TrueValueMetrics ... Impact Accounting for the 21st Century

Date: 2025-08-22 Page is: DBtxt003.php txt00028994

WAR IN UKRAINE REPORTING BY PPR GLOBAL ... AUGUST 8TH, 2025 Russia’s Supply Bridge to Crimea Is GONE – $30K JDAM Bomb Just Shut Down $3B Main Railway Connection PLAY YOUTUBE VIDEO Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6wuukWxIcdc&list=TLPQMDkwODIwMjWyc1gQ8_9OlA&index=2
Russia’s Supply Bridge to Crimea Is GONE – $30K JDAM Bomb Just Shut Down $3B Main Railway Connection PPR GLOBAL 768K subscribers Aug 8, 2025 #ukrainewar #ukrainewarupdate #military #ukrainewar #ukrainewarupdate #military #militarydevelopments #militarystrategy Ukraine’s Air Force has pulled off one of its most devastating precision strikes yet—destroying a key military bridge in the Zaporizhia region with JDAM-ER bombs launched from MiG-29 jets. This was no ordinary bridge; it was Russia’s primary southern logistics artery, connecting Crimea to the eastern front. Now, that link is gone. Ammunition convoys are halted. Fuel trucks are stranded. In this video, we unpack how this single attack triggered a cascade of logistical failure, from supply chain breakdowns to economic ripple effects in occupied Crimea. You’ll learn: How MiG-29s were retrofitted to fire U.S.-made JDAM bombs Why the Karachokrak crossing was more than just a bridge The real-time impact on Russian armored units, fuel deliveries, and air logistics How Ukraine is creating a systematic campaign to collapse Russia’s supply network And why this might be the beginning of a strategic siege on Crimea itself Every bridge destroyed is not just a structure lost—it’s an entire battalion immobilized. Don’t forget to subscribe, leave your thoughts in the comments, and turn on notifications for more deep-dive war intelligence. Peter Burgess COMMENTARY This is a 3 hour presentation that talks about the use of drone technology by Ukraine compared to the technoiogy available to Russia. I am not clear, however, whether this is totally factual or some sort of virtual fabrication, or some mix of the two. It is certainly interesting ... but whether or not it is valid is not at all clear. Peter Burgess Transcript 0:00 Russia's southern front plans were thrown into disarray by a single bombing order. The Ukrainian air force destroyed a vital border crossing in Zaparizia with Jdam er bombs dropped from Mig 29s. This crossing was not just a bridge. It was the military backbone connecting Crimea, Marupole and Denipro. Now that backbone has been broken. Munition shipments have stopped. Fuel convoys have been cut off. The Kremlin's summer offensive collapsed before it even began. Can Russia compensate for this setback? On July 7, a Ukrainian MiG 29 fighter jet targeted a vital Russian crossing point over the Karachukra River in the Zapperia region. This bridge was no ordinary structure. Although not the main branch of the Denipro River, it served as a key link in the Russian army's supply chain on the southern front. Heavy fuel tankers, trucks loaded with ammunition, and armored repair convoys regularly cross this crossing every day, feeding the logistics line stretching from Tokmack to Mel Toppel 1:00 and from there to Crimea via Kinburn. This route, considered an alternative to the Kirch Bridge, was critical for the transfer of cargo to eastern ports in particular. In the spring, Russia built a temporary but structurally sound military bridge over the carer crack to reinforce this route. Supported by concrete slabs, this structure allowed heavy vehicles to safely cross the marshy ground. An average of 230 vehicles used this route daily with onethird of them directly supplying ammunition to the front lines. The remaining transportation handled fuel and food logistics. This is precisely why Ukraine did not hesitate in its target selection. The attack was not a conventional air operation, but was carried out using two GBU62 bombs equipped with advanced JDAM ER guidance kits. These bombs were modernized versions of the US produced 1,000 lb MK83. Thanks to the GPS guided kit added to the tail section and the deployed flaps, these bombs can reach a range of 2:01 over 70 km and hit targets with accuracy of just a few meters. Normally, Soviet-designed MiG 29s were not equipped with the necessary interface to use these bombs, but Ukraine introduced Western munitions to these aircraft with a special adaptation kit developed in Lviv. The pilot can now see the range and targeting data of NATO inventoried smart weapons on the cockpit display. This transforms an old jet into a modern precision strike platform. As a result of the attack, the temporary military bridge was completely disabled. One of the factors that made the attack so effective was not only the precision of the munitions used, but also the systematic air defense suppression operation carried out prior to the operation. In particular, the Russian army's Buckm2 medium-range air defense systems deployed in the region were disabled by successive suppression of enemy air defenses attacks in recent weeks. Despite having an effective radar lock range of up to 45 km, these systems were either detected and destroyed or rendered blind due to their radar frequencies being jammed. As a result, 3:05 Ukraine's MiG 29s were able to advance through an open air corridor as they approached the range to launch JDM bombs. The second and less talked about effect of the operation was not limited to the destruction of the bridge. This bridge was not just a crossing point. It also served as a buffer zone, masking the logistics hub of the Russian 35th Corps on the Eastern Bank. Hidden behind the fog of war, this staging area was now exposed and vulnerable. Satellite imagery and heat signature data indicate that smoke rose from three separate camp areas shortly after the attack. This likely indicates secondary explosions in ammunition or fuel depots. Following the attack, the eastern ramp of the bridge was completely collapsed into the sea with concrete blocks blocking the inner roadway. This structural collapse not only stopped traffic but also wiped Russia's critical supply route from Marupople to Crimea off the map. They now have to detour from Tokmack to 4:05 Berdansk to reach the east of the Denipro. But this new route means an additional 160 km and a loss of time. Moreover, this secondary route is extremely unfavorable in terms of both geography and infrastructure. Consisting of a narrow strip of earth, this passage quickly turns to mud, especially during summer rains. In such conditions, heavy fuel trucks could get stuck on the road with their wheels sinking into the mud. This is not merely a physical disruption, but a collapse of the logistics chain because the fuel needed to reach the tank's tank is being used to charge a satellite phone used to call for a crane. On the military side, another panic has emerged. After the bridge was hit, Ukraine demonstrated that its longrange Jummy AR munitions could easily strike the rear of the front lines, forcing the Russian air force to respond urgently. SU30SM 5:02 fighter jets were moved to the vicinity of Malito and day and night patrol flights were launched on the Vasilivka Maltool line. But these aircraft cannot fly above 4,000 m to avoid entering the radar range of Ukraine's Patriot systems which are equipped with AIM120 AMRAM missiles. This limits both their field of view and their attack position. There are patrol flights, but there is no real threat of a raid or suppression. The S400 air defense batteries are scattered in a rather haphazard manner against this new threat. According to data obtained from satellite images, these batteries are mounted on temporary ramps that are constantly being moved rather than being placed in fixed positions. The aim is to prevent the destruction of all radar and command units with a single hit. This portability brings with it another problem. The radars cannot operate at the optimum altitude. In addition, Russian defense forces have deployed CRBN masking systems to make it more difficult for JDAM ER munitions to target them. These systems reduce 6:04 visibility by deflecting radar signals rather than suppressing them, but this appears to have seriously slowed down coordination and the chain of command on the ground. The impact of the attack has been much deeper and more multifaceted than meets the eye. With the bridge out of commission, the Russian command realized that it could not reinforce its front lines in Marupole with BMP3 armored vehicles which were running on low fuel reserves. With the road link cut off, the solution shifted to air transport. The first reflex was to deploy ill 76 military transport aircraft. These flights via Kirch carried spare engine parts, sets of tracks, and emergency ammunition. But this method created two major problems. First, large targets such as the IL76 are very easy to detect by western radar systems, which means that the risk of air defense is immediately sky-high. The second is economic. Each ton transported by IL76 costs three times as much as the 7:03 same load transported by truck. The cargo carried by Russia's logistics network on its southern front is no longer limited to ammunition and fuel. The Ministry of Agricultures seasonal supply line from Donbas to Crimea has also been directly affected. Trucks traveling along this route transported grain, vegetables, meat products, and milk to food warehouses in Crimea, returning with empty pallets, crates, and waste packaging. But the destruction of the temporary bridge over the carer crack disrupted the two-way flow of this route. In particular, large refrigerated trailers are now forced to take a 160 km detour via Berdansk as an alternative route. Fuel consumption for trucks on this new route has nearly doubled. Logistics companies can no longer afford these extra costs. Many subcontractors have started to report losses. Civilian suppliers are directly sending invoices to the government, stating, 'If prices on the shelves in Crimea do not increase by 18%, we cannot cover these costs. 8:06 One of Russia's most trusted lifelines in the war is being cut off. The railway network is collapsing step by step. The line stretching from Vulgar to Rostov, from Catelnikova to Salsk, and from Archida to Kaman Alongni has been severely damaged by Ukrainian drone attacks. This is not just about a few stations being out of service. It means the critical logistical backbone carrying ammunition, fuel, and troops to the southern front is being shattered. Wagons are stranded midjourney, locomotives are silent, and the supply chain is paralyzed. Railway lines stretching from Donbass to Crimea and from St. Petersburg to the Caucusus are no longer safe. If trains come to a halt in the war, how will Russia advance on the front lines? On August 4th, a salvo of Ukrainian Liutib bobber drones targeted the Arda railway station in the town of Folivo, located in Russia's Vulgar region. During the nighttime attack, multiple drones simultaneously targeted the station complex. One of them struck the control room responsible 9:04 for signal and traffic control. Within seconds, the electrical system collapsed, signaling was disabled, and all train movements in the area were suspended. However, the real damage occurred when one of the ammunition laden wagons parked on the main line was hit. The explosion was so powerful that it was heard in nearby villages. The fire quickly spread around the station. The infrastructure around the station was completely destroyed. Words alone cannot describe this scene. You must see it for yourself. For this reason, we are sharing footage recorded by civilians who were at the scene immediately after the attack. The chain reaction of the attack also disrupted the regional transportation system. Airports in Vulgrad and Tambov temporarily suspended flight arrivals and departures for security reasons. The difficulties faced by search and rescue and firefighting teams in reaching the area once again highlighted how sudden and effective the attack was. Ashida station is located at 10:00 a critical point for regional military train transportation where the line from Rostov branches off toward Vulgrad. Convoys carrying fuel, armored vehicles and personnel to the front lines were being dispatched via this route. Therefore, this attack is not only physical destruction but also a strategic blow to the supply continuity of Russian forces on the southern front. Just 3 days before this attack, the Catelnikovo station was also targeted by Ukrainian attacks. Unmanned aerial vehicles targeted the station's traction transformer. The power supply was cut off and the system collapsed. This was literally the same principle as life stops when the water stops flowing in the body because the trains moving along the tracks are powered by the energy from this system. And when the energy stops, the entire logistics chain grinds to a halt. Catelnikovo may be 400 km away from the front line, but it is no longer a security line. For in modern warfare, the concept of range has changed. Ukrainian drones are easily penetrating Russia's inner depths. Despite this, vulgar governor Andre 11:04 Bcharov sought to downplay the situation, claiming that the fires had started from dry grass. However, this statement was quickly debunked by OSINT experts and satellite data. Open- source intelligence analysts like Tatarigami confirmed the presence of high temperatures and intense fires in the transformer area using heat signatures from NASA's firm satellite system. Just 12 hours before the Catel Nikovo attack, a fuel supply facility in Sochi was struck. The burning depot contained not only the Sochi International Airport's backup fueling area, but also JP8 fuel stocks that supplied the Black Sea fleet small patrol boats and reconnaissance vessels. It took 9 hours to extinguish the fire, but the real damage was in liquid form. 12,000 tons of jet fuel vaporized. The negative scenario for the Kremlin does not end here. On July 29th, unmanned aerial vehicles were again deployed in Salsk. This time, a fuel 12:02 train was directly targeted. Flames engulfed the wagons, rendering the storage areas unusable. On the same night, the power plant in Olvski was taken offline. The attack on the transformer station in Zhutovo on July 27th followed the same pattern. When you look at the map, the lines become clear. Kotel Nikovo, Salsk, Zhutoo, Cam Alongi, Novachask, all are stops along the same route aligned along the same strategic backbone embedded within the same attrition algorithm. Vulgrad is not merely a transit hub connecting St. Petersburg to the Caucuses. It also lies at the heart of an energy corridor that enables crude oil from the northern ports of Arcangels to be transported by land to the tanker terminal in Rosto and from there via pipeline to the Novarosis refinery on the Black Sea coast. Thus, the Vulgar station is the intersection point of both military and economic transportation routes. This is precisely why it is vulnerable. Figures provided 13:00 in the Russian Ministry of Defense's 2024 logistics inspection report vividly illustrate how this strategic hub has been utilized throughout the war. Since the start of the war, an average of 540 armored vehicles have been transported to the front lines via the Vulgor Rosttov route each week. Of these, 25% were T72 and T80 tanks. 33% were ammunition carrying trucks and the remainder consisted of fuel tankers and maintenance repair wagons. Even a 3-day disruption of this route would mean a delay of up to 40% in weekly fuel shipments to a division in Donetsk or Zaparisia. Fuel shortages directly limit not only maneuverability but also the intensity of artillery fire. The tactical mission cycles of the air force are directly linked to the number of aircraft that can take off from the runway. For this reason, ISW's analysis report noted that the attacks on the vulgar line were not just sabotage but a strategic shift. The 14:01 report clearly states, 'Ukraine has moved to the stage of collapsing the Russian army's logistical nerve center without forcing it to open a second landfront. The damage caused by the Sochi attack goes beyond a mere fire, directly striking the energy backbone that sustains the military mobility of the Black Sea. At this strategic storage complex owned by Ross Neft, approximately 9,000 tons of fuel were being transported daily to Russia's southern military region and naval forces via direct shipping pumps. According to satellite images, three large fuel tanks were completely destroyed by the attack and rendered unusable. The fourth tank sustained serious structural damage and lost its operational capacity. This loss is expected to slow down the supply line to the Black Sea fleet via Twapsi for at least 10 days. However, for Ukraine, this is not limited to triggering a temporary disruption. 15:07 Ukraine has dealt a major blow to the Russian air force. Five Russian warplanes were shot down over Crimea. Each one is now a pile of scrap metal worth approximately $ 35 to $50 million lying in smoke along the Black Sea coast. This is not just an operation. It is a strategic loss. But the real question begins here. How did Ukraine lure this massive air force into a trap? On the morning of August 4th, the skies over Crimea once again echoed with Ukraine's unmanned aerial attacks. However, this time, what happened was far beyond the ordinary. This was not a reconnaissance patrol. It was a targeted, meticulously planned raid designed to paralyze a major air base. The target was the Saki Air Base, one of Russia's largest and most welle equipped air bases in Crimea. This base was crucial for maintaining air superiority over the Black Sea, launching air strikes on southern Ukrainian cities 16:04 like Kersonen and Mikoliv and serving as the heart of Russian aviation operations in the region. The 43rd separate naval assault aviation regiment stationed at the base played a key role in military operations in the region. Every day Sue30 SM fighter jets took off from here. Sue 24 bomber jets changed course to conduct penetration flights and ground radars were fed with false targets. But on August 4th, this routine was disrupted. The special operations center a affiliated with the Ukrainian security service launched the attack on this strategic location following months of reconnaissance, frequency monitoring, and airflow analysis. First, numerous longrange UAVs with low radar signatures surrounded the Saki base. Some UAVs used false routes to create radar jamming while the main wave targeted launchpads, aircraft parking areas, and ammunition depots directly. According to hit records, one Sue 30SM fighter jet was 17:03 completely destroyed. Another SUe 30SM sustained severe damage. Three Sue 24 bomber aircraft were rendered inoperable. The main ammunition depot caught fire. Explosions continued for hours. The type of UAVs used by Ukraine in this attack has not been officially disclosed. However, based on technical data, it is estimated that these vehicles are equipped with highresolution electrooptical targeting systems and special guidance software resistant to GNSS jamming. Additionally, the fact that the attack vectors came from different directions within the same time window indicates that coordination was carried out through an AI supported network. Why Saki? Saki air base is not just a runway for aircraft. It also serves as the control center for air reconnaissance missions in the Black Sea, the central hub for electronic warfare systems and a key logistics supply chain node for air defense batteries across Crimea. Even a temporary shutdown of this base would mean a significant weakening of Russian 18:03 air presence in the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The Sue30SM in particular is the backbone of the Russian Air Force's multi-roll mission load. Moscow developed this aircraft as a response to NATO's F-15. It is twin engine, multi-roll, and long range. It can strike both air and ground targets, refuel in midair, guide strategic bombers, and serve as a flying command center when necessary. Sue 24s are primarily used for lowaltitude bombing and can carry heavy munitions such as the KH29, KH58. On paper, it was invincible, but on the runway, it wasn't. The Sue30SM's mission was to detect the enemy from a distance and eliminate it. The possibility of being left defenseless on the battlefield was never considered in the design of this platform. The destruction of these aircraft deals a blow to Russia's ability to attack longrange targets. Moreover, the average cost of a Sue30SM 19:00 fighter jet is approximately $50 million. This figure is not merely the sticker price of an aircraft. It represents the concrete value of Russia's extremely limited resources, engineering capabilities, and time. Producing a fighter jet of this caliber is not just a matter of money. It requires modern electronic avionics, advanced radar systems, engine components, testing infrastructure, and highly skilled labor. However, Russia is currently facing serious bottlenecks in almost all of these areas. Western sanctions have brought the supply of microchips and advanced composite materials to a virtual standstill. The Russian defense industry is forced to turn to secondary parts from China or lower quality alternatives from the domestic market. This is both slowing down the production process and lowering quality. Moreover, the constant spending pressure caused by the war has disrupted budget planning. The Kremlin had increased the defense budget to $150 billion for 2024, but was forced to reduce it to $100 billion for 2025. 20:06 This decline weakens the ability to establish new production lines and disrupts the maintenance and repair cycles of existing lines. Immediately after the attack, Russia tried to downplay the scale of the incident. However, the fires were clearly visible in satellite data published by NASA's firm's system. Leaked civilian videos showed flames reaching nearly to the runway boundaries. The immediate closure of the Kirch bridge to traffic along with air defense alerts in Theodosia and Symphopel highlighted the scale of the panic. Traffic on the Crimean Bridge came to a complete standstill. The queue of vehicles stretching toward the Tamman Peninsula reached a record density of over 30 km. Drivers were unable to move for hours. According to a statement from the bridg's press service, around 2:00 a.m. 1,850 vehicles attempting to enter the bridge from the Tarmac side were in line for manual security checks. The waiting time reached up to 5 hours. At 21:04 the same time, 349 more vehicles arriving from the Kirk's direction were waiting for security checks. The process on this route was faster, taking approximately 1 hour to complete. However, scanner checks took up to 7 hours in some cases. By 400 p.m. the congestion had decreased slightly. The number of vehicles in the queue dropped to 1,400 and the waiting time fell to 4 hours. Nevertheless, traffic flow in the area has almost completely come to a standstill. Authorities have stated that the delays in scanning are due to increased security concerns. In particular, Ukraine's long range drone attacks in recent days have prompted Russia to tighten manual checks at critical infrastructure points. The Crimean bridge is one of the places where these measures are most severely felt. The psychological repercussions of this demonstration are the other side of the coin. The latest call by Refak Chubarov, 22:01 chairman of the Crimean Tata National Assembly, clearly reveals this psychological breakdown. Chubarov said that civilians who came from Russia and settled in Crimea illegally must leave the peninsula immediately. And he recorded his message in Russian to directly target the occupiers. In his statement, Chabarov said, 'As you have already begun to realize, the Kirk bridge, which was illegally built to connect occupied Crimea to Russian territory, will soon be destroyed, and you may find yourselves trapped in a kind of pocket addressing a broad audience, including Russian citizens vacationing in Crimea and reinforcing his call for withdrawal. We are seeing these calls yield concrete results. In April 2025, the governor of Sevastapul called for the voluntary evacuation of families with children, followed the 23:01 next week by the return of railway cars from Daetsk loaded with passengers via Kirk to Kranadar and posts on Russian defense blogs stating that officers families were being relocated to Novarosis, raising alarm bells. News reports indicate that many military families are returning to the Russian mainland in secret or in stages. As is well known, after the 2014 annexation, Russia began encouraging tens of thousands of Russian citizens to settle on the peninsula. The aim was to turn Crimea into Russian territory and change the demographic structure in its favor. According to Russia's official 2014 Crimea census results, the total population of the peninsula was reported as 2.28 million. In this census, the Russian population accounted for 67.9%, Ukrainians for 15.7% and Crimean Tatas for 10.6%. The ethnic Russian population has risen to 1.5 million since 2014 due to 24:03 migration and the arrival of military personnel and their families. However, with the war in Ukraine, the situation has changed, especially for Russian officers and their families. The families of Russian military personnel stationed in Crimea are concerned that Crimea may be targeted in a Ukrainian counteroffensive. The Ukrainian partisan movement atesh made important assessments on this issue. Attesh reported that almost all of the families of senior personnel of the Black Sea fleet had left the peninsula. The movement attributes this to an internal directive ordering Russian forces to take higher security measures at military facilities in Crimea. According to a report by German broadcaster Deutschevel, citing diplomatic sources, Moscow has introduced a priority quotota system for the families of security personnel stationed in Crimea. Initially, around 10,000 people were targeted for relocation to Kranodar and Stavropole. The partisan network reported that bar's reserve units were conducting secret patrols in civilian clothing in the bays of Sevastapole, that security measures 25:04 had been increased, and that equipment was being concealed. Additionally, all leave days for military personnel have been cancelled. According to a statement by an ATESH agent directly linked to air defense systems, air defense personnel have begun evacuating their families to military camps in the southern military district. This evacuation order can be seen as a sign that the security situation in the region is critical. It is alleged that the Russian administration plans to evacuate approximately 250,000 people in the first phase, including military families, defense industry technicians, railway and port personnel, children, and the elderly. According to an analysis published by Forbes Russia, the Black Sea Fleet headquarters has 30,000 family members, half of whom have already left between May and July 2025. In addition to military personnel, ordinary Russians on the peninsula are also leaving Crimea. Reports indicate that the number of Russian citizens leaving the peninsula has reached 100,000 in recent times. This number is 26:04 expected to increase further in light of recent developments. The total daily capacity for two-way traffic is 40,000 vehicles, but following the explosions in 2024, traffic on the sole remaining bridge has been reduced by half. The same situation is ongoing today. However, traffic on the peninsula remains gridlocked. The Kirch Bridge is also a risky alternative for those seeking to flee Crimea. This is because the bridge falls within the range of Storm Shadow and attack MS missiles. Ukraine stated in May 2025 that it is maintaining its strike and retreat capability targeting Kirch. The railway section is still limited by repairs. It has been reduced to two trains per hour or 4,000 passengers. In other words, all exits from the peninsula are about to close. Novarosis was considered a route. 50% of the Black Sea fleet is stationed here. The fleet can carry 1,000 passengers charms landing operations with repurchass landing ships, but a 27:01 significant portion of the ships have been hit or are under repair. The straits are closed to warships under the Montro Convention, but civilian row services are theoretically possible with Turkeykey's permission. Large passenger flights are unsafe due to the threat of UAVs and cruise missiles. There have been no scheduled flights since the summer of 2024. IL76 sorties are being used for military strategic transport. Civilian ship passage in the Black Sea is free under the Montro Convention. But Turkey invoked Article 19 3 days after the start of the war in March 2022, restricting the straits to the waring parties. Therefore, Russian naval assets cannot enter the area. However, Russian civilian feries can transit from the Caucus' coast to the waters of Adessa without stopping. Turkey does not provide military escort to evacuation ships caught in the actual conflict, but can provide a pre-authorized corridor through the straits for humanitarian convoys flying the SafI/ICRC 28:01 flag. Considering all this information, the evacuation of all Russians in Crimea appears to be quite challenging. In conclusion, Ukraine's latest drone attack not only eliminated a military target, but also once again declared to the world that the nature of war has changed. In the battlefield, it is no longer expensive technology that prevails, but accessible intelligence. Drones costing a few thousand are rendering jets, radar facilities, and ammunition depots worth millions of dollars useless in a matter of seconds. This was more than just an attack. This was asymmetric warfare itself. Ukraine is now openly challenging Russia's military infrastructure built over decades and costing billions of dollars with a drone worth a few months salary. These UAVs, which cost less than a family car, can take out an entire air base. Russia's high-tech platforms like the Sue30SM were designed for modern air combat. But when parked, they are as defenseless as a bird. This is where Ukraine's advantage lies. This is not a land grab. The issue now is doctrine, superiority. And who will define the 29:04 logic of future warfare? Every jet shot down is not just a combat vehicle. It is a blow to the Kremlin's belief that it is superior in war. Every depot that burns is not just a loss of ammunition. It is a crack in the invulnerability armor that Putin's regime has presented to the public. And this is not only on the front lines. It is also creating chaos in the subconscious of the Russian people. For civilians living in semiisolated but strategically important regions like Crimea, these attacks mean that areas once considered safe are now targets. Ukraine is no longer a passive defender. It is an active and planned threat. This new strategy, which achieves greater impact at lower cost, proves that war is won not just with weapons, but with time, resources, and psychology. At this point, Kiev has struck not only a SU30SM, but also Russia's perception of superiority in the war. The outcome is clear. Ukraine is determined. Its strategy is sharp and the message is clear. Crimea is Ukraine. 30:01 Thank you for watching. What moves could Russia make in response to the bridg's destruction? One of the most likely options is to disable the Patriot batteries in Ukraine. To do this, Moscow theoretically has KH59 air-to-surface missiles at its disposal. But in practice, things are not so simple. The US Norwegian-made Nemesis electronic warfare system deployed west of Kharkiv confuses guided missiles such as the KH59 with GPS jamming signals it spreads across the field. These missiles need American satellite data to find their targets. But Nemesis distorts directional information, so the missiles often veer off into empty fields or are shot down before they can turn back. This means that the first option is systematically doomed to failure. The second option is to launch a salvo of caliber NK missiles from the Black Sea fleet at the Odessa Bilhurod Dinistrovski line. The aim here is not a direct hit but to put pressure on the Patriot systems radar and optical sensors. The missile threat would jam the radars and slow down the defense response. But this also looks stronger on paper. This is because Kaliba 31:04 missiles are already assigned to more priority defense areas such as the Kirch Bridge, Novarosis, and Vulgrad. Each caliber missile is expensive and there are few of them. Therefore, rather than spending its caliber stockpile to gain limited psychological superiority, the Kremlin is focused on shaping its defense against the JDAM ER threat. Because what they have realized is that an American bomb can cause much more damage than a missile range test from the Soviet era. The Ukrainian side is preparing for the second phase immediately after the first strike. The number of MiG 29s carrying JDAM ER munitions has now exceeded 18. Thanks to newly developed wing pylon adapters, each aircraft can carry two GBU62 bombs in a single sorty. This creates an operational multiplier effect. More destruction with fewer flights. The target list has already been finalized. One option is the suspension towers of the Kirch Bridge. The other is the Marupople railway vioaduct. Both are of both symbolic and strategic importance. When the munition's payload reaches 32:04 2,000 lb, the destruction threshold for such fixed structures is easily surpassed. Western experts are quite clear about this attack concept. This package, whether it's a radar tower or a bridge pier within range, will hit its target with pinpoint accuracy when the right coordination is in place. Ukraine, meanwhile, is preparing to use this precision to systematically dismantle Russia's logistics and transportation infrastructure. More interestingly, the question arises whether new Jamie will replace the existing stock. The Pentagon has committed to delivering an additional 900 units to Ukraine by the end of 2025. This means that Kiev now has not just a few munitions at its disposal, but the capacity to carry out a planned campaign. The calculation on the strategic table is as follows. If we strike one bridge per week, Kirch will be under psychological siege before summer ends. The targets on the map have already been marked. Alternative routes for armored convoys have been nearly eliminated. Russia's asphalt and railway network is 33:06 being cornered further with each strike. On the countermeasure front, there is a plan being carried out in a hurry. Sue 30 SM fighter jets are being integrated with made kibu electronic jammers. But there is a serious problem here. The software is not ready. The target date for the updated Jammer software to be put into active service is the end of the year. Until then, the Russian military's fuel and ammunition transportation will have to race against the clock and navigate every millimeter like a minefield through the sunken passages of the Nippro. The most notable balancing factor in Ukraine's latest bridge destruction attack is the new core structure of its air defense system, Patriot batteries. The US has quietly increased Ukraine's Patriot capacity to three batteries through shipments from Poland's rush of air logistics hub. Two of these are the latest PAC 3 MSE variant while the third is the GEMT which provides broader coverage. This combination provides not 34:02 only point defense but also sufficient range for regional threat suppression. Positioned to protect the Zaparigia front. These systems create an electronic umbrella that provides maneuvering space for the Ukrainian air force. When MiG 29s carrying JDAM take off from this Patriot coverage area and launch their munitions, an interesting tactical chain begins. The Russian side seeking to intercept the launched JDAM is forced to fire S300/400 series SAM systems as a counter measure. But the radar emissions and launch fire from these systems are directly visible on the Patriot radar image. When the S400 comes into play, US-made PAC3MS missiles can instantly detect these threats. This tactic is known in military literature as forcing a stalemate. Ukraine is forcing Russian air defenses to make a decision. Either fire the missile and risk being destroyed by the Patriot MSE or remain silent and watch the strategic bridge collapse. The S400 battery did not fire in this 35:05 attack because if it had, it would have faced the risk of an out-of-range intercept, i.e. missile loss or a Patriot counterattack. Result: The bridge collapsed. This is a new nightmare for the Kremlin. Now it's not just about focusing on the target. They must also calculate the risk of exposing their systems, missile waste, and radar positions with every shot. Don't be surprised if new JDM images appear on your screens in the coming days because every explosion destroys not just a target but also a supply network that has been woven over weeks. Sometimes destroying a bridge is enough to immobilize an entire brigade. The carer crack pass was precisely that breaking point. How do you think Moscow will compensate for this blow? Will it open a new transit route, bring its air defense forward, or pursue a completely different strategy? We look forward to your comments below. Don't forget to subscribe and turn on notifications because in this war, a single GPS coordinate can change the fate of an entire front. Thank you for watching. A Mikollaybased naval intelligence unit 36:05 reports that the attack directly affected stocks of JP5 highdensity jet fuel needed to fire caliber cruise missiles from Caraker class corvettes. These corvettes form the backbone of Russia's strategic deterrence in the Black Sea. However, such disruptions in the fuel supply chain not only slow down their operational tempo but also limit their missile strike capabilities. Furthermore, if the fuel terminal in Soi remains out of commission for an extended period, the Russian Navy will have to redirect its JP5 refueling operations to Novor Rossk. This is not merely a physical change of direction. It adds an additional 170 km to the supply chain. Land-based refueling reaching sea-based fuel platforms via this new route requires both more time and additional security units. When evaluated based on technological parameters, the Liuti Bober architecture calls into question the sustainability of the Russian defense system, not only due to its kinetic impact on the battlefield, but also due to the 37:03 disruption it causes to budget schedules. The core strength of this system does not lie in its radar visibility, but in its stealth capabilities. The carbon and kevlar based composite body reduces the RCS value to below 0.005 m. This places it in the category of targets that remain undetectable by most short-range radars. There is no reliance on classic GNSS-based navigation. Thanks to convolutional neural network supported optical matching trained with lowresolution maps and integrated IMU sensors, the Luty Boba can reach its target with a C of 8 to 12 m even under GPS GLO blackouts. Moreover, these flights are conducted in RS silent mode, leaving no electromagnetic signature detectable by Russian electronic warfare systems. Looking at the hardware side, the picture is even more striking. The flight control board consists of an inexpensive PCB imported from Taiwan, 37:56 soldered with an ARM Cortex M4 microcontroller. The camera module is an 8 MBCOS sensor produced for the Chinese 38:04 market. Including labor and mold expenses does not exceed $25,000. Meanwhile, the cost of repairing and reactivating just two transformer stations in Catel Nikovo and Salsk according to the regional energy authority amounted to $31 million. This translates to a devastating cost effectiveness ratio of 1 to124. In other words, Kiev can neutralize $124 million worth of fixed infrastructure with every $1 million spent on drone stockpiles. This is why the Kremlin has shifted its defense strategy toward protecting infrastructure. The concrete hanger project comes into play precisely at this point. Highsece ceiling impactresistant RF shielded reinforced concrete structures are being built at railway junctions such as Vulgrad, Brians and Rosto to minimize the impact of UAVs. However, this solution which looks promising on paper faces three major obstacles in the field. First, concrete domes reduce access for overhead crane systems, slowing down the 39:07 loading unloading cycle per station by 140%. Second, these structures cause dangerous gas buildup in the summer due to ventilation deficiencies. The risk of explosion increases, especially in gasoline and diesel tanks due to vaporization. Third, and most importantly, the construction process. A typical hanger takes 330 days to build. This allows Kiev to produce more than 700 leutout bobber during the same period. The financial picture is even bleeer. The Russian Ministry of Economy's budget revision report submitted to the Duma in May 2025 forecasts a 42% increase in spending on rail defense in rubles. However, during the same period, the ruble lost 4.3% against the dollar due to panic selling that began after the Sochi refinery was hit. While concrete plans are being made, foreign exchange 40:04 reserves are dwindling. The current expression used sarcastically in Moscow is the wall cracked before it was built. A security fantasy plastered with fragile rubles rather than concrete clearly reveals that the Kremlin's defense reflexes are constrained by economic rather than technical limits. The ruble crisis on the economic front has landed on the Kremlin's desk as the financial echo of the gradually spreading railway sabotage. By the end of July, the Russian Ministry of Finance was forced to increase the budget item under the heading of National Internal Security by 500 billion rubles. This represents a deviation of 23% from the target set at the beginning of the year. However, the bill did not remain on paper. The ruble fell to 83.5 2 days after the Soi explosion and tested the 85 mark after the Vulgar fire. This was a psychological breaking point in the 41:01 foreign exchange markets. The central bank hit the brakes. The ruble was propped up with a 500 basis point interest rate hike. However, this intervention triggered another crisis in terms of the defense economy balance. Commercial interest rates skyrocketed to 21.5%. This increase directly hit not only large holding companies, but also small and medium-sized enterprises, which are the real backbone of Russia's industrial chain. Thousands of local producers supplying bolts, fuel filters, pressure valves, or PTFE hoses to the defense industry complex can no longer access short-term credit. This is because the ruble has created an inflationary environment that is eroding working capital on a nearly weekly basis. As the fragile components of the military supply chain struggle to access financing, production has begun to slow down. A Kuga workshop supplying air valves to a defense factory in Rostov has postponed its order schedule by 2 weeks due to an inability to secure a letter of guarantee. This domino effect 42:06 signifies not only a production slowdown, but also a permanent investment erosion in Russia's domestic defense capabilities. In this entire scenario, the most critical gain for the Ukrainian side is psychological. The Kremlin's 20-year narrative about the invincibility and stability of its deep internal lines has been shattered by the orange smoke billowing from the vulgar station. The internal front rhetoric is now the subject of mockery on Russian social media. Under the hashtag Naroddney corridor, young people are sharing photos of train tickets with fire emojis added via Photoshop. Though it may seem like a minor military detail, for the first time since 2022, a significant portion of the Russian population outside Moscow is actually feeling the logistical strain of war. In summary, fuel is burning in tanks. Rails are intact, but bridges are destroyed. Money is melting away in an unprotected budget, but asymmetric intelligence does not melt. Every time the polymer body of 43:06 the Leuti Boba cools down, a new orange mushroom cloud rises above another station. No matter what concrete dome the Kremlin uses to cover the supply chain, the fire of $25,000 drones will continue to empty the iron grids. Because this war is no longer fought only in trenches, but in signal boxes, transformer squares, and the fine dust of rail tracks illuminated at dawn. And the pen writing that story flies on small but deadly wings guided by a calculated mind. Thank you for watching. Vladimir Putin is no longer fighting only on the front lines, but also against betrayal within his own ranks. 44:05 Beyond the trenches, another front has opened where trust has collapsed and loyalty has been shattered. Russian soldiers are secretly communicating with Ukraine, leaking coordinates and even targeting their own commanders. Could this be a sign that the army is rotting from within. Ukrainian front commander Alexander Sirski has ordered a tightening of defenses particularly along the Kameyansky line in response to increasing pressure from Russia. In accordance with this order, the 210th Separate Assault Regiment and the 118th separate mechanized brigade have launched active counterattacks along the defense line extending to the Orkiv region. Ukrainian troops are not only defending their positions but also exerting constant pressure to halt the Russian advance. But amid these clashes, another front has opened that could influence the fate of the war. The psychological and intelligence fronts are more active. A Russian soldier belonging to the 57th separate brigade 45:02 in the Zaparisia region secretly reported the location of his unit's camouflage T62 tanks to Ukrainian forces. Shortly after these coordinates were relayed, the tanks were targeted and destroyed. The tanks were destroyed not only physically, but also as symbols of the Russian army's morale. This is not an isolated case. [Music] Numerous reports from the front lines in recent weeks indicate an increase in similar tip offs. Ukrainian intelligence sources report that some Russian soldiers have begun sharing coordinates of troop movements, armored formations, ammunition depots, and even temporary command centers with the Ukrainian side. This trend is even more pronounced among soldiers newly deployed to the front lines. Some are resorting to sabotage, jamming radio signals, deliberately damaging equipment, or revealing the locations of their positions before 46:04 surrendering. [Music] Western intelligence sources classify regular data leaks from within the Russian army as of the second quarter of 2025 under five main headings. These leaks are no longer random. They are disciplined, systematic, and at a level that will affect the fate of the war. The first heading is location data. The coordinates of armored units, artillery batteries, radar stations, and ammunition depots located behind the front lines are being directly transmitted. These GPS or glownass supported locations significantly improve the targeting accuracy of Ukrainian artillery. Now, a smur is no longer hit approximately, but precisely. The second category consists of planning schedules. Details of defensive fortifications, troop rotation timelines, and position changes prepared 47:06 within the command structure are leaked as PDF files or direct photographs of command boards. These documents hold not only military but also psychological value. Ukraine knows in advance when and where the opposing side is vulnerable. The third stream focuses on logistics logs. In particular, the barrel numbers of fuel convoys, the routes of transport vehicles, their transit times, and tables detailing daily ammunition consumption rates of units are directly reaching Western centers. This is invaluable data not only for attacks, but also for a wear and tear strategy. The fourth and more internal area is morale reports, complaints sent by soldiers to their commanders, lists of dead and wounded within units. Correspondents showing delays in salary payments and frontline reports paint a detailed picture of the mood at the 48:00 front. This information is critical in both propaganda warfare and psychological operations. The fifth and most dramatic heading is sabotage. Information is no longer just flowing. Actual sabotage is also being carried out from within. Some soldiers jam their own radios while others remove the fuses from anti-tank mines. Some guns have internal barrel defects and deliberately created recoil problems. These actions show that the war is being fought not only on the external front but also on the internal front. 60% of this extensive data flow goes directly to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's special encrypted telegram bot called surrender hotline. 25% is transferred to joint signal intelligence centers of the United States and the United Kingdom. The remaining 15% reaches Western media directly through various channels. What is the reason behind this betrayal? It is difficult to 49:05 explain the process leading Russian soldiers to turn their backs on their commanders and their state with a single reason. But behind the cracks on the front lines, five fundamental factors stand out. The first factor is a lack of trust in the chain of command. Since the harsh winter of 2024, at least eight regional commanders have been dismissed. Although the official reasons given are corruption or military in discipline, the reaction on the front lines is different. Officers believe that the chain of command is no longer shaped by the demands of war, but by political balances in Moscow. The perception that orders are political rather than military in nature is eroding trust in the command structure. The second factor is a logistics and resource crisis. By the summer of 2025, ammunition and fuel supplies had caused serious disruptions on the front lines. Starting in June, some units were reported to have been without artillery support for an average of 4 to 6 hours a day. In a war where their own artillery is silent and fuel 50:05 supplies are delayed, the soldiers morale is rapidly declining. What often comes at the expected time of support is only silence. Mobilization fatigue also triggers betrayal. Most of the new soldiers sent to the front with the third wave of mobilization were conscripted without the slightest idea of the nature of the war. Sent directly into combat after less than two months of accelerated training. These soldiers perception of reality is based on short videos they watch on social media. The conflicting content they are exposed to on social media platforms triggers a reflex of questioning rather than propaganda. We must also mention the climate of conspiracy and fear. Disciplinary processes within the Russian army feed the perception that they are being sacrificed on the front lines. By mid 2025, over a thousand soldiers had been brought to court on charges of insubordination and desertion. These trials have become a kind of warning, especially for those serving on the front lines. A soldier who sees his own officer arrested simply 51:05 for opposing him now fears not only the enemy, but also the system itself. Finally, family pressure and insecurity are also fueling betrayal. Despite social media restrictions, Russian families are finding ways to learn the whereabouts of their loved ones at the front. In some cases, soldiers coordinates are tracked via apps downloaded to their cell phones or SIM cards that are sold. But the authorities efforts to conceal the losses have the opposite effect on families. As trust in the Kremlin rapidly erodess, pressure on soldiers at the front to come back, or at least tell the truth, is growing. Kiev, meanwhile, is determined to turn these voluntary reports from the front lines into a systematic process rather than random gestures. To this end, the Ukrainian government has established a three-pronged and highly sophisticated intelligence gathering mechanism. The first prong of the system consists of digital communication channels that are accessible 24/7. 52:02 Special bots developed on Telegram are designed so that any Russian soldier can easily make contact. For those who want a higher level of security, an anonymous application called Surrender Chat operating on the tour network is available. This system offers an accessible and untraceable way out, especially for soldiers who fear being monitored. The second step involves reintegration centers in Ukraine where Russian soldiers who surrender or provide intelligence are received. This center established in Pava is structured to operate not only in a military but also in a humanitarian framework. Soldiers who surrender here are thoroughly interrogated under the supervision of United Nations officials. Those who pass the information verification process are issued an official humanitarian status document. This document protects those who surrender from allegations of war crimes and ensures they are treated in accordance with international law. The 53:00 third pillar of the system is an openly attractive incentive program. Kiev offers personnel who provide critical information, not only temporary protection, but also a long-term life plan. For these individuals, post-war status guarantees, permanent residency in Ukraine or transfer to European countries are among the options being considered. for young, educated, and technically skilled personnel. This offer represents not only a means of escape, but also an opportunity for a new life. As a result, the system both enhances intelligence flows and deepens the disintegration within the Russian military. The Kremlin has taken panic measures to stop this erosion of loyalty on the front lines. The first of these was the deployment of strict control units called discipline trenches. The task of these units was to confiscate soldiers personal devices before they could commit treason and cut off suspicious communications at the source. But in theory, discipline turned into oppression in practice. A catch and 54:01 judge mentality began to prevail on the front lines. Soldiers found with unauthorized cell phones in the field are sent directly to martial law courts. So far, 491 cases have been sent to military judges in the war zone. This judicial crackdown is further undermining morale at the front by targeting not only those who leak information but all soldiers who have confidence issues. The second measure is technological. The Kremlin has distributed a new generation of RF jamming modules came resin to the front lines. In theory, this system is designed to disrupt encrypted data transfers. But the reality on the ground is quite different. Resin Signal only affects messaging apps that operate on certain wavelengths. This means that a photo of a paper map sent from a cell phone or a classic MMS message can reach the other side without being affected by this system. In other words, intelligence can be transported not only with high technology but sometimes with 55:00 old-fashioned methods as well. Contrary to expectations, all this repressive environment and technological measures are also having the opposite effect. Some soldiers on the front lines, believing they will face trial anyway, are beginning to see surrender or leaking information as a form of salvation, thinking, 'Since punishment is inevitable, at least I can find a way out.' These developments are shaking the image of charismatic commander-in-chief and disciplined army that Vladimir Putin has meticulously crafted over the years. In Kremlin propaganda, the Russian armed forces were presented as a war machine managed from a single center with a fully functioning chain of command. But the betrayals on the front lines and intelligence leaks from within are eroding this image on two fronts. In the outside world, especially in Western media, every new leak is reported with headlines like Putin doesn't control the army. The army doesn't control Putin. This creates the impression that strategic decisions are not made from above, but are shaped by morale on the 56:01 ground and the instinct for personal survival. The Kremlin's message that Putin is pulling all the strings in this war, which it has been repeating for years, is becoming increasingly less credible. The picture is even more complex within the country. The families of soldiers serving on the front lines are losing trust in the Kremlin's control of information as they see their sons locations and even their dates of death being exposed on social media platforms. The question, if their locations can be revealed so easily, why are they still there has become a daily query. Putin's powerful image as a leader on television is now giving way to skepticism in the silence of kitchens and living rooms. If these intelligence leaks continue at the same pace, the dynamics of the war could shift dramatically on three key fronts. First, artillery superiority could completely shift hands. Ukraine no longer fires blindly. It strikes Russian battery positions with centimeter precision using coordinates obtained directly from inside the country. This forces Russian 57:04 artillery units to constantly change positions and distribute their ammunition hastily and irregularly. Firepower decreases, accuracy drops, and panic grows. The second shift occurs in the supply chain. Fuel depots, bridges, or train lines that were previously targeted using reconnaissance satellites or reconnaissance flights are now directly targeted using information obtained from inside the country. As a result, logistical costs skyrocket. The number of soldiers and vehicles required to ensure the safe transport of an ammunition convoy doubles. Time is prolonged. risk increases and the pulse of the front line slows. The third and perhaps most dangerous shift, a breakdown in morale. If the number of soldiers providing information from within or surrendering exceeds 5% of the total personnel, a psychological threshold is crossed. Questions such as how many others are talking and who leaked information in the neighboring battalion spread among the soldiers. 58:02 This kind of environment of distrust triggers herd mentality. Individual desertions turn into mass defections. The war begins to be lost not only on the battlefield but also in the minds of the soldiers. Putin will probably resort to economic morphine in the short term to stop this trend. Pay raises for those serving on the front lines, extra compensation for their families, propaganda films with themes of execution for traitors. But all these steps have a common limitation, money. The ruble is now melting as fast as it is on the battlefield. refineries ablaze from drone attacks, sabotaged railway lines, and now a wave of betrayal rising from within the front lines. Even the Kremlin's last reserves may not be enough to finance this new phase of the war, which is exploding from within. As a result, Moscow's narrative of a strong army and unwavering loyalty is now nothing more than window dressing. On the real front lines, it is not loyalty, but questioning that prevails. A soldier's armor can be repaired if it is pierced. But once doubt enters his mind, no amount of resources can fill that crack. Once trust is lost, it cannot be 59:05 regained through propaganda, but only through a genuine sense of justice and meaning. If Russian tanks are being hit today, not by enemy artillery, but by coordinates coming from within, this is no longer an exception, but the result of systemic decay. If the Kremlin cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the question echoing in the soldiers minds, why am I fighting here? Then the direction of the war will no longer be determined by rockets, but by consciences. And those consciences are working in favor of Kiev, not the Kremlin. Thank you for watching. The Russian army spent months laying mines and traps in critical areas and passageways. But Ukraine used unimaginable tactics to blow Putin's traps up in his face. Using the enemy's traps against them required great 1:00:05 coordination, intelligence, and tactical awareness. In this context, on August 2nd, Ukrainian forces carried out a demolition operation that looked like something out of a military thriller. The incident was highly dramatic for the Russian army. This is because the Russians had placed TM62 anti-tank mines on the bridge over the Tarta River. They had prepared to blow up the bridge in the event of a Ukrainian attack in the Brians region. They hung nets and set traps to protect the bridge. And in the event of a possible Ukrainian ambush, the Russians would press the button as Ukrainian troops crossed the bridge. But moments later, a Ukrainian FPV drone pilot using a fiber optic connection skillfully overcame all obstacles, accurately hit the Russian mines, and blew up the bridge. The strike asset selected for the bridge in Brians was a carbon fiberbodied FPVcontrolled 1:01:06 324 kg class kamicazi drone. The 400 to 500 g of explosive material placed in the front section of the body was insufficient to detonate directly. Nearly 30 TM62 anti-tank mines were placed under the bridge to block Ukrainian advances. These Soviet-made mines with steel bodies carrying 7 to 8 kg of TNT had the power to shatter a tank's underside. Under normal circumstances, these mines would be activated either by a mechanical trigger system or by remote detonation. But this time, Ukraine started the chain reaction. However, when it struck with precision, it was powerful enough to create a shock wave that would trigger one of the TM62 anti-tank mines inside the steel console holding the bridge. The TM62 contains 7 to 8 kg of TNT in its body and the pressure exerted on its fusion element triggers the mine. The chain reaction anticipated by the Ukrainian planners began precisely here. 1:02:05 When a single mine detonated, all the other mines embedded in the bridge's structure exploded one after another. In total, an energy equivalent to nearly 250 kg of TNT was released. The concrete pavement layer along with the steel beams was lifted several meters into the air before shattering and scattering into the Tarta River and its surroundings. According to eyewitness accounts, an area with a radius of 100 m was nearly completely transformed into craters and debris after the explosion. In footage shared on social media, the FPV drone can be clearly seen gliding at low altitude, then locking onto its target and colliding with its support leg, followed by the start of a destructive chain reaction explosion a few seconds later. 1:03:03 [Music] With the explosion, the drone camera goes dark and then a column of flames rising into the sky is reflected in the camera. As a thick layer of smoke rises in the area, only charred metal pieces and blackened concrete blocks remain of the bridge. With the collapse of the bridge, evacuation and support links for Russian troops stationed along a 16 km border strip have been completely cut. explosion destroyed not only a passageway but also Russia's confidence in its border defense line. But don't think that an ordinary target was destroyed. This was a Russian defense hub that had been carefully prepared not only from an engineering standpoint but also on a tactical level. The basis of this operation is Ukraine's drone doctrine which has been maturing in the field. Kiev has abandoned its Soviet era heavy industry-based defense concept and perfected the lowcost high impact formula with cheap, agile, and smart 1:04:04 platforms. According to Osent sources close to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the troops serving in this region are currently effectively trapped behind Ukraine's front lines. So why did Russia set such a trap for itself? The reflex to protect the border was based on the buffer corridor doctrine officially announced by Moscow in the fall of 2023. Under this doctrine, a series of fixed defense lines were built along the Briansk, Belgarod, and Kursk regions. The main goal was to stop possible Ukrainian ground attacks before they reached the border and to create a defensive depth within Russian territory. To this end, anti-tank trenches were dug for miles. Minefields were laid. Concrete blocks were used to create barriers and remotec controlled explosive devices were placed under strategic bridges. But this defensive architecture also had a weakness. The geographical structure of the region was extremely limited in terms of alternative passages and logistical 1:05:00 flexibility. Concrete bridges built over natural obstacles such as the Tata River served not only a tactical but also a strategic lifeline function. These bridges were indispensable not only for the passage of military convoys, but also for the advance of armored units, the transport of ammunition and fuel, evacuation routes, and even basic lines to rear logistics centers. The bridge over the Tata was an absolute choke point due to the inadequacy of the surrounding infrastructure. The dirt roads to the south were muddy during the summer months due to sudden rains, making it impossible for heavy transport vehicles to pass. The forest cover to the north consisted of narrow sloping slopes unsuitable for armored vehicles. [Music] Therefore, the destruction of the Tata bridge eliminated not only a transport line but also the main supply and 1:06:03 evacuation corridor for all Russian forces in the region. How Ukraine achieved this cannot be explained by simply flying a drone. First came the intelligence step. Both satellite imagery and frontline intelligence sources were used to map the mine configuration in the area. Civilian-looking fixedwing surveillance drones recorded military traffic between the bridgeg's entrance and exit for a week. Video analytics revealed the times when fuel tankers and armored personnel carriers passed through. Heat map analysis identified the traces of excavation activities carried out by Russian excavators at the bridg's foundation which helped determine the timing of mine laying. Signal intelligence then came into play since Russian engineering units used low power RF firing modules to remotely trigger TM62 mines. Electromagnetic interference patterns were observed in the area. Interference windows confirmed the geographical distribution of the mine 1:07:02 array. The final attack plan was drawn up, assuming that there were three main drive points on the northwestern leg of the bridge and one on the southeastern leg. The target was the corner leg where at least two mines would trigger each other. The FPV drone, equipped with a limited explosive charge, locked onto this leg. The drone's final maneuver lasting 10 seconds was designed to move parallel to the ground and then suddenly climb upward, causing the body to strike the underside of the bridge. Gerder. One important detail to note is that the bridge has been designated a red zone by Russian troops since the first year of the war. There are unmanned surveillance towers and thermal cameras, but most of the night vision algorithms are focused on tracking trucks and vehicles that give off high heat signatures. With its composite carbon body, electric motor, and minimal IR signature, the FPV drone was almost impossible to detect on Russian surveillance screens. When the flight speed reached 120 km an hour, the 1:08:05 detection window dropped to 2 or 3 seconds. A very short window for a human operator to react, activate an RF jammer, or relay orders to a drone defense artillery unit. When considering why Russia couldn't prevent this, three answers emerge. First, the mine network laid under the bridge falls under the passive defense category. While the mine is under the bridge, the RF trigger cannot be jammed with interference because the activation sensor is triggered by mechanical vibration when the drone collides with it. Second, Russian electronic warfare capabilities were weak near the bridge. EW teams were deployed deeper into the front lines to protect critical radar domes in Belgor and Kursk. This rural area of Brians was primarily a transit point for ground convoys. Air defense was a low priority. Third, the Russian army adopted a modular corridor approach instead of a comprehensive surveillance network. So 1:09:02 sensor data does not flow to a simultaneous command center. Each bridge is under the responsibility of a separate unit. Different regiments carry different EW codes. In such fragmented networks, opening a window for rapid reaction is nearly impossible. Looking at the impact of the attack on the front lines, logistical delays are already being felt. Russia was moving an average of 300 tons of fuel and ammunition per day through Brians before the bridge was destroyed. In the first 48 hours after the explosion, shipments fell to almost zero. Alternative routes offer two different bypasses via Clincy in the north and around Stadoo in the south, but both routes are longer and have been marked as sensitive areas since previous Ukrainian drone attacks. The first figures included in ISW's daily frontline report indicate that approximately five Russian units have shifted positions along the Brians border under the pretext of a tactical withdrawal. In reality, this is not a 1:10:01 withdrawal, but an inability to hold positions due to supply shortages. If the fuel convoy cannot arrive, the six soldiers inside the BMP3 cannot maintain the fire support line. When ammunition trucks are delayed, it becomes impossible to defend 122 mm artillery positions with AK74 rifle fire. The psychological impact is even more intense. Russia frequently uses the concept of a deep rear in its propaganda. Regions close to Moscow, key bridges behind the front lines, and major railway junctions are claimed to be under absolute protection out of reach of Ukrainian drones. The destruction of bridges has undermined this claim. Images shared on Russian social media by relatives of soldiers show not only bridge debris but also armored convoys diverted onto side roads. The question why are our mines exploding on us has been trending on social media. The economic impact extends beyond Bryansk. The bridges in the border region are the arteries of the north south logistics axis 1:11:02 stretching from the Caucasus to St. Petersburg. When this route is cut off, additional strain is placed on railway traffic between Rostoff and Dombbas. Railway transportation accounts for 70% of Russia's total military logistics. The destruction of a bridge may seem like a minor setback at the macro level, but if we consider the series of events that took place at the same time with oil depots burning in Sochi, a tanker station being hit in Vulgograd and a fuel train exploding on the Rostoff Salsk line, the cost multiplier grows. While the cost per UAV ranges from $5,000 to $25,000, repairing a concrete bridge can cost $4 million to $5 million. When multiplied by fuel supply delays and armored repair bills, the damage adds up to a staggering figure. The attack also stands out as a textbook example of Kiev's deep strike logistics disruption strategy. This strategy is based on a three- tiered attack architecture. The first layer consists of lowcost but high impact continuous drone attacks. FPV and fixedwing 1:12:02 kamicazi UAVs are sent in waves to targets behind the front lines. These attacks are often carried out with decoy UAVs to confuse air defenses and force them to overreact. As a result, the Russian defense system becomes unable to distinguish which threats are real. The second layer is the precision strike phase where high precision guided munitions come into play. Western systems such as JDAM ER, Storm Shadow, and Scalp EG target critical infrastructure such as radar towers, fuel tanks, bridges, and command centers. The third layer consists of electronic warfare supported signal jamming operations. Jamming systems such as Nemesis, Buavvel, and Thor in Ukraine's infantry blind the radars of Russian surfaceto-air missile batteries, facilitating the previous two layers targets. This three- tiered structure was applied exactly in the attack on the bridge over the Tarta River in Bryansk. Electronic warfare assets near the Ukrainian border prevented Russian EW units from tracking the drone's routes and taking counter measures. The FPV 1:13:04 drone then targeted Russian anti-tank mines placed directly on the bridgeg's support columns. The force of the explosion came from both the munitions and the chain reaction. The invisible aspect of the operation is the drone technology itself. Several Ukrainian startup companies have produced semi-artificial intelligence control software for FPV drones. The operator manually flies the drone until the final approach. In the last 15 m, the internal lidar and optical matching systems kick in. The artificial neural network identifies the weakest point of the bridgeg's structure and sends a confirmation signal to the pilot. This minimizes factors such as signal delay and wind drift. No matter how small the target, the drone hits its final point, known as the laser laser, with millimeter precision. In Russian defense doctrine, countering this is only possible with hard kill cannons or high energy lasers. However, Russia's Pancier S1 batteries experience delays when 1:14:00 firing 30 mm cannon shells, even if they detect a 1 kg FPV drone. And if the detection to fire window is less than 2 seconds, the artillery response cannot keep up. High energy lasers are still in the prototype stage. This technological asymmetry is directly reflected in Putin's image. The most critical component of the military modernization narrative that the Kremlin has been building for years is air defense. Platforms such as the S400 Triumph, Pancier, TORM2, and BAL radar were lined up like decorations in parades. Now, images of FPV drones costing a few thousand slipping through the S400's blind spot and disrupting Russia's own mine system are undermining the triumph narrative on the ground. What is devastating for the Russian public is not so much the magnitude of the loss as the fact that the trap has backfired on its creator. The long-term equation that will result from the bridge destruction may force Russia to question its mine trench defense doctrine. When combined with the bridge, the mine protecting the shelter becomes a potential bomb ready 1:15:01 to explode. Moscow will either reduce the number of mines. This will open the way for Ukrainian ground forces, or else a bridge system with more steel-plated mines will be needed, which will increase costs and extend construction time. The rule of military engineering that protection if it lacks flexibility backfires is being added as a footnote to Russia's Briansk lesson. Finally, we must address Putin's political image. A regime that bases its legitimacy on the strategic control myth must rewrite its narrative when it loses a bridge due to its own mine plan. Let's end with a pertinent question. If the Kremlin's mine explodes on the border bridge, who will defend the watchtowers in Moscow? Public perception is embracing the narrative of disaster rather than explaining the failure. Russian history is familiar with the smell of gunpowder from military mistakes, from the Afghanistan trauma to the Cheschna fiasco. But this time, the mistake is not exploding on the front lines, but in the backyard, the smell of gunpowder at 1:16:00 home is too strong to be suppressed by any propaganda. The destroyed bridge in Brians is not just a pile of concrete and steel. It is a living monument to the defeat of a costly legacy of defense by a wave of cheap and clever attacks in the old new war equation. Ukraine made Russia pay for this with an FPV drone. Russia fell into the trap it had set by laying mines. The war will continue, but now everyone knows that the side that can bomb the red lines on the map, not on the battlefield, will win the game. Thank you for watching. [Music] Putin is in panic mode because a single move by Sweden and the US is undermining Russia's latest plans on both the Baltic and Ukrainian fronts. Russian warplanes were doing whatever they wanted in areas they considered their safe haven in the Baltic. And Russia was trying to 1:17:05 pressure the West with its massive drone pressure in Ukraine. But everything changed dramatically in an instant. Here's how. At the end of July, Stockholm announced that it would integrate the latest variant of the AIM120, the C8, worth $3.5 billion, into its Grien fleet, and at the same time accelerate the program to transfer hundreds of RB99s, the old A IM120Bs that had been waiting in hangers for years to Ukraine. So, how might Russia be affected by these developments? With Sweden turning the Baltic sky into Ukraine's air defense shield, Sweden's AIM120 C8 modernization may appear to be a technical upgrade that fundamentally disrupts the Baltic air balance, but there is a multi-layered strategic plan behind it. The new C8 variant provides approximately 40 km of additional range compared to its predecessor, the C7, and 1:18:01 almost entirely covers the launch and escape zone that Russian Sue30/35 fleets have considered safe when departing from Kheningrad. For example, the distance from the eastern coast of the Baltic to Stockholm is 430 km and from Gautland to St. Petersburg is 320 km. A gripen carrying C8 with its lowaltitude climb profile can patrol right in the center of this corridor without refueling. Russian pilots now begin receiving high probability engagement warnings in the cockpit before even approaching firing range. This not only increases the likelihood of aircraft loss, but also accelerates the rate at which expensive Kinsal or KH31 cruise missiles are expended. For Moscow with limited munition stocks, this makes the dilemma of going deep or launching from a distance and retreating quickly even more costly with each sorty. The second critical factor as important as technical power is electronic warfare 1:19:00 immunity. The C8's digital guidance unit neutralizes the noise cloud techniques created by Kiini Jamming pods thanks to its mixed waveform and steerable antenna scanning pattern. Target updates are transmitted every second of flight via the Grien's link 22 data link to the area AWNC radar NATO's common air picture and the sensor fusion of Patriot PAC3 batteries. Russian ECM pods are few in number, maintenance intensive and already operating at limited capacity. As a result, their operational rhythm breaks down when forced into narrowband jamming. The passive scanner modules of Sweden's Coast Guard radars, which will be modernized in 2024, also increase the signal consistency of this network. Even after a missile is launched, the tracking and illumination signal is not interrupted, and Russian pilots lose the comfort of fire and forget. The Green concepts roadto-air tactic directly exploits the logistical weaknesses of the Russian aerospace forces. Thanks to the standard six-minute takeoff and 1:20:05 12minute rearming times achieved by SAR engineers on a 400 m asphalt strip, more than 20 temporary runways in Finland and Sweden can be randomly activated, leaving the Russian A50U early warning access in a complex and unpredictable missile trap. The already limited number of A50U platforms have neither the personnel nor the spare parts chain to maintain a 24-hour watch in the Western Baltic. The geographical circle is also narrowing as Finland prepares its F-35 squadrons for deployment. The island of Gautland is closing off the lowaltitude shadow corridor favored by Russian Su34s using the Erie radar flying sentinel concept. Transporting new S400 batteries to Keningrad is bringing Moscow into a high cost, low sustainability spiral due to the logistical risk of HMR's ER range, the defensive vulnerability of the Sualkuli corridor, and rising foreign exchange costs. Longrange R37M 1:21:03 or K77M stocks are currently prioritized for the Ukrainian front. Any missile production plans to be shifted to the Baltic will be postponed, increasing the unit cost by 18% annually due to the volatility of the rubal yuan exchange rate. But Stockholm's agenda does not stop there. The second pillar of the strategy involves transferring RB99 AIM120B stockpiles to Ukraine. In accordance with the third-party transfer provisions of the Pentagon's July 31st document, hundreds of RB99 Rathians rusting in Swedish hangers are entering the revision line and being made compatible with NASAM's block 2 launches. Russia was facing an increasingly dire situation in Ukraine. The Russian army reached a deadlock in its ground operations. It also failed to achieve any results at sea. Its only hope was to wear down Ukraine with drone attacks and it almost succeeded. Russia launched a record 6,400 drones and missiles in July 1:22:01 and Patriot stockpiles were reaching alarm levels, but the Patriots arrived first. Then, with a single agreement, a powerful missile chain exchange from Sweden began, and this is changing the entire war equation. Timing is critical here. This move is being made at a time when Russian airspace violations are increasing along the entire Baltic Black Sea line and 6,400 drones and missiles have been launched by Russia in Ukraine. It is claimed that in closed briefings by the Ministry of Defense, it was noted that when the newest missiles arrive, our RB99 stock will be taken out of active service. The RB99 is the modernized version of the AAM120B which operates under the Swedish code. Although classified as second generation under western standards, this munition can still pose a significant threat to charadder derived drones, KH59 cruise missiles, and even lowaltitude Sue25 attack aircraft thanks to its active radar seeker and practical strike radius of approximately 55 km. 1:23:04 Sweden's intention to redirect 2/3 of its approximately 1,500 RB99s to a new ally, namely Ukraine, under a stock transfer protocol, is no longer a secret. The economic equation behind this decision is straightforward. As the C8s arrive, the RB99s will remain idle in storage. Their shelf life will shorten and each maintenance cycle will create chronic budget pressures. At regional cabinet meetings in Oslo, Copenhagen, Vnius, and Ria, the view that it is better to put them to use on the front lines than let them rot on cold shelves was voiced loudly. According to Stockholm's budget briefing, the total amount allocated for C8 integration is $800 million. Of this, $350 million will be covered by US domestic production subsidies and $200 million by R&D loans from the European Defense Fund. Thus, Sweden will not have 1:24:00 to take cash out of its coffers when donating the RB99s. Accelerated delivery for early transition to modern inventory has also been added to Washington's approval document. Kiev's contribution to this package will be minimal. German and Dutch grant funds will cover a significant portion of the transportation, coding, and adaptation costs. The remainder will be covered by the US's 2025 sustainment assistance program. The picture emerging for Ukraine points to an increasingly tough defense struggle. A total of 6,400 unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles fired by Russia throughout July 2025 were reported by the Ukrainian military intelligence agency as a firing tempo beyond tactical limits. This figure was supported by over 200 Shahid 131/136s, nearly 180 KH1 cruise missiles, and more than 50 Caliba missiles in just one month. The gaps in Ukraine's air defense map, particularly in the mid-altitude layer, have become much more visible in 1:25:02 this new wave of attacks. While Patriot Pack 3 MSE batteries can intercept hypersonic threats at high altitudes, such as the Khol and Caliber, the layer transition points between mid and low altitude layers remain vulnerable. This is where the strategic value of the RB99 stockpile becomes clear. Sweden's transfer of these missiles to Ukraine creates an intermediate layer in terms of both platform and range. According to NATO and SAB sources, the RB99 missiles are configured to be easily integrated with NASA or future F-16 fleets. The Ukrainian Air Force's first F-16 fleet, awaiting final combat approval in Romania, is already loaded with A IM9X Sidewinders. But the real critical threshold is integration with fully compatible variants of the AM RAM series. Since the RB99 is actually a customized version of the AMA for Sweden, the software protocol is completely identical thanks to weapon platform compatibility packages called 1:26:00 dock files shared by SAR with Ukrainian engineers. Full synchronization can be achieved with only 3,700 lines of source code and four in-house test flights. This reduces the software certification process, which normally takes 6 months to as little as 6 weeks. This means that Ukraine will theoretically be able to launch RB99/ AMA variants from F-16 by September 2025. The stock figures are worth mentioning. When a thousand RB99s are deployed, each F-16 can carry 20 missiles in the medium altitude defense line stretching from the Black Sea to Pava. Assuming an 85% hit probability algorithm, this adds the capacity to respond to 200 targets per week with the help of data link assistance from Patriot radar networks. This seemingly technical ratio strikes at the most vulnerable aspect of Russia's swarm drone bombardments, their economic sustainability. The Shahed 136 costs between 15,000 and $20,000 to procure. In Ukraine, an average of 1/3 1:27:02 reach their target and two are shot down. The RB99 may seem expensive at $50,000 per engagement. But when the same target is hit with the Patriot architecture, the bill rises to $3.5 million. Thus, the RB99 takes over the Patriots role in the mid-altitude window for emergency takeoff and heavy bombardment, reducing missile costs by 98%. This scenario is even more problematic for the Russian side. As the safe passage rate for Shaheds declines, the Kremlin is forced to increase trade-off prices with Iran instead of boosting production. The latest Defense Intelligence Analysis report notes that Russia spent $300 million on Shahed procurement alone in the first half of 2025, subsidized by sales of petrochemical byproducts. The second piece of the defense chain comes from Germany. Berlin has agreed to transfer two complete Patriot systems, a combination of 16 launchers and 10 radar command vehicles to Kiev under the US Germany Ukraine trilateral protocol. These batteries will undergo serial 1:28:02 modification at the Yavariv training ground near the Polish border. The planned deployment will protect the Odessa Mikolive line and the Kharkiv Dinipro corridor while the Amram stock will fill the middle layer. The Patriot will strengthen the upper layer's interceptor shield. Although the costbenefit analysis discussed by the German interior and defense committee raised the objection that the RB99s will run out of range while the Patriots wait in Polish skies. The Federal Chancellor passed the decision citing the Scandinavian strategic share of the Amram swap. Berlin's calculation is twofold. First, as Ukraine's qualified air defense weakens Russia's motivation to target energy infrastructure, Europe's gas electricity fluctuations will remain stable. Second, once the Patriot batteries are withdrawn from German territory, modernization will be prioritized with the TLVS/Patriot hybrid system taking their place by 2028. On the technical front, the Gripen C/D fleet is the backbone of the operation. SAR's design, which has been in development for over 30 years, stands 1:29:05 out with its ability to take off and land on short runways, low radar cross-section, electronic warfare pods embedded in a composite fuselage, and most importantly, NATO link 16 data link. It may seem small compared to huge programs such as the F-16 Block 70, which is being discussed for sale to Turkey, or the F-35 ordered by Poland, but in the Baltic the being small is an advantage. Gripen's real weapon is its network ccentric combat capability. The aircraft's IDAM data link pod can combine what the ground radar cannot see, what a visby corvette's passive sensor detects, and even the electrooptical fragments collected by a Finnish groundbased passive listening station into a single screen. This network creates a complete kill web matrix for the AM RAM C8. When the missile is launched, the pilot can turn without having to cut the illumination line to the target, transferring guidance information to a peer aircraft. This multi-pronged system leaves the Kiningradbased Sue 30s SM pairs with a 1:30:03 narrowing maneuvering corridor. Because even if they evade radar, another node will detect their signature. When Ukraine's F-16s arrive with link 16 standard software, this network will extend from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Russia's openly stated counter reflex is to keep its MIG 31BM interceptors on high alert in the Keningrad and Leningrad oblasts and to shift the patrol route of its A50U early warning aircraft from the Baltic center to the St. Petersburg coastline. Logistics documents from the Leningrad military district show three additional tanker flights in the last week. If additional flight time is being spent, it means that the airspace the aircraft has to monitor is becoming crowded. However, this measure remains reactive against the Grippon RB99 combination. This is because the Amram's radar head does not require semi-active illumination even on final approach. By the time the trace detected by the A50U is converted into data and reaches the battery, the engagement window is closed. Moscow's only real antidote is to keep its Kabini 1:31:02 U and L175V hybrid electronic jamming pods in large numbers. But the confirmed success rate of Kibini against the AIM120 family is limited. The false echo programs loaded into Russia's PKKC Rook and armored threat radar operating modes are quickly eliminated due to the AMRAM's low sidelobe detection algorithm. Let's turn to Ukraine. When RB99s are deployed in F-16 cockpits, an air defense screen will form at medium altitude to intercept targets illuminated by Patriot radars. In fact, Kiev's plan is two- layered. To shave down drone swarms approaching cities from below with the growing Sky Sentinel tower network and to strike the remaining cruise missiles at medium altitude with RB99s and the Patriot dual shoot procedure. This double shot technique adds 15% to the kill probability in arrival kinematics and target prediction accuracy equations. In a world where missiles are expensive, 1:32:00 every missed shot burns a hole in the budget. The RB99 is cheaper than the Patriot, and the Patriot's radar is invisible to the RB99. For relatively expensive missiles such as Caliber or KH101, such layered defense reverses the Kremlin's cost effectiveness graph. According to data from the Economist Intelligence Unit, Moscow's monthly missile drone expenditure is currently around $350 million. When Kiev's layered defense with Western stockpiles comes into play, the cost per unit destroyed will triple. This economic erosion will inevitably slow down the pace of attacks. This is because Rosstec's feedback capacity is limited and its petro dollar revenues are in a bottleneck due to sanctions. The geopolitical dimension in the Baltic Black Sea ring is also intensifying. Sweden's official entry into NATO was completed last year, but air policing duties have been ongoing since 2015. Those patrols are now evolving into active deterrence. When the Griffin flight route extends over Gautland to Poland, the Kinenrad corridor narrows. At the same time, Romania's F-16 fleet 1:33:04 is increasing the number of patrols in the Black Sea. In between, with Turkish F-16s flying the Aian Black Sea route and Awax on shift, Russia is caught on combined radar almost every time it takes off. Kiningrad's already limited runway capacity is feeling the pressure from both Sweden and Poland. At this point, the strategic question is unavoidable. Are we ready for the Scandinavian dome? Building defenses with concrete and iron instead of electronic waves is not a concept that has been tested in history. The new doctrine relies on two gaps on the ground. First, Russia lacks the platforms to deploy its electronic warfare capabilities in the Baltic with equal force. Kibupods are limited and as MiG 31BMS are deployed on additional missions, engine hours are increasing and maintenance and spare part cycles are lengthening. Second, due to economic embargos, the Kremlin is forced to source every range upgrade from the Chinese market. The Amram production chain, however, still has controlled component status. This means that when Washington clicks to increase its order, 1:34:04 production capacity can be ramped up to three shifts. But when Moscow's integrated circuit gets jammed, containers from Shanghai wait for weeks at the border. This difference in supply speed is reflected in the field as a monthly rather than an annual impact. Ultimately, Sweden's Amram swap is more than just a change in ammunition inventory on paper. In the Baltic skies, code lines, logistics, finance, and psychology intertwine. Every missile box sent out builds a wall around a Patriot site in the Black Sea, thickening the lowaltitude canopy over Ukrainian cities. How much longer can the ruble withstand this heat? Can Russia sustain its drone swarm? Nothing is certain. What is certain is that the first beam of the Scandinavian dome narrative was laid by the Gripen jets, the second by the Patriot, and the third is coming from the RB99 stockpile. When these three beams are fully in place, the sky over the Baltic and Black seas will become a single metal reflection, a single voice of the data network. When 1:35:03 that day comes, Russia will have no sky to fly its drone swarms, no hidden exit route to launch its calibers, and perhaps not a single ruble left in the defense ministry's budget. and the whole domino will fall with a signature, a tweet, and a few old but golden RB99s. This whole picture also amplifies the psychological pressure. Sweden's link 22 integration provides a multi-layered close-air picture by sharing real-time data with Polish F-16s and Norwegian F-35s. Russian pilots are moving on a chessboard where their post-take mission parameters are constantly being updated. Every blue warning tone echoes in the cockpit as a potential risk that could cancel the mission. At the strategic level, as the Kremlin directs more spare parts and personnel to the Baltic to maintain air superiority in the north, gaps will open up in southern logistics along the Rosto Vores Belgarod line, weakening the supply chain to Crimea and allowing Ukraine to increase pressure on its land and seafronts. Thank you for watching. region's governor says at least four people were injured after 1:36:05 what they're describing as a massive strike that follows a possible drone attack overnight on a Russian oil refinery. Russia is engulfed in flames. The lifelines of Russia's war machine melted away in three explosions on July 22 to 33, 2025. There are three critical pillars that give Russia its confidence in war. the chemical plants that feed its explosive production lines, the fuel refineries that keep its air and land vehicles running, and the energy and communications backbone that connects its troops behind the front lines. In the last week of July, Ukraine struck all of these pillars in quick succession. First, strikes disabled Russia's largest prochemical complex in the Samara region, followed by a second wave that shut down a high-capacity refinery in the same city. The following night, the successive targeting of a thermal power plant, a regional railway junction, and Rostolecom's main data 1:37:00 center in Novachasque made it clear that the attack was no coincidence. For Moscow, the result was not just zeros added to the fire reports. It was a chain reaction that ranged from the speed of artillery fire to the tempo of air sorties to the labels on food shelves. So, how did Ukraine target these facilities, overcome Russian defenses, and [ __ ] the Russian war machine? All three targets were hit by a single actor, the Ukrainian armed forces low radar signature UJ26 Boba swarm. Let's start with the chemical plant. Andre Kovalenko, head of the disinformation response center affiliated with Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, reported on Tuesday, July 22, that an attack had been carried out on a facility belonging to the novelishk prochemical company in Russia's Samara region. Kovaleenko stated that the facility produced raw materials for explosives including benzene, phenol acetone, alphamethyl styrene, synthetic ethyl alcohol, and paratertbutylphenol. The CPD chairman explained that these 1:38:04 components are used in the production of TNT, hexogen, tetril, and other types of explosives used to equip artillery shells, aircraft bombs, fragmentation munitions, and rockets. Indeed, this facility was of great importance. The Novakuish Bishevk prochemical complex with an annual processing capacity of 1 million tons serves as the backbone of Russia's high explosive raw material production. Aromatic hydrocarbons such as benzene and phenol enter nitration reactors here, undergo several stages of processing and are transformed into precursor components of TNT and RDX. These intermediates are shipped to filling lines in the eurals where they form the explosive content of 122 and 152 mm artillery shells. The first target of the attack on the facility was the raw benzene storage tanks. The exposed flames rapidly expanded the mixture inside the pressurized pipe within seconds. Within a short time, 1:39:02 three nitration towers exceeded the safe operational limit and triggered an emergency shutdown. The line was completely shut down until a water wall was established to cool the process at the facility due to the risk of leakage. Although this decision appears to have been an environmental accidentrevention measure, it had a direct negative impact on the stock of explosives destined for the front line. Satellite images of the area indicate that the diameter and rise time of the initial explosions were low, suggesting low payload but highly accurate kamicazi drones. The U.J26 bobber, which has been mentioned frequently in recent times, is a possible example of this. According to open sources, the body length is around 3 m with a delta-shaped wingspan of 2 1/2 m. Thanks to its low infrared signature, it engages lowaltitude weapons at the pancier level rather than the S300. It is claimed that a glowness GPS hybrid module and image recognition package are combined for guidance. This allows it to select the target tower from stored reference photos without an 1:40:05 external connection during the last 5 km of its route. The real critical point is range. Targets struck more than 100 km deep inside Russian territory show that the UAV took off from inside Ukraine and passed through a very wide S300 coverage area. The reason why air defense radars cannot detect bobber is that its radar cross-section is close to that of a bird and does not produce reflections at certain wavelengths. Bobber or a similar body at least open the first wave. Hours later, on the morning of July 22nd, residents of Novaku Bishevk in the Samara region reported powerful explosions. Ukraine carried out a successful attack with unmanned aerial vehicles on a Russian strategic facility. Sources reported that at least two UAVs reached their targets, the Novakuishvk's oil refinery. A direct hit caused a fire at the facility. Industrial areas were engulfed in flames. The Novakuishv's refinery is 1:41:04 located next to a chemical complex. The Novakuishevs refinery is part of Ross Neft and is of key importance for oil refining in the Vular region. Among other things, it produces fuel for jet engines. It produces highquality bitmen and RT fuel, the main type of aviation kerosene in demand by Russian military aviation. It processes 8,800,000 tons of crude oil annually and produces RTclass jet fuel for the Russian air force. The standout feature is not just the volume but the production process which can be redirected to the front lines in a very short time. This means that the thousands of tons of kerosene stored here can be transported to Engel's air base or the helicopter landing pads in Vores within a day if needed. The second wave heading for the refinery hit the distillation tower and the hydrocracker line. The technical team acknowledged in the first hour that operations had been shut down and cooling was expected. In short, the general shutdown meant that crude oil input had stopped and output was close 1:42:06 to zero. As soon as the air command received this statement, it reduced its sorty plans on the southern and western fronts by 45%. Tanker flights had to take fuel from the eastern region, increasing both flight time and costs. The following night in the Rostov region was the second act of the strategic coup. On the night of July 23rd, an intense attack by unmanned aerial vehicles was carried out on Novachasque in the Rostov region, causing destruction and fires in the city. The railway infrastructure, a regional power plant and a Ross telecom building were under attack. The Novacascaya thermal power plant provides load balancing for both regional industry and the railway signaling network. Around midnight, Russian media reported that pieces of the allegedly downed UAVs had caused a fire in the center of Novachasque. According to the Russians, explosions also occurred near the Novachasa thermal power plant. The drone attack caused 1:43:03 power outages in Novaque. Yeah, but a single drone carrying a 75 kg payload harved Russia's combat capability for a few seconds. No. Oh, weird. On the night of July 31, a highly critical Russian factory complex was targeted by Ukraine's long-range drones, and this attack reached proportions that could alter the course of the war. 11 consecutive explosions silenced the command factory, which the Kremlin had deemed untouchable. Within seconds, the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation identified the target as the radio works factory in Penza, an important facility of the Russian military-industrial complex. The attack by the Luitti drone disabled the Raddio complex in seconds, causing enough damage to [ __ ] Russia's command and control system. The Penza operation was 1:44:04 challenging. The facility located approximately 700 km from the front lines was not a target for artillery shells, but a nerve center transmitting target coordinates. For this reason, Ukrainian forces needed to use a vehicle with both high explosive capacity and long range capabilities. For this reason, the LUerty drone was chosen as the main strike force in the operation. The AN-196 Lerti was the most suitable for this operation due to its high destructive capacity and long range. Local authorities confirmed that there was a large fire at the factory after residents shared videos of drones flying low over the city. Footage posted on social media by Penza residents clearly shows the Lui drone flying toward the critical Russian facility and striking it. The Lioti has a range of approximately 1,000 km and can fly at speeds of 250 to 300 kmh, making them a highly efficient threat capable of operating deep inside Russian territory. Additionally, it can carry up to 75 kg 1:45:05 of explosive material. Furthermore, the Luti is equipped with thermmoaric warheads, meaning these UAVs possess the destructive power to obliterate the entire structure of a target by combining explosive force with oxygen. Such warheads cause severe damage to the targets internal structure, rendering sensitive electronic systems such as radar stations and communication centers completely inoperable. In the initial phase of the operation, Ukrainian UAV teams and intelligence units identified Russia's most critical targets. These targets typically included command and control centers, radar systems, logistics infrastructure, and military facilities. Ukraine's goal was to [ __ ] Russia's air defense networks and command and control capabilities. The first step in crippling the Russian factory was to direct the Lebouti toward its target. The Lebouti uses traditional aircraft takeoff methods using fixed 1:46:01 landing gear. This design allows it to take off from improvised runways such as highways without the need for special runways. Ukraine made a plan that required great coordination when launching the operation. Before LUT and its supporting longrange jammers began flying toward their targets on the ground, roots and targeting points were determined in detail for all UAVs. At this stage, different flight routes were planned for each drone based on its mission along with coordinates supported by deceptive signals and a precise approach plan toward the targets. First, a strategy was implemented to deceive Russian air defense systems during the approach to the targets. Lebouti UAVs use a hybrid navigation package based on glow NASA mimicry. Unlike traditional navigation systems, this system is designed to provide false coordinates during flight to deceive enemy radars. The system, which detects the target's location and directs itself toward it, confuses the radars and diverts the attention of Russian air defense systems. As a result, enemy defenses are 1:47:04 rendered passive and the UAV can be easily directed toward the target. Lebouti successfully deceived Russian radars, keeping the targets real coordinates hidden. This made it difficult to detect targets and activate defense systems. Additionally, each drone was equipped to transmit deceptive signals capable of disabling enemy radars. When the plug was pulled, all batteries were plunged into darkness. The UAVs set off for their designated targets and reached Russia's internal lines, launching their attack. Timing was critical to the success of the attack. As the targets were very far away, it was essential to pay close attention to the range and speed capabilities of the UAVs. In the first minutes of the attack, the high gain antenna towers that were set ablaze disrupted approximately 70% of the real-time coordination traffic, providing coordinates to the howitzer batteries stationed on the southern front. In the first strike, the high gain antenna towers at the radio plant 1:48:01 were disabled within the first seconds of the explosion. These antennas were of critical importance for providing target coordinates to Russian artillery. Secondary explosions triggered by the initial blast targeted Russia's air defense radars and command centers. Liot UAVs, specifically targeting these objectives, crippled Russia's radar capabilities across the entire country. This limited Russia's ability to identify targets on the front lines and enhanced Ukraine's maneuverability. 11 explosions recorded simultaneously at the Penza radio plant complex triggered an unprecedented disruption in Russia's command and control network since the start of the war. Tens of thousands of kilometers of fiber optic lines, Rossteche made C4 ISR modules and 46 billion rubles worth of signal processing traffic per year were shut down with a single press of a button by a 75 kg bomb. This is because Radius of Odd was the main port that fed target data to thousands of Russian units from howitzers on the southern front to 1:49:05 strategic missile batteries. In fact, this facility located hundreds of kilometers from the front lines served as the brain center for C4 ISR production under the Rosstec umbrella. A significant portion of the communication lines transmitting target updates to Russian artillery units were fed directly from this location. The Russian Federation is burning, and this time it's for real. This is not a metaphor, but a real-time map of fires across the country. On the same night, Ukrainian drones targeted an industrial nerve center that runs the length of Russia with surgical precision. The drone swarms focused on simultaneously pressuring the fuel supply, takeoff 1:50:00 runways, and command and control networks. Each target was carefully selected to directly impact the firing rate of an artillery battery at the front, the sorty of an airfield, or the movement of a supply convoy. The first reports of explosions came from Lipitzk. Explosions near the military airfield in the area caused short-term chaos in the airspace. Although local authorities initially reported a fire in a motor vehicle depot, open- source Sentinel 2 data and images from the site showed that the incident affected Yak 130 training jets and Sue34 maintenance shelters. The Sue34s departing from there were typically tasked with carrying KH29, KH59 tactical cruise missile packages toward Kkefe. Damage to three points of the runway infrastructure led to takeoff restrictions. Subsequent information from Ryazan revealed that the situation was far more extensive. A fire broke out around the city's large oil refinery. The speed and intensity detected by NASA via infrared sensors confirmed a temperature profile consistent with fully loaded crude oil tanks as reported by civilian monitoring networks. At the 1:51:05 same time, explosions were heard over the strategically important Dilvo military airfield. This base is known as one of the main hubs for Russia's longrange bombing capabilities. It is estimated that the base's fuel supply infrastructure could be operational again within 6 to 8 weeks. Considering Russia's Tu22 M3 maintenance rotation schedule, the missile salvo capacity over the Black Sea will experience at least two full sorties of downtime. In the Vorones region, intense explosions lit up the night sky. Local sources reported that the flames rising in the area appeared after Russia's air defense systems were activated. This indicates that the attacks resulted in both direct hits on targets and secondary effects caused by air defense. One of the heaviest damages occurred near Samara. Ukrainian drones struck the Novokco Koobyki refinery owned by state energy giant Ross Neft. Located just 19 km 1:52:00 outside the city center of Samara, this facility is one of Russia's largest and most critical refineries. Fuel produced here is pumped into export pipelines, sent to military fuel depots and forms the backbone of regional logistics. The facility, which is subject to US sanctions, was engulfed in a massive fire after being hit. Following the attack, Samara airport was closed to flights and mobile internet was cut off in the area. Firefighters began emergency response efforts to protect Rosenef's remaining assets. Two of the three reactor groups in the CDUVDU line, which has a daily processing capacity of 200,000 barrels of crude oil, were shut down. The damage, which is expected to take more than a week to repair, is estimated to cost Rosenef $32 million in daily revenue. Not only local production, but also fuel flows to Black Sea ports via the Vulga Basin have decreased by 10%. The diversion of RZD freight trains operating in the same corridor to secondary routes for diesel refueling is directly affecting the 1:53:00 speed of artillery and ammunition convoys advancing to the front. In the medium-term, this logistical pressure will reduce the supply frequency to the Zaparisia Donetsk front. Another location attacked was Penza. The target here was the Electra Priyore facility, a critical component of the Russian military-industrial complex. This factory produces digital network equipment used in military control systems as well as high precision devices for aircraft, armored vehicles, warships, and even space vehicles. The Primosco Atask military air base on the Azovv sea coast was targeted by Ukrainian drones. However, this was not an ordinary base attack because Primosko Atars is not just a runway. It is one of the main coordination and launch centers for Russia's Shahed and Geran type suicide drone attacks against Ukraine. Iranian-made Shahed 136s and Russianmade Giran2s have been taking off from this base for months, striking Ukraine's energy infrastructure, grain terminals, schools, and civilian areas. Russia 1:54:03 viewed these unmanned vehicles as a strategic advantage, lowcost, difficult to detect, and effective in psychological warfare. But Ukraine has now turned its attention to the source of this threat. The attack was multi-layered and highly accurate. Within minutes, both the launch pads and the areas where the drones were stored were engulfed in flames. The strikes on the runway completely halted takeoff operations. Widespread explosions occurred in fuel and ammunition storage areas. The most striking information, however, emerged as Russia attempted to conceal the extent of the damage. NASA's Modis and V satellites revealed the reality that the Kremlin sought to hide. They simultaneously recorded multiple fire points over Primors Ataskk. The Ukrainian security service stated that the target of the attack was not only the runway but also drone storage facilities and command infrastructure. The shelters, which were started to be built in late 2024 and designed to 1:55:00 protect unmanned aerial vehicles from air attacks, were likely among the targeted sites. However, the problem is that these structures were built based on the principles of rapid production and low cost. Therefore, they were not resistant to drone attacks. Those shelters are now burning, emitting a red light into the dark night. A video circulating online and quickly going viral clearly shows Ukrainian-made long-range unmanned aerial vehicles striking the Shahhead ammunition depot in Primosco Ataskque with pinpoint accuracy. The SBU has officially confirmed the authenticity of the footage. Russia not only lost the exit route for the martyrs but also found its drone superiority shaken because primoscow was the closest attack platform to the northern coast of the Black Sea. The drones launched from there targeted cities such as Odessa, Mikoliv, Zaparisia and Denipro. Now this exit point is largely non-functional. At the same time explosion sounds were heard along the eastern coast of Crimea 1:56:03 near Fodosia. Ukrainian drones targeted a large oil storage facility in Fodosia. The area was engulfed in flames. This facility was one of the key centers for fuel distribution along the Black Sea coast. The explosions were followed by huge fires and the area was evacuated. The attack did not stop there. New explosions were heard near Kirch and the Crimean bridge was immediately closed to traffic. This means that Russia's most important land supply route to Crimea has been temporarily cut off. The security risk level was raised and both vehicle and train traffic on the bridge were suspended. The success of these attacks is not only due to Ukraine's technological advances, but also to fundamental weaknesses in Russia's air defense architecture. These weaknesses are particularly evident in the concept of radar saturation. Every radar system has a certain tracking and target separation capacity. Especially when multiple targets with low radar 1:57:00 cross-sections approach simultaneously from different directions, the systems tracking memory, signal processing circuits, and data link traffic can quickly reach a saturation point. This is exactly what happened on the day of the attack. Despite appearing to be an ordinary factory, it integrated a sensor network spread across the field. images from reconnaissance satellites and unmanned systems on the front lines, all under one roof. This attack came just a few days after another attack on July 26th, and there was a direct connection between the two operations. On July 26th, another attack was carried out on an electronic warfare signal factory near Krnodar. This shows that targeting industrial complexes that produce lowcost, high production capacity electronic systems for modern warfare and supply the front lines can bring thousands of times the profit. The greatest strategic success of this operation was that LUT hit its targets with pinpoint accuracy thanks to its 1:58:00 long range and high destructive power. At this point, the accurate identification and instantaneous striking of targets shows how successfully Ukraine's war strategy is working. The drone's ability to evade Russia's air defense systems by using deceptive radar signals and then immediately retreat has increased the speed and efficiency of such operations. These attacks demonstrate the evolution of Ukraine's strategies and how unmanned aerial vehicles such as Liuti can play a transformative role in warfare. It is expected that Ukraine will use more UAVs in the coming period to target military infrastructure. Additionally, the strategic advantage provided by Lauti UAVs will strengthen Ukraine's position in the ongoing conflict. While drones destroyed Russia's electronic infrastructure, they also seriously weakened Russia's air defense umbrella. In short, Kiev's cost calculation is quite simple. With a single drone costing $30,000, more than a communication artery worth billions in 1:59:02 rubles, was vaporized. The disruption caused by the shutdown of a single factory has consigned the doctrine of the rear is secure to history and provided the first direct evidence of Kiev's command and control fragmentation strategy, which it has been talking about for months. When the critical importance of Radio Zavod is reflected in figures, the picture is even more striking. With an annual budget of 46 billion rubles, the facility produced signal processors, satcom modules, and multiband tactical terminals that served as a nerve center for the southern military district's fire support network. The Kiev administration is thus presenting the Penza attack as proof of its thesis that the rear is no longer secure. Kovaleeno, head of Ukraine's disinformation response team, said static command centers are the weakest link in modern warfare. New ones can be set up when they are hit, but the delay in the chain of command cannot be recovered. The 2:00:03 Moscow front, as in previous attacks, claimed that there was no critical damage. However, the complete shutdown of mobile internet in the Penza region 2 hours after the explosion indirectly confirmed that the local defense network's cloud-based control had been damaged. Although the disruption in civilian traffic was presented as a counter measure against unmanned systems, the access points for the packets controlling the field drones were also operating through the same cloud. The intertwined structure of the defense network blinded the entire short-range hunter drone network in the region with the burning of a single factory. On a strategic level, the real question is how long it will take to repair the gap in Penza Teis. Modern command centers require tens of thousands of network devices, thousands of critical personnel, and months of integrated testing. Much of Rosstec's supply chain is still dependent on Chinese components. And with the global semiconductor shortage continuing, the 2:01:01 most optimistic estimate for setting up new facilities is six months. This means that the electronic backbone that carries the war effort will remain fragile for a long time. The Kremlin may try to patch up the interior by withdrawing personnel from Donbass or Luhansk, but this would create a gap in frontline experience and reduce field capabilities. In short, the personnel distribution has become a patchwork quilt with another tear appearing wherever you touch it. To predict the operational effects, it is useful to look at similar historical cases. In World War II, the Allied tidal wave raid on the Peshd oil fields did not stop Nazi Germany's tanks at once, but it did condemn its fuel supply chain to chronic weakness. While the Penzer attack did not destroy Russian firepower, it is pushing data flow into a long-term crisis. No matter how high the adaptability of field tactics may be, delays in the command network accumulate day by day, creating a multiplier effect on efficiency losses. The issue is no longer the number of drones, but a 2:02:04 sustained network disruption strategy. Radio jamming modules, artificial GPS signal generators, and passive radar networks are at the top of the order list. Thus, Kiev aims to complete its strategic encirclement through information networks by exerting high tempmpo pressure not only on the front lines but also on Russian internal lines. This approach directly undermines the Kremlin's conventional superiority by transforming the classic artillery tank ccentric war into an algorithmic nerve war. The picture is incomplete when the economic dimension is ignored. The production line in Penza accounted for approximately 9% of Rosc's defense electronics revenue. The factory will remain closed for months at best. Even if it returns to full capacity, the lost contracts will not be recovered. This situation will also put pressure on Russian defense export figures as potential buyers have already begun questioning supply chain guarantees. Countries seeking electronic 2:03:03 modernization packages, particularly in the Middle East and Asia, are demanding factory capacity and delivery schedules before considering Russian offers. A complex with its doors burned down is being labeled high- risk in Excel spreadsheets. In future projections, a map of Penza-like nodes is becoming critical. Kiev Intelligence has identified 13 command facilities stretching to the Euro line. Two of these also host the main server clusters for ammunition planning algorithms. An attack on any of these centers would open unexpected gaps in the fire regime in different parts of the front. Russian military planners are faced with two options. Invest in fixed facilities or establish more dispersed but capable mobile centers. The first option means long-term gaps when hit, while the second means high mobility costs. The internal debate in Kiev has moved beyond the dilemma of whether to prioritize ground forces or electronic warfare. The current understanding is that the troops 2:04:01 on the ground can only achieve sustainable progress through a robust campaign to demoralize the enemy. Indeed, as seen in the example of Penza, as soon as the advance of the front is directly linked to the collapse of the command network, the cost benefit graph shifts in Kiev's favor. The record distance of 1,000 km achieved in drone production has proven in practice that no region of Moscow's hinterland is protected. At this point, the Kremlin's problem is reduced from the question of how was it hit to how quickly can it be replaced. The answer, which revolves around logistics, technical personnel, component supply, morale, and politics intersects with the economic dilemmas that Russia is currently struggling to resolve. A budget model reliant on energy exports for foreign exchange revenue limits the resources that can be redirected to high-tech C4 ISR segments. Semiconductor production capacity remains constrained and import alternatives are trapped in sanctions networks. Thus, what burned to the 2:05:06 ground in Penza was not just a factory. It was also the Kremlin's narrative about its technological substitution capacity. Western allies are more willing to open the supply tabs when they see that electronic warfare focused aid has immediate results on the ground. When integrated with longrange air defense systems, this support will enable Ukraine to control the tempo of its offense and defense. Penza was only the first step. The resulting landscape portends an unstable future for armies that rely on fixed command facilities. Russia must find new solutions to prevent attacks in order to protect its electronic lifelines. Otherwise, even if the front line is not defeated militarily, it could become effectively ineffective due to a lack of coordination. This question will determine not only Moscow's war capabilities, but also the general course of the conflict. Because when the flow of information is cut off, the artillery falls silent and even the most 2:06:03 modern armored vehicle becomes a motionless pile of metal. In summary, the collapse of the Penza radio plant due to a drone attack exposed the fragility of Russia's command and control architecture. The destruction of the factory not only disrupted data flow, but also directly impacted frontline ammunition planning. A 12% capacity loss in the logistics chain was reported, including the backup fiber line in Vulgrad. This disruption serves as the first major on the ground evidence of Ukraine's strategy of targeting rear area nodes using long range unmanned systems, marking a turning point that permanently calls into question Moscow's war management capabilities. How long do you think the Kremlin will take to repair this nerve-wracking breach? or is the next phase of the war just beginning here? Share your thoughts in the comments. Don't miss out on these in-depth analyses. Subscribe to the channel, turn on notifications, and like the video. See you in the next broadcast. The 92N6E engagement radar 2:07:08 linked to the S400 Triumph air defense system over Lipetsk was attempting to track targets approaching its area while simultaneously monitoring similar UAV types arriving from the Riaan direction via the network. This is because these systems are tasked with ensuring the tracking of regional threats through centralized data sharing. However, this workload reduce the radar's target update frequency exceeding the systems simultaneous tracking capacity. Instead of tracking incoming target clusters individually, the radar began to perceive them as cluttered clusters. In this scenario, the radar experiences delays in threat verification, engagement time increases, and coordination with defense missiles is delayed. Result: Some UAVs pass undetected, some advance without being hit. Even more striking, reports leaked from security sources in Bikonur revealed that the Nebo MVHF early warning radar, the backbone of the early warning layer covering Riazan and its surroundings, was undergoing technical 2:08:04 maintenance during the attack. This radar is one of the few systems capable of detecting lowaltitude and low RCS targets from long ranges. However, when it was out of service, the area was left virtually blind. The early warning time was reduced and the reaction window to targets narrowed. Russia's air defense system still relies heavily on fixed radar nodes and fixed missile batteries. While this structure provides advantages in covering large areas, it creates disadvantages in the face of flexible attack scenarios. This is because fixed nodes are planned according to geographically fixed threats. However, Ukraine is testing and exceeding the horizontal spread limits of the radar network by sending swarms of UAVs to different provinces simultaneously. In particular, the simultaneous targeting 2:08:48 of regions such as Lipetsk, Riazan, Samara, and Veron in recent attacks forced the Russian defense network to redistribute its resources internally. However, since this redistribution could not be done instantly, some areas 2:09:01 remained relatively blind. This is what makes Ukraine's strike multiple targets simultaneously strategy so effective. We must also mention the impact of these effective results on Russia. In particular, the destruction of the Nova Kubashevki refinery owned by Roseneft in Samara triggered a chain reaction of crises in Russia's domestic fuel supply. The fire at the fuel facility in the port of Fodosia brought fuel supplies for maritime transport in Crimea to a standstill. These developments caused an abrupt price shock of approximately 10% in the domestic energy market denominated in rubles. The price cap mechanism linked to Brent crude oil was temporarily suspended by Moscow to control the sudden surge. This marks one of the rare instances where the Kremlin temporarily abandoned its price control regime in the domestic market. Supply restrictions have begun at fuel stations in some regions and a quotota system has been introduced for transportation companies. We must also mention the impact of the attacks on the front lines. The most noticeable change is 2:10:00 observed in the salvo patterns of shahedgar type unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs. According to log data from electronic warfare and air defense systems along the front line, there has been a sudden decrease in attacks carried out by these UAVs in groups of six or seven over three consecutive nights. According to the latest findings, the number of salvos has dropped to four. This indicates that Russia is experiencing disruptions in both its production capacity and launch rhythm. The attacks also disrupted Russia's diesel fuel supply to the front line via the vulgar route. This caused disruptions particularly in the supply of heavy armored transport vehicles and ammunition. The direct impact of this was observed in the intensity of fire from Russian artillery units. Russian units which were previously able to fire between 7,000 and 9,000 artillery shells per day have been forced to reduce this number to an average of 6,000 over the past few weeks. A noticeable slowdown in artillery activity has been observed in hotspots such as Tokmack, Avdka, and Kremina. Ukrainian defense forces have 2:11:01 begun to turn this situation into immediate tactical advantages by exploiting gaps in counterb fire. Another significant development, no less important than the tangible effects is the reduction in strategic air threats. The targeting of facilities housing 222M3 heavy bombers such as the Diagulvo air base in Riazan not only damaged the platforms but also disrupted flight planning due to increased security risks in the areas where 222 M3s are stationed. The number of sorties by these aircraft has decreased significantly. This situation has led to a noticeable decline in the long range threat capability of KH22 supersonic cruise missiles. During this process, Ukraine's air defense forces have been able to use their resources more efficiently by shifting from constant alert to a lower intensity strike and weight cycle. The moral dimension is also not to be underestimated. The 222 M3s were considered one of the symbols of Russia's strategic deterrence. Their withdrawal from the field or more limited flight operations reinforce the 2:12:03 feeling among troops on the front lines that support from behind is weakening. From the Kremlin's perspective, UAV attacks are causing not only military but also political fractures. The Kremlin's long-standing narrative that the war is far from us, the threat is at the front, is beginning to lose its credibility among the Russian people. According to the latest Lavvada Center poll, the percentage of those who believe that Ukrainian attacks cannot reach Moscow or the interior regions has dropped from 44% to 32% in just a few months. This 12-point drop is more than just a single blow to confidence. It signals a shift in perception on the home front because now the Russian people see that the war is not just on television screens but can be felt right outside their doors. Explosions in regions previously considered safe such as Samara, Ryazan and Leetsk prove that the concept of a rear no longer exists. People are realizing that the war is not confined to Dombas, but is being fought 2:13:00 in refineries, airports, and drones flying over their neighborhoods. This awareness is breaking the propaganda effect and reducing trust in official statements. The attacks are changing not only the public's attitude, but also that of local authorities, governors, and regional officials who used to make statements entirely in line with the Kremlin have now begun to direct criticism toward the center, albeit cautiously. One of the most prominent examples of this trend was the statements made by Samara Governor Dimmitri Yadashkin. After the UAV attack on the Novak Kubashki refinery, the fact that the fire could not be brought under control for 6 hours drew public criticism. Yadashkin attributed this delay to a lack of logistical equipment and insufficient emergency response vehicles. This was an indirect reference to the Ministry of Defense and the federal crisis response structure. Yardashkin's statement is not isolated. Similar statements about infrastructure deficiencies and slow central assistance have been increasingly heard in press releases by officials in the Voran, Belgarod, and Kursk regions in recent 2:14:02 months. This shift in rhetoric points to a loosening of the Putin regime's vertical structure of governors who speak on orders. These cracks in the lower tiers of the vertical pyramid could make the fragility of central authority more visible, especially as the war drags on. The real threat these developments pose to the Kremlin is not the loss of control, but the loss of the illusion of control. This is because political stability in Russia is fueled not only by security, but also by the perception of security. The fact that the public viewed the war as a distant issue allowed the regime to operate with ease. However, now the public is hearing about attacks on the ground and realizing that local leaders are unable to cover up Moscow's shortcomings. This fault line has the potential to turn into a socopolitical fault line, not just a military one. As a result, the meaning of tonight's offensive is clear in the strategic picture of the war. Ukraine has moved beyond the defense counterfense equation and entered a phase of deep offensive targeting the enemy's sources of power and 2:15:01 capabilities in a systematic manner. Every refinery hit, every runway closed breaks a cog in the wheel. As these cogs come loose, Moscow's heavy metal army faces the risk of becoming immobilized. In short, Kiev is no longer turning the tables by hunting drones in the sky, but by destroying them before they take off. This reversal will inevitably slow down the firing rate of artillery, tanks, and rifles on the front lines by increasing the strain on the logistics chain. Thank you for watching. Russia is a country at war, but it is not only fighting on the Ukrainian front. It is also at war on two other major fronts within. The first is the economy. This is not difficult to predict, but the second is a direct indication of Putin's weakness. And this leads us to a tragic move for Putin. Putin now travels with mobile anti- drone systems. This week, Putin was caught on camera traveling with his close protection, carrying what appeared to be a Yulka anti- drone missile that can be fired from the shoulder. But this was far from a show or a demonstration. Ukraine's drone attacks had forced Putin to travel with a mobile defense system 2:16:05 escort. In short, the second front was the loss of confidence in the army and defense systems among all Russians, including Putin. So, what connection could there be between the economy, Yulka launchers, and Putin? It is clear that Russia is facing its worst economic crisis in recent times as the ruble exchange rate hit 79.7. Moscow fell into silence when news broke that the Trump administration would grant a 10-day final objection period for its new sanctions package. A sharp sell-off began on the stock market. Just 11 minutes after the news, the exchange rate hit the 82 mark. Reuters ran the headline, 'Rubble melts 4%.' At the same time, a short Victory Day rehearsal video published in other global media sources announced that Putin's close protection had been caught walking around with what appeared to be a Yulka anti- drone missile fired from the 2:17:01 shoulder. Russian mid-altitude air defense systems such as BookM1 or TOM M2 were completely ineffective against low signature, high maneuverability Mavic based FPVs. This helplessness forced Putin to make this move. Yulka is a specialized kinetic interceptor designed to neutralize enemy unmanned aerial vehicles without the need for explosive warheads. Instead, it uses high-speed collisions to disrupt the structural integrity of its targets. This method is likened to the shoot and forget principle of portable air defense systems. The systems compact design and ease of use allow frontline soldiers to deploy it with minimal training, making it a practical tool for dynamic battlefield conditions. The integration of artificial intelligence for target detection and tracking combined with its extraordinary speed and maneuverability is said to provide a high success rate in combat. Of course, this would have provided Putin with a low-level defense, but showing weakness would have cost Russia dearly. When Putin's close 2:18:03 protection was seen with the Yulka anti- drone launcher, which appears to be shoulder fired, the country was instantly convinced that it was defenseless on both the currency and air defense fronts. This is because each unit of the Yulka costs $60,000 and every 1% drop in the rubles's value according to defense ministry projections vaporizes 600 million rubles. While the Ministry of Finance was under pressure to allocate an additional 120 billion rubles to the armament budget before the end of the year under the heading of emergency appropriations, oil revenues had already shrunk by 9% on a monthly basis in June due to successive attacks on refineries in Rosto, Vulgrad and Tapset. Eurals's crude oil continued to hover around the 63 per barrel mark. As the currency weakened, every ruble spent by the Kremlin on missiles, radar systems, and imported micro electronics in foreign currency was draining the budget at an 2:19:00 increasingly higher rate. If the ruble crosses the 85 threshold and remains there, domestic bond demand could collapse and targeted asset swaps targeting public deposits may be needed to defend maturing OFZ coupons. At this point, the concept of mandatory anti- drone bonds began to be mentioned loudly behind the scenes. In other words, what was being discussed on paper as a security measure was in practice a model of domestic borrowing that would lead to direct cuts in payrolls. The fundamental reason why financial technocrats put such a harsh scenario on the table was the absence of any reserve item to replace the petro dollars that the war economy had swallowed in 2 years. This is because oil flows are being sold at a discount due to sanctions reductions and physical production loss data from pipeline refinery nodes hit by Ukrainian drone swarms can no longer be concealed. The Russian energy agency withdrew its latest statistical report for the second time citing the need for updates. However, Kuna's based global com trade 2:20:05 satellite infrared analytics measured the intensity of smoke plumes in the country last month at 27% lower than in the same period in 2021, providing clear evidence of the decline in production. In such a scenario, the classic recipe to stabilize the ruble would have been a rate hike. But this was not feasible as it would have further strained the Treasury, which is already struggling to fund military expenditures. The Russian central bank could only raise the funding rate by 50 basis points by the end of June. However, exchange rate expectations entered a tragic breakaway psychology. Rubal USD futures moved to 87.5 in the offshore over-the-counter market while CDS spread widened by 60 points in a week. The collapse felt by citizens in their daily lives was much more direct as the foreign exchange card limit mandatory for payments for imported medicines and car parts was reduced twice in the stateowned Spurbank 2:21:02 app. At the same time, a maximum limit of three packages was imposed on sugar and sunflower oil shelves in food chains. As Rostat gave updating its inflation basket, the official annual rate stood at 8% while civilian economists measurements pointed to 18%. The difference at the bottom was now closed by rumors of preventive bond deductions from payrolls. A draft revision prepared by the state duma finance committee would nationalize 3% of citizens bank account balances in the form of digital financial assets if the ruble falls below 85 for three consecutive business days transferring the funds to the defense ministry's procurement fund. In exchange, bonds with a 4% ruble interest rate over 5 years will be issued, effectively creating a mandatory savings scheme with a negative real return similar to the Soviet era reward savings certificates. Technical justification. The rapid proliferation of yolkite kinetic anti- drone systems as electronic jamming has failed and the cheap FPV swarm tactics 2:22:05 experienced with Iranian-made Shahed variants have disrupted Russian air defense plans. The doctrine of locking on to targets emitting intense radar signals as employed by medium alitude units like the bookm or to M2 proved completely ineffective against low signature high maneuverability Mavic based FPVs. As a result, the defense ministry turned to Yulka missiles which must be paid for in foreign currency. However, as the ruble collapsed, defense spending ballooned with 57 billion rubles already spent on anti- drone measures in the first 5 months of the year. The 120 billion ruble supplementary budget requested at the end of July drew criticism even from parliament. Economists say that with foreign currency borrowing increasing exponentially and Russia being the only country selling at a discount despite the price of Brent crude, the only option is to expand the tax base or devalue the ruble in a controlled manner and tighten the budget in the domestic cycle. But as the Putin administration 2:23:06 enters an election year, it finds it unthinkable to cut military spending. This reinforces the rubles's vulnerability. Indeed, Trump's decision to reduce the objection period from 180 days to 10 days and the clarification that swift restrictions will also cover derivative products has pushed Moscow's financial corridor into a tighter corner than in 2014. Accompanying this, Ukraine's lowcost, highdensity drone strategy has set fire to oil storage tanks, ammunition depots, and even the Rostovograd railway junction. The reconstruction bill is denominated in foreign currency, while the oil you sell is discounted in rubles, creating a double-edged scissors effect. The decline in the central bank's foreign exchange reserves from $320 billion to $213 billion is the liquidity side of this scissors. In addition, onethird of the reserves are blocked abroad and the 2:24:02 rest is in yuan and gold. So the coffers are even emptier for imports that require hard currency such as the Yulka missile. International research group CSIS and Rand state that as the ruble weakens, relying on expensive kinetic solutions is pushing the Kremlin into an unsustainable spiral in both its balance sheet and supply chain. While burning foreign exchange to cover failures in electronic warfare is accelerating economic deterioration. While heroic epics play out on Russian television, the real crisis is felt in the streets and at the grocery store where North Caucus oil workers have not been paid since March. Eurovvagen Zavod subcontractors have begun paying their advance fees with concrete and iron left in warehouses instead of rubles and the spot price of steel has risen in rubble terms but fallen in dollar terms because currency depreciation is driving up raw material costs. The clear picture emerging from this first paragraph is as follows. As the ruble becomes a 2:25:03 suspended currency on the foreign exchange front, the image of a bodyguard carrying Yulka on his shoulders in the air is a confession that even cheap FPVs can penetrate the prestige armor of the Commonwealth of Independent States Army. Thus, economic devaluation and security devaluation collided on the same symbolic day, and Russia's war machine is now engaged in a two-front panic struggle, not only on the front lines, but also within its own internal cycle. The fragility of the ruble can no longer be read from daily charts, but from the sparseness of smoke rising from factory chimneys. This is because in the first 24 hours after the exchange rate climbed from 82 to 84, nine companies linked to the manufacturing index on the Moscow stock exchange suspended trading. But even the central bank's move to impose quotas on spot currency demand before the weekend could not slow the meltdown of reserves. This is because export invoices are being settled in a dollar yuan basket while import banking still 2:26:05 demands convertible foreign currency. Moreover, the defense ministry requires a foreign currency deposit to import Israeli made infrared sensors via a third country for the Yoker line, which adds an extra 600 million rubles to the budget for every 1% depreciation of the ruble. Calculations made at the end of July indicated that the rubles's 17% depreciation compared to the beginning of the year would result in an additional 10.2 billion rubles in costs for the anti- drone budget. Moreover, the Armenia Georgia transit route, which the Kremlin has designated as a critical import corridor, slowed by 38% in February and March transfers due to a swift warning from regional banks seeking to avoid being added to Washington's secondary sanctions list. Therefore, while the request for an additional 120 billion rubles was being discussed in the Duma, the Treasury was forced to open an OFZ auction worth 950 2:27:01 billion rubles on the domestic debt market. But when forward buyers demanded foreign currency based swaps instead of trusting the ruble, the yield curve steepened. The 10-year coupon hit 13.2%, the highest level since the 2020 pandemic shock, making it impossible to refinance social spending funds. This is because the budgets for education, health, and pensions total 7 trillion rubles annually while defense spending has exceeded 11 trillion rubles. This is where the idea of imposing mandatory anti- drone bonds on payrolls came into play. According to the finance ministry's draft, if the exchange rate remains above 85 for three business days, 3% of all employees net income will be deducted and converted into 5-year bonds that cannot be redeemed early and are not indexed to inflation. The central bank will record this item on its balance sheet as a mandatory social participation instrument. The real return will certainly be negative, but the bureaucracy hopes that it can be sold as a direct contribution to 2:28:04 national defense. To make up the difference, Moscow is covering the freight insurance for India, but premiums have risen 40% due to the currency shock. As a result, the income statement is melting away with the budget deficit reaching 2.8 trillion rubles in the first half of the year compared to a target of 3.2 trillion rubles for the year. In other words, the projected deficit was almost filled in the sixth month. On the social front, wages and prices are spiraling upward. The St. Petersburg municipality has raised public transportation fairs for the second time this year. Electricity subsidies have been lifted in the Far East. Bread producers in the Kiran region are begging for flower coupons. The tax office is demanding advanced VAT payments. Physical cash shortages have begun. Airport currency exchange offices in Siberia have hung signs saying they have no dollars. This is because the central bank is keeping cash transfers 2:29:00 to regional branches under pressure. Even transfers of precious metals, which importers call the gray corridor, have been disrupted due to the Black Sea insurance ban imposed by the Corg Logistics Company. While the Kremlin may describe this situation to the public as temporary pressure, there are no traditional tools left to defend the ruble. Raising interest rates would strangle the budget. Selling reserves to buy foreign currency would be a mistake under sanctions. And increasing production by bypassing OPEC plus quotas is impossible due to refinary repairs. The only realistic option is to keep the ruble in a position of slow but steady depreciation. But since the war economy has a high share of imported inputs, this gradual devaluation is multiplying input inflation. As the vicious cycle spins full circle, the expensive kinetic panic symbolized by Yulka orders is creating even higher foreign exchange needs. Therefore, the ruble is falling, import bills are growing, the budget deficit is widening, and the ruble is falling again. International investment 2:30:02 banks Moscow desks are no longer providing exchange rate forecasts. The risk of a political decision shock is adding to the negative outlook. Fitch changed its rating outlook to negative even before revising the rating. Russia's 2026 maturity euro bond traded at a 17% yield in mid July. In other words, the market fears that the government will not be able to find foreign exchange even 3 years from now. Domestically, businesses are opening rubal yuan swap accounts at Chinese banks and accumulating funds there instead of transferring profits directly. However, since yuan cannot be spent within Russia, investments are fleeing abroad in physical form. This is drying up the capital stock. From a military perspective, the Yulka image is not just about protective aesthetics. It is a declaration of bankruptcy for the army's electronic jamming solutions. This is because the anti- drone jammers 2:31:00 produced by KR at its St. Petersburg factory used lithium cells sourced from Taiwan. Imports were restricted and production declined. The old model jammers with thick walls were heavy on the front lines and had limited range, so they were replaced with expensive singleshot kinetic interceptors fired from the shoulder. 70% of the supply contract signed for the Yulka stock is denominated in foreign currency, while the ruble has lost 12% since June, and the 600 million ruble/president% rule is hitting hard here. While CESIS' latest report uses the term unsustainable loss budget spiral, the RAN scenario predicts that if the ruble reaches 90, the Ministry of Defense will request an additional 250 billion rubles. This is because every item in the supply plan is dependent on imports. The opposite effect is seen on the Ukrainian side. The dollar-based cost of drones remains fixed while Russian defense purchases in rubles are becoming more expensive. 2:32:02 Thus, the lowcost high loss equation is widening in Kiev's favor. In other words, as the ruble weakens, the price of Yulka rises. And as Yulka orders increase, the pressure for additional budget allocations further undermines currency expectations. On the streets, the people's fundamental question is clear. Will the government save the falling drone or the melting ruble? As traditional tools to curb the exchange rate are being phased out one by one, the tremors that began in the lower echelons of the economy are now reflected in official figures. A 10% decline in non-oil and gas revenues was announced for the July September period. However, because the average exchange rate in the month in which the tax was collected did not match the import bills immediately following that month, the Ministry of Finance was forced to create a new item in the budget called exchange rate shock compensation. This means that every time the ruble weakens, an additional subsidy is created for the same tax unit and that subsidy in turn creates a need for foreign currency. Thus the ruble is depreciating rapidly 2:33:07 not only due to external pressure but also due to the internal mechanisms of public finance. Moreover, oil revenues are shrinking not in terms of turnover but in terms of profit. This is because shadow fleet insurance has become more expensive and the euro's discount has deepened. The reexport corridor through Finnish and Baltic ports has closed. This has dragged down foreign exchange inflows which are the lifeblood of the war economy. On top of that, FPV fleets supported by Yukroboron Prom caused five separate fires in storage tanks in Novarosis in July and August. Transf's emergency repair fund has been exceeded by 50% and the company has for the first time requested an advance directly from the budget instead of bonds. It thus entered into competition with the Ministry of Defense. When both were forced to ask the central bank for rubles, the monetary base swelled. Inflation returned to double digits in 2:34:01 October. Rossat labeled this as energy distribution costs, but market shelves showed that true type inflation exceeded 30%. To escape this vortex, Putin's administration is looking for new financial partners to whom it can pledge its traditional collateral, namely oil. But Chinese banks are accepting yuan rather than rubles due to concerns about secondary sanctions. The yuan is not fully convertible in the Russian domestic market. So barter and clearing proposals are on the table, but none of these can pay state workers salaries or index increases for pensioners. Thus, while the economic channel is squeezing Moscow, the security channel is exerting the same pressure. The Ukrainian side, meanwhile, has shifted its target list to defense projects with high foreign currency requirements in order to squeeze the rubalbased defense budget. Drone attacks burn Germanlic licensed machines at the Cosmos electrooptical satellite factory and foreign currency is needed to bring in new ones which requires new bonds which in turn 2:35:03 requires the value of the ruble. With each turn of the wheel the fragility of the economy becomes more visible and at the same time the public is experiencing for the first time the reality that the cost of war is coming out of their own pockets. Every day, a 0.3% loss in value. Every night, cheap motorized FPVs, rendering expensive kinetic yokers obsolete. Both the Treasury and street morale are being consumed simultaneously. As the line between financial collapse and defense deficit blurs, the Kremlin can no longer answer a single question. If the money runs out, what will protect the sky? If the sky falls, who will care about the rubles's value? This question will likely echo loudly in Putin's ears, spreading from the streets of Russia to the inner chambers of the Kremlin. Thank you for watching. Putin's missile arsenal exploded in his face in just one night. Every KH1 101 and every Kinjal 2:36:01 that the Kremlin launched into the sky as a show of force is now worthless with a single signature from Trump because of the $3.5 billion AIM 120 Amarayam package approved by the Pentagon on July 31st. This order provides Ukraine with not just a few boxes of missiles, but thousands of new missiles. Ukrainian air defenses will now be able to launch thousands of additional AMRMS from both F-16 cockpits and groundbased NASAMS launchers. This overnight closure of the ammunition gap is forcing Russia into an expensive dilemma. Will it escalate the salvo, risking its front lines and budget or slow down the pace and lose psychological pressure? Each AMRM represents a single line of code and explosive mixture capable of stopping a Russian H101 cruise missile fired from 1,000 km away. A Kindel hypersonic strike or dozens of Shahed drones. Moreover, the cost of shooting down a single H1 has now risen to tens of 2:37:03 thousands of dollars for Ukraine and hundreds of thousands for the Kremlin. Additionally, while the link 16 network feeds hitand run coordinates from Patriot radars to F-16 cockits in seconds, Russian Sue35s are still forced to carry half-loaded R77 missiles. The new production batches referred to as lot 39 and lot 40 are increasing both the number and capabilities of the missiles. In the C8D variant, the radar seeker antenna has switched from narrowband to smart wideband modulation, catching the algorithms of Russian jammers off guard, which assume the signal to noise ratio is constant. As the jamming signal increases, the missile narrows its search cone, cuts off false echoes, and stays on course to the real target, even at ranges exceeding 160 km with a probability of hitting the core within a 2.5 m circle. This renders the Russian H101's 2:38:01 lowaltitude evasion maneuver ineffective. The missile is still coming and the radar is still locked on. The same seeker head operates without detecting Patriot or Sentinel radars as it enters pitbull mode after launch and finds its own target. AM RAM pitbull break away. When the pilot is turning after firing, the missile's own radar head kicks in, eliminating the need for a data link. The Ukrainian pilot does not need to look back. Even if the enemy target escapes, the missile's intelligent EC section predicts the deviation. A software update to the AM RAM's global navigation system enables AI assisted target prediction. The missile calculates the high escape probability corridor by learning the targets statistical maneuver archive from previous engagements. This data is displayed in the pilot's cockpit. The R37M will dive under the aircraft and reduce speed. The ideal intercept window is 14 seconds. The pilot's decision time 2:39:00 is reduced and the maneuver is clearer. The law is simple. As the data grows, the missile becomes smarter. And as it becomes smarter, enemy maneuvers become meaningless. The Ukrainian pilot can open the throttle and break away immediately after making the firing announcement. The thermal trail left behind does not interfere with the approach parameters automatically calculated by the missile. This freedom turns cruise missile hunting from a game of cat and mouse into an engineering routine. This is critical in night missions and against subcloud cruise missiles. Russian forces had caused difficult moments for Kiev's air defense in the winter months with their H101 and KH555 missiles which they sent from low altitudes over the vulgar corridor using a stealth approach tactic. Now placing an F-16 100 kilms beyond a low-flying cruise missile or maintaining duplicate stocks of nims with a range of 30 to 40 km from the ground means the same ammunition can be used simplifying logistics. The order list does not only include fighter jets. Land-based NASA ER 2:40:03 kits are also being supplied from the same shipment. This expands the medium altitude umbrella that forms the lower layer of the Patriot Pack 3. AMRAMM ER with its ceiling of 40 km and a range of 45 to 50 km converts tracking data from Kiev's early warning sensors into kinetic solutions in just a few seconds. The stockpile sharing also renders the question of which one shot down the target irrelevant. If the Patriot radar detects an H22, it can transfer firing authority to an F-16 patrolling 200 km away if necessary. This flexibility pushes Russia's missile program into a dilemma of whether to attack from the ground or the air. As the Kremlin now has to overcome two defense lines per missile, the expansion of the link 16 network is perhaps the most critical step in the order in terms of military diplomacy. 10 years ago, it would have been impossible for a Patriot radar to detect an H1001 and transmit the data to an E3 Century early warning aircraft and 2:41:02 then to the MFD of an F-16. Now with the Mids JTRS terminal, this is possible in a matter of seconds. This allows the link 16 terminal which is part of the F-16AB upgrade package to send target data from the Patriot Pack 3 radar or E3 Sentry early warning aircraft to Amraham in an encrypted package. In other words, while a Patriot battery in Ukraine is scanning Khiv, an F-16 that has taken off from Odessa can receive the information that KH22 is moving toward this geographical reference. When the missile data is processed in the cockpit, the launch accept code will activate even if the pilot does not have a line of sight. This makes Russia's level one strategic bombing package H22 H101 Kel vulnerable to being struck by F-16s or NASAs using a shared stockpile. This takes air defense from above the city and moves it into a moving balloon in the sky. Russia is now struggling to maintain its planned open corridor route on the map because F-16 patrols, which take up as much space in the sky as a 2:42:05 balloon, can close the open corridor in seconds. The ongoing energy infrastructure attacks have also been forced to reduce frequency because the high tempmpo hitandrun tactics are disrupting allied signal chains. Rathon's Tucson line is preparing a new shift schedule. The systems annual capacity of 1,600 bodies is being increased to 2,200. The first delivery is planned for the first quarter of 2026. 560 missiles will arrive in crates labeled Ukraine with the rest distributed around the world. This number may sound abstract. Let's put it more concretely. Russia can launch an average of 30 40 high-speed missiles or drones in one night. And the period when Ukraine stocks woke up every night with a 80% reduction is coming to an end. As ammunition becomes more abundant, the command cent's hesitation over whether to expend missiles on a target diminishes, and Moscow's large salvo 2:43:00 strategy loses its cost effectiveness. If the salvo grows, the Amram stockpile can still keep up. If it shrinks, the Kremlin's psychological pressure disappears. In both scenarios, Kiev wins because it establishes balance, not in terms of cost, but in terms of missile flexibility. Another factor as important as the ammunition equation is pilot training. The lot 40 MRM include a USBMS unified simulation bus messaging module for training with real-time missile flight data in F-16 simulators. This means that every missile that rolls off the production line in Tucson automatically generates digital twin data which responds to the Ukrainian pilot's shots in the simulation cabin and calculates the target deviation line. In this way, mission doctrine is taught without spending real ammunition. Hitting Russia's Kinjal hypersonic missile with a conventional air-to-air missile is still theoretical, but the US Air Force's silver shield exercise showed that if the correct altitude energy window is captured, there is a 2:44:01 high probability of interception. The AMR AMC8 can extend its nominal range of 160 km to 185 km when fired at an altitude of 15,000 m. The approach cone to a hypersonic target is narrow, but there is a chance of interception during the climb phase when the target is most vulnerable. Ukraine's advantage is that its F-16s have direct access to NATO software manuals. The Rammstein software update package used by Poland and Romania has been made available to Kiev under a security cooperation license. This allows the OFP operational flight program file loaded onto the F-16 to be updated to the same version as the US NATO cycle. Russia's OFP updates for the SU35s are progressing slowly due to data transfer restrictions and difficulties in obtaining 16 nanometer processors. This will create an advantage for Ukraine when electronic warfare turns into a speed race. Russia's jamming superiority argument will be tested with the new software package. Amramd uses an 2:45:05 elastic detection window to resist electronic countermeasures. When jammer output increases, signal analysis dynamically narrows and independent target echoes are filtered out. The kibony U and L4108 pods in the Kremlin's inventory are fixed threshold dependent. And the MiG 31K, which launches Kil missiles, risks acting as a continuous beacon for AM RAM, even if it activates its jamming pod while returning home at high speed. This presents Moscow with the high-speed, high visibility dilemma. Let's look at Russia's response. Moscow has been trying to increase production of the R771 in recent months, but component bottlenecks at KTRV facilities continue due to air-to-air stock shortages. SU35S patrols have been reduced to a 2R771 plus 2R73 configuration whereas the ideal package is 4S771. This reduces the likelihood of a Russian 2:46:01 pilot hearing the Fox 3 warning sound first in the event of an unexpected aerial encounter. The AMRAM's 160 km lob range exceeds the 120 km launch accept threshold of the SU35's N011M Bars R launch radar, allowing KE's F-16s to fire first and disengage. The NASA's launcher kits included in the order are suitable for deployment on the front lines. Each launcher carries six AM RAM missiles and a battery of four to eight vehicles can be formed with a mobile radar and command unit. They can move behind heavily mechanized units in a fly plus formation. Deploy on a truck trailer and reach firing position in 6 to 7 minutes. This creates a mobile air bubble protecting the rear of the front line in the Kkefe or Chernivive border regions. While Russia is engaged in artillery resupply efforts, additional risks emerge in the sky. When a cruise missile is hit at low 2:47:02 altitude, high Mars or storm shadow systems in reserve behind the terrain can launch counterattacks. Will a ground attack version of the missile be considered? The A120 has shown limited success in land attacks in the past, but the software for the AMA ground attack mode launched from the NISAM's launcher is still in the laboratory stage. Nevertheless, engineers at the Pentagon believe that the C8 Seeker can lock onto strong radar reflections thanks to its DBS Doppler beam sharpening mode, which means that Russian S300400 batteries can be hit if their mobile radar is briefly inside the range. The technical risk is high, but the possibility of a lowcost radar killer solution could wear down Russian air defenses. So, will the F-16/ Amram combination completely eliminate the Russian cruise missile threat? No. But it raises the threshold. Moscow's monthly replenishment capacity for the H101 is around 40 to 50. Ukraine can now fire 70 to 80 AM RAM ERS and 20 air 2:48:06 launched AM RAMs in a single night. The mathematical pressure will either force the Russian side to stockpile or reduce the frequency of attacks. The second scenario is possible. Russia may reduce its firing tempo and switch to a prestige salvo model because firing multiple salvos becomes expensive and ineffective and the propaganda motive diminishes. Another layer to consider is the hypersonic scenario with a speed of Mac 10. The Kindel has been labeled uncatchable but last year's silver shield exercise by the US Air Force showed different figures. The C8 launched at an altitude of 15,000 m hit a Mac 6 target 100 km away with a margin of error within telemetry. The Kil's climb peak curve starts at 20,000 m at which point its speed drops to MAC 3 to 4. If the correct angle and sufficient altitude window are achieved, the F-16 2:49:01 AM RARM duo has a chance to intercept in that brief window we call the radar sensitive moment. It's not impossible, but it requires meticulous energy management, which is why the training package is so important. The economic policy side of the order is also surprisingly strategic. The US Congress's decision to include 19 countries in a single order reduces the unit cost by 17% thanks to a joint order. Berlin, Helsinki, Warsaw, Taipei, and Tel Aviv are all receiving the same part number. This gives key of a discount and also priority in Europe's powder keg. The first delivery order has been updated according to geographical proximity to the threat. This is a silent but clear message to allies. The places Russia most wants to hit are the first to come under the Patriot umbrella. The Kremlin now faces a new equation. The cost per air salvo is increasing while its impact is decreasing. Previously, an H101 could cause a power outage in a district of Kiev. From now on, launching the same missile may only result in a detected 2:50:05 shot down report. As the ledger darkens, propaganda fades. Russia sees two options. Either escalate salvos and face a cost explosion or reduce salvos and lose psychological impact. The hit hard, hit fast tactic is being shattered by the Patriot and Narsam's networks. The hit often tactic is leading to stockpile and budget crisis. On the other hand, Ukraine still has a critical shortfall in terms of achieving full air superiority, the number of modern aircraft. The first batch is expected to include 20 F-16s with this number increasing to 32 in the future. While each aircraft can carry two long range and two short-range missiles, completing the fleet is essential to achieve the actual coverage volume. But the early arrival of the Amram order gives Ukraine the advantage of having ammunition before the aircraft arrive. Filling the depo while pilot training is completed. 2:51:01 Fuel and maintenance cycles are also locked into the Amram pool and parts sharing simplifies logistics. Russia's double hypersonic double drone salvo remains a possibility but it is expensive. Kinjal is limited. Avanguard is strategic ammunition. Shahed production depends on Iranian and North Korean semiconductors. US EU export restrictions are felt in every part. Amram stocks on the other hand are coming in full force and new ones are on the way. In other words, no matter how fast Russia fires, its stocks are running out just as fast. No matter how much Ukraine fires, it still has more. As the equation on the air side of the war changes, there will be repercussions on the ground. The increase in AM RAM stock allows Patriot and NASAMS to be pulled back from the front lines, enabling ammunition depots to be moved to more protected locations and reducing the risk of logistics routes being hit. Fewer air strikes mean faster repairs to railway lines and the replacement of highar damaged railway bridges. As 2:52:05 ammunition and fuel transportation speeds up, Ukraine's ground forces gain the capacity to launch a surprise offensive in the fall. From the Kremlin's perspective, the picture is bleak. Its claim to air superiority is eroding day by day as numerical superiority is being offset by precision strikes. We saw the same math during the Soviet era with the MIG 21 verse is Sidewinder era. Numerical superiority was crushed at the threshold of quality. Now, the F-16's cockpit cloud capability and AM RAM's new radar head are turning the value effectiveness graph in Ukraine's favor. So, what scenario will Russia face when the lot 40 delivery is complete? By the end of 2026, Ukraine's airfleet will have 32 F-16s and its ground defense will have six NASA's battalions. A total of over 1,200 AMAs are projected to be in stock. While 2:53:03 Russia is keeping the number of new cruise missiles it has produced under wraps, open-source figures point to around 300 350. This means that Ukraine will have enough low-cost missiles in its arsenal to cover a year's worth of attacks. Even if the effectiveness rate is 100%, it is politically risky for the Kremlin to use up its remaining stockpile. Because missiles fired at civilian infrastructure have little strategic value and send a signal to the world that we are hitting civilians with random missiles. This narrows the scope for propaganda and increases diplomatic isolation. How Ukraine packages this deal is also important. Joint stock, joint defense. The message from the US is that a country officially using NATO standard missiles just across the border against Russian aviation is being supported. In previous months during discussions about F-16 training, the question which country will have NATO pilots firing NATO bullets was raised. Now Ukrainian 2:54:04 pilots who complete their training and take their seats will know that the missiles they fire come from a consortium stockpile. And now let's return to the Kremlin's latest impass. How many more factions can finance the strategic bombing doctrine? Will they allocate their limited hypersonic stockpile to the front lines or to strategic deterrence? Which semiconductor embargo will they have to circumvent to accelerate charad production? On the other hand, the unit cost of AMRAM is 1.2 to $ 1.5 million, but it drops with bulk orders. The approximate cost of the package allocated to Ukraine is $700 to $800 million. Instead of directly granting this amount to Ukraine, the West is offering a discount through bulk purchases and providing the remaining difference as a military aid loan. Kiev will repay this over a 10-year period. This softens criticism in the US public that our tax money is being spent on a foreign war. Defense industry employment 2:55:03 increases and the Tucson production line expands once again. Domestic politics provides indirect support to the foreign front. In conclusion, this massive amaram order ties Ukraine's air defense umbrella to a single ammunition category, effectively grounding it and severely restricting Russia's attack model. F-16 pilots are now more prepared to fire without worrying about wasting missiles. Patriot NASA's operators are reducing concerns about additional ammunition for protecting civilian cities by sharing the same stockpile. And Moscow must once again calculate the cost effectiveness equation with every new salvo decision. Do you think Russia can maintain its air attack tempo once Lot 40 deliveries are complete or will it have to seek new tactics? Share your thoughts in the comments. Don't forget to subscribe and turn on notifications. Stay tuned for verified defense analyses from the front lines.

SITE COUNT