• Timeline and drone concept (at a high level)
• Rail super/substructure damage & repair window
• 72‑hour operational ripple effects
• Why low‑cost drones produce strategic outcomes
• The future of conventional war: logistics‑first attrition

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• 0:00
• August 19, 2025,
• exactly 8:01 a.m.
• A Russian fuel train with 30 wagons was
• heading towards Crimea. Road convoys
• were being targeted.
• The sea route was at risk. The railway
• was therefore critical. It was mandatory
• and one way for Russia. The train had to
• take this route. However, there was no
• escape lane. The train drivers were
• unaware that they were being monitored.
• And soon dozens of bombladen drones dive
• into this giant train. Ukrainian
• intelligence was set up in layers.
• Visibility was limited in this area for
• unmanned systems, but signal strength
• could be concentrated. This was an
• advantage for guided drone attacks. The
• intelligence network produced a hybrid
• map combining satellite images,
• listening devices, and electromagnetic
• signal reflections. Optical and thermal
• satellite images were matched.
• Commercial SAR packages were also added.
• The enemy signal jamming and camouflage


• 1:00
• were penetrated. Station GSM traffic was
• monitored. Locomotive telemetry was
• captured. The day and time the train
• would pass were determined through both
• signal intelligence and exposed
• secondary supply plans. The convoys
• estimated speed was recorded. The
• intersection point was marked. The UAVs
• were deployed in a formation consisting
• of three segments for the attack. The
• first segment was targeting. The second
• segment was the dive strike. The third
• segment was signal backup and return
• sabotage. The drones used were modified
• high temperature resistant kamicazi
• platforms called Maluk V2. Their range
• capacity was 210 km. The guidance system
• supported both GLONAS and GPS signals.
• Data links were encrypted at the AES1
• 128 level and included a satellite-based
• recall algorithm. Each drone weighed 5
• kg, was covered in polymer, and was
• equipped with a lowdensity explosive
• capable of generating a shock wave at
• 9,000 m/s. The target was not the wagons


• 2:02
• themselves, but the fuel inside them,
• which was intended to be used against
• the wagons. Ukraine classified such
• attacks as self-igniting targets. In
• other words, the drone only initiated
• the ignition while the destructive
• energy was provided by the targets own
• materials. Therefore, the attack was
• designed not as a munitions battle, but
• as a chain of destruction triggered by
• fuel. The timing of the attack was
• determined based on the daily train
• traffic density on the line. On the
• morning of August 19th, there were only
• two scheduled crossings on this line.
• The first was a civilian cargo convoy,
• which had likely left the line by dawn.
• The second was the targeted fuel train.
• The train at the primary target departed
• from the TAC regional control center.
• Its direction was south toward Uro Xian.
• The train consisted of a total of 30
• wagons. Each wagon contained an average
• of 5 tons of liquid fuel. This amounted
• to approximately 150 tons of highly


• 3:00
• flammable material in total. The first
• six wagons were carrying aviation type
• fuel. The middle 12 wagons were filled
• with diesel fuel. The remaining 12
• wagons contained blended industrial
• fuel. The locomotive was a TE33A diesel
• model. This model was a heavyduty
• locomotive capable of reaching speeds of
• 100 kmph equipped with 12 cylinders and
• 3,300 horsepower. Thus, the train not
• only transported cargo, but also
• possessed significant kinetic energy on
• its own. Ukrainian drone operators
• launched the attack as the train reached
• the most congested and inaccessible
• segment of the track. The first Maluk V2
• drone dove into the 14th car, one of the
• units carrying diesel fuel. The
• explosion hit the lower central section
• of the car. The diesel vapor ignited due
• to internal pressure. The liquid began
• to burn. Approximately 7 seconds later,
• the aviation fuel in the adjacent 13th
• car reacted. The first chain reaction
• had begun. The second wave targeted the


• 4:00
• 16th and 17th cars. These were closer to
• the rear half of the train. The
• explosion increased the temperature and
• shock wave in this section. This caused
• the train to split into two. The front
• 13 cars could not complete their forward
• movement and derailed. The rear 17 cars
• remained on the tracks engulfed in
• flames. Due to the heat, the concrete
• sleepers of the track cracked. When the
• steel rails reached temperatures
• exceeding 620° C, they lost their
• structural integrity. The rails bent.
• The third wave targeted the fourth car.
• This car was also carrying aviation
• fuel. The locomotive's body shifted from
• its position due to the explosion. The
• front wheel set came off the tracks. The
• engine compartment swelled due to
• pressure. The attack lasted a total of 6
• minutes and 48 seconds. A total of seven
• drones were used. Each drone carried out
• a single effective strike. The total
• length of the track destroyed in the
• attack was measured at approximately 312
• m. The Ukrainian armed forces issued an
• official confirmation message. Video
• footage of the attack was released by


• 5:01
• global media sources later that
• afternoon. The footage clearly showed
• the moment of the explosion, the size of
• the fireball, and the deformation of the
• tracks.
• For the first 90 seconds after the
• attack ended, only flames and smoke were
• recorded along the track. According to
• visual recognition data, the flame
• column formed after the explosion
• reached a height of 27 m. The fire
• spread due to the combination of high
• surface temperatures from fuel
• vaporizing in the diesel wagons. The
• fire advanced along a 200 m section of
• track within the first 3 minutes.
• Approximately 40% of the steel rails
• were structurally bent. Due to thermal
• radiation after the explosion, all the
• dry grass in the surrounding area caught
• fire. The high density of fuel vapors
• caused the fire to spread not
• horizontally but in drooping flames.
• This created an explosion effect that
• redirected the pressure wave, keeping
• the track at the center rather than
• damaging surrounding structures. It was
• noted that unmanned aerial vehicles
• continued to record data after the


• 6:00
• attack. The Maluk V2 drones were
• programmed not only for the strike but
• also for post explosion analysis. Each
• drone was equipped with a lowresolution
• thermal camera in its nose section.
• These cameras transmitted the thermal
• map of the explosion to the operator
• center. This data was used to determine
• whether wagons that had not been reached
• by the explosion should be targeted
• again. However, a second wave of attacks
• was not planned for the operation.
• Therefore, after transmitting their post
• impact data, all drones initiated their
• self-destruction protocol. RF
• communication intensity in the area
• increased during the attack. When
• comparing the communication patterns of
• Russian systems before and after the
• attack, it was determined that there was
• a complete communication blackout during
• the first 10 minutes of the incident.
• The first contact between the units
• responsible for protecting the train and
• the logistics command in TalkMac was
• established 12 minutes after the
• explosion. During this time, no data
• flow was possible between the scene of
• the incident and the central command.


• 7:02
• The main reason for this was the
• disruption caused by the drones in the
• electromagnetic bandwidth. The attack
• was not only physical destruction but
• also meant the collapse of information
• flow. It took approximately half an hour
• for firefighting teams to arrive at the
• scene. The first two firet trucks
• dispatched from the Tokmach Regional
• Center could not approach within 1
• kilometer due to the high temperature.
• Access to the high temperature zone was
• only possible using military fire
• control vehicles. These vehicles reached
• the scene only an hour later. During
• this time, the fire completely destroyed
• the wagons containing diesel and jet
• fuel. The fire lasted for 2 hours and 46
• minutes. It then began to gradually
• subside. During this time, six secondary
• fires were recorded at six different
• points in the local area. These fires
• were not caused by drone strikes, but
• developed due to flying, flammable
• debris. The first images from the scene
• clearly showed that the rails had been
• bent into a U-shape. The tensil strength


• 8:00
• of the rail steel was between 540 and
• 620 MP. However, at temperatures above
• 750° C, this strength decreases by up to
• 40%. Analyses revealed that this
• threshold had been exceeded on the rail
• surface. This meant that the track had
• to be completely replaced. At least a
• 400 m section of the track became
• inoperable. Since the rail
• infrastructure was damaged, replacing
• the superructure alone was insufficient.
• This section of the Tokmach Urojine line
• was constructed using a double track
• system with concrete block foundations.
• Therefore, repair work could not be
• limited to replacing the rails and
• sleepers. It was recorded that the
• ground in the area had settled by 12%
• due to thermal shock. This posed a
• permanent risk for future freight
• transport on the same line.
• Additionally, most of the signaling
• cables in the area had melted due to the
• fire. At least 4 days of engineering
• work were required to reinstall the
• railway communication signals. It might


• 9:01
• have been necessary to wait even longer.
• During this process, the Russian
• military's railway supply line to Crimea
• was completely suspended. Only civilian
• class low-volume road transport could be
• switched to. However, this method could
• only meet 17% of the daily supply
• volume. This led to a serious supply
• crisis for Russian troops at the front,
• including armored vehicles, artillery
• batteries, and units in need of fuel. 12
• hours after the attack, the Russian
• military administration convened an
• emergency meeting. Initial assessments
• suggested that the attack was an act of
• local sabotage. However, satellite
• images and social media videos leaked
• within hours revealed that it was a
• direct drone attack. Additionally, the
• precision of the explosion sites
• indicated that the attack was carried
• out not from within but through high
• precision remote guidance. The railway
• line was completely shut down after the
• attack. The Tokmach Eurosene line was
• the only railway channel connecting
• Crimea to the mainland. An average of


• 10:00
• four logistics trains were scheduled to
• pass through this line daily. Each train
• carried an average of 900 tons of cargo.
• This amounted to a total daily supply
• volume of approximately 3,600 tons. When
• this line was closed, seven logistic
• centers directly in Crimea and on the
• southern front were affected. These
• centers relied on this line for the
• supply of ammunition, fuel, and water.
• Alternative transportation methods were
• both insufficient and posed security
• risks. Road transportation was not
• suitable for armored vehicles. Sea
• transportation had been halted due to
• Ukraine's Seabclass surface drone
• attacks. As a result, the Russian
• military faced a serious supply
• bottleneck in the rear for at least 72
• hours. This disruption directly impacted
• the flow of fuel and ammunition for
• artillery systems. Additionally, planned
• shipments of tanks and ZTR type armored
• vehicles were postponed. According to
• field reports, some battalions canled
• their movement plans on August 20 due to
• the attack. This situation significantly


• 11:02
• slowed down the operational rhythm at
• the front. The total amount of fuel
• carried by the destroyed train was
• estimated to be approximately 150 tons.
• This is estimated to be equivalent to
• the operational fuel requirement of a
• mechanized division for 3 to 5 days.
• Among the fuel types was JP8 class jet
• fuel. This was being transported for use
• at forward airfields behind the front
• lines by Russian air forces. The cost of
• the Maluk V2 class drones destroyed in
• the attack was approximately $38,000
• each. The operational cost for the seven
• drones used was approximately $266,000.
• The market value of the fuel carried by
• the destroyed train was estimated at
• approximately $2.5 million. However,
• from a military logistics perspective,
• this loss was much greater. One wagon of
• JP8 fuel is equivalent to 18 helicopter
• sorties. According to this calculation,
• the loss of six wagons means that over


• 12:00
• 100 air missions cannot be carried out.
• When such air missions are not
• conducted, the ability of ground troops
• to receive support is significantly
• weakened. The damage to the railway line
• also means strategic delays. It was
• reported that six full days were
• required for track repairs, ground
• reinforcement, and signal system
• restoration. During this period, no
• freight trains could use the line. This
• gap was strategically exploited by
• Ukraine to launch a second phase of
• attacks. The supply vehicles that had
• gathered at the northern exit of Crimea
• later became the target of different UAV
• attacks. So this operation was not just
• the destruction of a train, but a
• disruption of the logistics chain that
• continued with chain delays. Russia
• expanded its air defense perimeter in
• the first phase of the attack. However,
• the exact directions from which the
• attack originated via drones could not
• be determined.
• This is because the Maluk V2 class
• drones had the ability to change
• direction. Four different direction


• 13:00
• determining algorithms operated
• simultaneously in these systems. The
• flight path to the target could be
• changed up until the last second of the
• operation. This effectively reduced
• Russia's ability to intercept the drones
• to nearly zero. Additionally, since the
• drones flew at an altitude of less than
• 40 m above ground, they were very
• difficult to detect by radar systems.
• The radar cross-section area was not
• sufficiently widespread. This further
• increased the success rate of the
• attack. Following the attack, Russia
• implemented a temporary countermeasure
• package as an interim solution. A small
• portion of logistic shipments was
• redirected to camouflage tanker convoys.
• However, this method was both slow and
• less efficient. The main supply load was
• still awaiting the repair of the railway
• line. Ukraine did not publish the drone
• signal and thermal recordings following
• the attack. The reason was the
• possibility that the same route could be
• reused by the Russian military. This
• signaled that similar attacks could be
• carried out in the future. Russia was


• 14:01
• forced to develop a comprehensive
• defense plan in response to this threat.
• It was announced that 17 new radar
• stations would be established along the
• route to Crimea. Following this
• incident, however, these infrastructure
• preparations would take at least 2 to 3
• months. This meant that the railway line
• would remain at risk of attack with
• every subsequent crossing. Ukraine not
• only damaged the rear supply line with
• this attack, but also gain psychological
• superiority. Targeting the supply line
• of a critical region like Crimea
• disrupted the moral balance. This attack
• was regarded as an effective example of
• modern asymmetric warfare in military
• circles. It was recorded as an operation
• that produced maximum results at a low
• cost. Russia will now have to spend more
• personnel, escorts, and time on every
• logistical transport. This means waste
• of resources, fatigue, and inefficiency.
• Ukraine, on the other hand, once again
• demonstrated its ability to strike
• strategic targets using unmanned
• systems. With every strike, the logic of
• traditional warfare was transcended. The


• 15:01
• train tracks turned into a battlefield.
• Fuel was used against the enemy.
• Communication control and incendiary
• effects were combined. The attack turned
• into a segment of the war that Russia
• lost in terms of both the front lines,
• strategy, and psychology. This operation
• demonstrated that Ukraine can gain
• superiority not only on the front lines,
• but also in logistics. In your opinion,
• how do such precision strikes shape the
• future of conventional warfare between
• Russia and Ukraine? Please share your
• comments below the video. Don't forget
• to subscribe to our channel and like the
• video. Thank you for watching.