have shut down. Chemical plants have cut production. Truck fleets have fallen silent due to the lack of fuel. Workers in small towns are being forced to take leave. There are no raw materials, no transportation, no production. We are reaching the most critical point, bread. In Moscow, St. Petersburg, and many other cities, people are talking about the price of bread potentially doubling because the energy crisis is now hitting the dinner table. On the other hand, the harshest reality of war is this. Without fuel, there is no army. The steel of tanks, the barrels of cannons, the wings of jets, they are all just metal. What turns them into deadly weapons is fuel and Russia is facing this reality today. 10:01 Another dimension of this painful reality is the export channel. On the external front, Russia's oil strategy appears to have expanded its buyer portfolio, but it is now progressing on an unsustainable balance. Although major buyers like China and India continue to import, the refining collapse in the domestic market threatens Moscow's external flow balance. When the Russian government is forced to cut exports to meet domestic demand, each barrel cut creates a new hole in the budget. This is because oil is not only an energy source, but also the lifeblood of the Kremlin's war economy, the backbone of its budget, and the currency of its international power. Meanwhile, high interest rates domestically are dampening investment appetite. abroad. Rising insurance and freight costs due to sanctions are eroding the sales margin of Russian oil day by day. The revenues it used to earn by selling a lot are now declining in both volume and profit. In other words, Russia is 11:00 visibly selling oil but earning much less than before. Theoretically, the country has the capacity to continue crude oil production even if 77% of its refineries are out of service. In fact, because of this, it may be forced to export more oil abroad that it cannot refine domestically. If this scenario materializes, a glut of crude oil could emerge in the global market, and prices could fall in the short term. Importing countries such as China and India could benefit from this decline. However, the problem does not end there. The real crisis will erupt in refined products. Final products such as gasoline, diesel and jet fuel are produced in refineries and Russia had become a major supplier in this area in recent years despite sanctions. After being excluded from the European market, Moscow redirected its diesel to countries such as Turkey, Brazil, and the United Arab Emirates, thereby partially protecting its export 12:01 revenues. However, with refineries systematically shut down, there will be a significant gap in the supply of these products. Diesel is the heart of global logistics. Trucks, trains, ships, and agricultural machinery run on diesel. Disruptions in the supply of refined products will trigger price fluctuations worldwide. Everywhere will be affected, from urban transportation in Istanbul to agricultural machinery in Sa Paulo. From minibus fleets in Berlin to container terminals in Jakarta, there is no alternative to diesel and supply flexibility is limited. The effects of this shock are already being felt in global markets. Diesel and gasoline prices have risen and futures contracts have become volatile. In other words, when a drone in Ukrainian skies strikes a refinery in Russia, the repercussions can reach the pockets of drivers thousands of miles away. Someone wanting to go to work in Berlin in the morning, 13:01 someone stopping by the market in Sao Paulo, or a farmer plowing a field in Istanbul. All will have to pay more at the gas station. The Kremlin's short-term toolkit is limited and costly. Export restrictions and new taxes feed the domestic market while creating revenue losses. Insurance and freight subsidies cannot completely eliminate the shadow fleet's risk premium. Refinery protection measures tie up defense resources internally. Investments in imported replacement equipment cannot quickly close the technology gap. The capacity of gray channels for spare parts and catalyst supply remains limited. The overall result is a more expensive and more fragile domestic energy system. This system conflicts with the war economy's constant demand for fuel. Prolonged repairs increase tension between military and civilian allocation. Each new attack brings this tension back to 14:00 the forefront. Three scenarios stand out in the medium-term. First, the pace of attacks continues unabated and capacity loss becomes permanent at the 1/5 threshold. In this case, internal demand rationing becomes the norm. Second, defense and repairs accelerate, but the cost creates permanent pressure on the budget. This pressure increases the risk of cuts in social spending and tax increases. Third, with the opening of diplomatic channels, the intensity of attacks decreases and the energy sector gets a breather. However, this outcome does not seem easy without a change in political will. The dynamics on the ground and the pace of capacity repairs will be decisive. The limited nature of energy related foreign income sources may work against the Kremlin over time. The ongoing pressure each month will magnify planning errors. The sustenance of the war economy will continue to depend on the stability of fuel flows. Every disruption in the supply chain will disrupt the rhythm at the front. Disrupted rhythm will accelerate 15:00 personnel and equipment losses. This reality elevates fuel security to the top risk priority in military planning. Prioritizing fuel for the military will leave civilian production under a widespread constraint. As transportation and agriculture falter, inflationary pressure will increase. Inflation will trigger a wage price spiral, squeezing the budget once again. Energy elites may demand more radical concessions to curb margin erosion. These demands could intensify the conflict between the security apparatus and technocrats. Politics, economics, and the battlefield will become variables in the same equation. Ukraine strategy is in the background of this equation. Just a few years ago, many considered it mere fantasy that Ukrainian drones could penetrate deep into Russian territory and strike strategic refineries, air bases, or naval facilities. Moscow's airspace was considered impregnable, its radars allseeing, and its defense systems invincible. But now the picture has changed radically. Since 2024, 16:02 Russia's interior has been the scene of a new attack almost every week. And this new reality is based on several key reasons. Ukraine, which was largely dependent on foreign UAV technology in the early stages of the war, has nationalized it at an astonishing speed. It now has an ecosystem that produces hundreds of FPV kamicazi drones per day. Not just imported drones. Companies like Firepoint, Terminal Autonomy, and Brave 1 have begun producing hundreds of thousands of autonomous systems suitable for different types of missions. Combined with 3D printing, domestic chip assembly, and reverse engineering of Chinese-made parts, this wave has given Ukraine a massive army of aerial munitions. Costing only a few hundred each, these FPV swarms not only overwhelm Russian radars, but also pushed the expensive Pancier and to systems to the point of exhaustion. Cruise missiles such as Storm Shadow and Scalp EG, which have fallen into Ukraine's hands, have created a 17:00 capability that can reach deep into Moscow. These weapons stand out not only for their range, but also for their precision and low radar signature. At the same time, modified R360 Neptune systems have been reprogrammed for landto land missions. Their point attack capability exceeding 500 km shows that even Russia's most heavily guarded logistic centers are now under threat. Ukraine has raised the bar in asymmetric warfare by abandoning conventional tactics. The Engles and Shikovka attacks in the fall of 2024 were examples of this. In these operations, unmanned aerial vehicles hidden inside truck trailers were launched from within Russia and targeted four different air bases simultaneously. Beyond this, close-range guidance operations coordinated by special forces both increase accuracy and surprise the enemy. For example, in the strike on an ammunition depot in Belgarod, 18:00 civilian-looking local elements were observed, followed by a simultaneous attack by GPSguided drone swarms. Russia is the world's largest country in terms of land area. However, its defense resources are limited. Protecting political centers such as Moscow and St. Petersburg leaves air bases in Crimea, ammunition depots in Rostov, and refineries in Brians vulnerable. Every prioritization creates another vulnerability. Ukraine is carefully reading this vulnerability map and exploiting the gaps. For example, when S400 systems are concentrated around Veron facilities in the Eurals are left exposed. If system density is low in targeted areas, the defense loop is broken. NATO's optical, thermal, and Satellites are constantly on patrol. American RC 135 reconnaissance aircraft provide realtime signal intelligence over the Black Sea and the Baltic. Even radar images from 19:00 private companies like Japan's IQPS are reaching Ukraine. This allows Ukraine not only to select targets, but also to identify the most opportune window for attack. For example, 48-hour Sans conducted prior to the Voronesh attack revealed activity levels at the facilities and periods of radar silence. This kind of targeting intelligence enables instant but deadly strikes. When all these elements come together, even Russia's interior regions are no longer considered safe. Refineries, air bases, ammunition depots, and command centers have become targets that can be struck at any moment. Moreover, this does not only mean physical damage. Each explosion also strips away another layer of Moscow's illusion of untouchability. Putin's massive but scattered defense umbrella is now crumbling in the face of Ukraine's pinpoint attack intelligence. Drones are gnoring away not only at the sky but also at the foundations of Russian strategy. And perhaps the real change is this. Russia is now a party to 20:01 the war within itself. If you found this content valuable, don't forget to like and subscribe because this war is being won not only on the front lines but also through the power of information. Thank you for watching. Meanwhile, there is a donation campaign for Ukraine by United 24 in the video description. If you want to take part in the fight for freedom, we are waiting for your support. Now, let's get back to our main topic.

SITE COUNT