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UKRAINE WAR GOING AFTER RUSSIAN SUPPLY CHAIN PPR GLOBAL: Russia’s Supply Bridge to Crimea Is GONE – $30K JDAM Bomb Just Shut Down $3B Main Railway Connection PLAY YOUTUBE VIDEO Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TcNIXRDvplg
Russia’s Supply Bridge to Crimea Is GONE – $30K JDAM Bomb Just Shut Down $3B Main Railway Connection PPR GLOBAL Jul 27, 2025 766K subscribers ... 399,793 views ... 8.9K likes #militarydevelopments #ukrainewarupdate #ukrainewar #ukrainewar #ukrainewarupdate #military #militarydevelopments #militarystrategy Ukraine’s Air Force has pulled off one of its most devastating precision strikes yet—destroying a key military bridge in the Zaporizhia region with JDAM-ER bombs launched from MiG-29 jets. This was no ordinary bridge; it was Russia’s primary southern logistics artery, connecting Crimea to the eastern front. Now, that link is gone. Ammunition convoys are halted. Fuel trucks are stranded. In this video, we unpack how this single attack triggered a cascade of logistical failure, from supply chain breakdowns to economic ripple effects in occupied Crimea. You’ll learn: How MiG-29s were retrofitted to fire U.S.-made JDAM bombs Why the Karachokrak crossing was more than just a bridge The real-time impact on Russian armored units, fuel deliveries, and air logistics How Ukraine is creating a systematic campaign to collapse Russia’s supply network And why this might be the beginning of a strategic siege on Crimea itself Every bridge destroyed is not just a structure lost—it’s an entire battalion immobilized. Don’t forget to subscribe, leave your thoughts in the comments, and turn on notifications for more deep-dive war intelligence. Peter Burgess COMMENTARY Peter Burgess Transcript 0:00 Russia's southern front plans were thrown into disarray by a single bombing order. The Ukrainian air force destroyed a vital border crossing in Zaparizia with Jdam er bombs dropped from Mig 29s. This crossing was not just a bridge. It was the military backbone connecting Crimea, Marupole and Denipro. Now that backbone has been broken. Munition shipments have stopped. Fuel convoys have been cut off. The Kremlin's summer offensive collapsed before it even began. Can Russia compensate for this setback? On July 7, a Ukrainian MiG 29 fighter jet targeted a vital Russian crossing point over the Karachukra River in the Zapperia region. This bridge was no ordinary structure. Although not the main branch of the Denipro River, it served as a key link in the Russian army's supply chain on the southern front. Heavy fuel tankers, trucks loaded with ammunition, and armored repair convoys regularly cross this crossing every day, feeding the logistics line stretching from Tokmack to Mel Toppel 1:00 and from there to Crimea via Kinburn. This route, considered an alternative to the Kirch Bridge, was critical for the transfer of cargo to eastern ports in particular. In the spring, Russia built a temporary but structurally sound military bridge over the carer crack to reinforce this route. Supported by concrete slabs, this structure allowed heavy vehicles to safely cross the marshy ground. An average of 230 vehicles used this route daily with onethird of them directly supplying ammunition to the front lines. The remaining transportation handled fuel and food logistics. This is precisely why Ukraine did not hesitate in its target selection. The attack was not a conventional air operation, but was carried out using two GBU62 bombs equipped with advanced JDAM ER guidance kits. These bombs were modernized versions of the US produced 1,000 lb MK83. Thanks to the GPS guided kit added to the tail section and the deployed flaps, these bombs can reach a range of 2:01 over 70 km and hit targets with accuracy of just a few meters. Normally, Soviet-designed MiG 29s were not equipped with the necessary interface to use these bombs, but Ukraine introduced Western munitions to these aircraft with a special adaptation kit developed in Lviv. The pilot can now see the range and targeting data of NATO inventoried smart weapons on the cockpit display. This transforms an old jet into a modern precision strike platform. As a result of the attack, the temporary military bridge was completely disabled. One of the factors that made the attack so effective was not only the precision of the munitions used, but also the systematic air defense suppression operation carried out prior to the operation. In particular, the Russian army's buck M2 medium-range air defense systems deployed in the region were disabled by successive suppression of enemy air defenses attacks in recent weeks. Despite having an effective radar lock range of up to 45 km, these systems were either detected and destroyed or 3:00 rendered blind due to their radar frequencies being jammed. As a result, Ukraine's MiG 29s were able to advance through an open air corridor as they approached the range to launch JDM bombs. The second and less talked about effect of the operation was not limited to the destruction of the bridge. This bridge was not just a crossing point. It also served as a buffer zone, masking the logistics hub of the Russian 35th Corps on the eastern bank. Hidden behind the fog of war, this staging area was now exposed and vulnerable. Satellite imagery and heat signature data indicate that smoke rose from three separate camp areas shortly after the attack. This likely indicates secondary explosions in ammunition or fuel depots. Following the attack, the eastern ramp of the bridge was completely collapsed into the sea with concrete blocks blocking the inner roadway. This structural collapse not only stopped traffic but also wiped Russia's critical supply route from 4:00 Marupople to Crimea off the map. They now have to detour from Tokmack to Berdansk to reach the east of the Denipro. But this new route means an additional 160 km and a loss of time. Moreover, this secondary route is extremely unfavorable in terms of both geography and infrastructure. Consisting of a narrow strip of earth, this passage quickly turns to mud, especially during summer rains. In such conditions, heavy fuel trucks could get stuck on the road with their wheels sinking into the mud. This is not merely a physical disruption, but a collapse of the logistics chain because the fuel needed to reach the tank's tank is being used to charge a satellite phone used to call for a crane. On the military side, another panic has emerged. After the bridge was hit, Ukraine demonstrated that its longrange Jummy AR munitions could easily strike the rear of the front lines, forcing the Russian air force to respond urgently. SU30SM 5:02 fighter jets were moved to the vicinity of Malito and day and night patrol flights were launched on the Vasilivka Maltool line. But these aircraft cannot fly above 4,000 m to avoid entering the radar range of Ukraine's Patriot systems which are equipped with AIM120 AMRAM missiles. This limits both their field of view and their attack position. There are patrol flights, but there is no real threat of a raid or suppression. The S400 air defense batteries are scattered in a rather haphazard manner against this new threat. According to data obtained from satellite images, these batteries are mounted on temporary ramps that are constantly being moved rather than being placed in fixed positions. The aim is to prevent the destruction of all radar and command units with a single hit. This portability brings with it another problem. The radars cannot operate at the optimum altitude. In addition, Russian defense forces have deployed CRBN masking systems to make it 6:00 more difficult for JDAM ER munitions to target them. These systems reduce visibility by deflecting radar signals rather than suppressing them, but this appears to have seriously slowed down coordination and the chain of command on the ground. The impact of the attack has been much deeper and more multifaceted than meets the eye. With the bridge out of commission, the Russian command realized that it could not reinforce its front lines in Marupole with BMP3 armored vehicles which were running on low fuel reserves. With the road link cut off, the solution shifted to air transport. The first reflex was to deploy ill 76 military transport aircraft. These flights via Kirch carried spare engine parts, sets of tracks, and emergency ammunition. But this method created two major problems. First, large targets such as the IL76 are very easy to detect by western radar systems, which means that the risk of air defense is immediately sky-high. The second is economic. Each ton transported by IL76 costs three times as much as the 7:03 same load transported by truck. The cargo carried by Russia's logistics network on its southern front is no longer limited to ammunition and fuel. The Ministry of Agricultures seasonal supply line from Dombas to Crimea has also been directly affected. Trucks traveling along this route transported grain, vegetables, meat products, and milk to food warehouses in Crimea, returning with empty pallets, crates, and waste packaging. But the destruction of the temporary bridge over the carer crack disrupted the two-way flow of this route. In particular, large refrigerated trailers are now forced to take a 160 km detour via Berdansk as an alternative route. Fuel consumption for trucks on this new route has nearly doubled. Logistics companies can no longer afford these extra costs. Many subcontractors have started to report losses. Civilian suppliers are directly sending invoices to the government, stating, 'If prices on the shelves in Crimea do not increase by 18%, we cannot cover these costs. What moves could Russia make in response 8:01 to the bridg's destruction? One of the most likely options is to disable the Patriot batteries in Ukraine. To do this, Moscow theoretically has KH59 air-to-surface missiles at its disposal. But in practice, things are not so simple. The US Norwegian-made Nemesis electronic warfare system deployed west of Kharkiv confuses guided missiles such as the KH59 with GPS jamming signals. It spreads across the field. These missiles need American satellite data to find their targets. But Nemesis distorts directional information, so the missiles often veer off into empty fields or are shot down before they can turn back. This means that the first option is systematically doomed to failure. The second option is to launch a salvo of caliber NK missiles from the Black Sea fleet at the Odessa Bilharod Dinistrovski line. The aim here is not a direct hit, but to put pressure on the Patriot systems radar and optical sensors. The missile threat would jam the radars and slow down the defense response. But this also looks stronger on paper. This is because Kaliba 9:01 missiles are already assigned to more priority defense areas such as the Kirch Bridge, Novarosis, and Vulgrad. Each caliber missile is expensive and there are few of them. Therefore, rather than spending its caliber stockpile to gain limited psychological superiority, the Kremlin is focused on shaping its defense against the JDAM ER threat because what they have realized is that an American bomb can cause much more damage than a missile range test from the Soviet era. The Ukrainian side is preparing for the second phase immediately after the first strike. The number of MiG 29s carrying JDAM ER munitions has now exceeded 18. Thanks to newly developed wing pylon adapters, each aircraft can carry two GBU62 bombs in a single sorty. This creates an operational multiplier effect. More destruction with fewer flights. The target list has already been finalized. One option is the suspension towers of the Kirch Bridge. The other is the Marupople railway vioaduct. Both are of both symbolic and strategic importance. 10:00 When the munition's payload reaches 2,000 lb, the destruction threshold for such fixed structures is easily surpassed. Western experts are quite clear about this attack concept. This package, whether it's a radar tower or a bridge pier within range, will hit its target with pinpoint accuracy when the right coordination is in place. Ukraine, meanwhile, is preparing to use this precision to systematically dismantle Russia's logistics and transportation infrastructure. More interestingly, the question arises whether new Jamie will replace the existing stock. The Pentagon has committed to delivering an additional 900 units to Ukraine by the end of 2025. This means that Kiev now has not just a few munitions at its disposal, but the capacity to carry out a planned campaign. The calculation on the strategic table is as follows. If we strike one bridge per week, Kirch will be under psychological siege before summer ends. The targets on the map have already been marked. Alternative routes for armored convoys have been nearly 11:00 eliminated. Russia's asphalt and railway network is being cornered further with each strike. On the countermeasure front, there is a plan being carried out in a hurry. Sue 30 SM fighter jets are being integrated with made Kibinu electronic jammers. But there is a serious problem here. The software is not ready. The target date for the updated Jammer software to be put into active service is the end of the year. Until then, the Russian military's fuel and ammunition transportation will have to race against the clock and navigate every millimeter like a minefield through the sunken passages of the Nippro. The most notable balancing factor in Ukraine's latest bridge destruction attack is the new core structure of its air defense system, Patriot batteries. The US has quietly increased Ukraine's Patriot capacity to three batteries through shipments from Poland's rush of air logistics hub. Two of these are the latest PAC 3 MSE variant while the third is the GEMT which provides broader coverage. This combination provides not only point defense but also sufficient range for 12:01 regional threat suppression. Positioned to protect the Zaparigia front. These systems create an electronic umbrella that provides maneuvering space for the Ukrainian air force. When MiG 29s carrying JDAM take off from this Patriot coverage area and launch their munitions, an interesting tactical chain begins. The Russian side seeking to intercept the launched JDAM is forced to fire S300/400 series SAM systems as a counter measure, but the radar emissions and launch fire from these systems are directly visible on the Patriot radar image. When the S400 comes into play, US-made PAC3MS missiles can instantly detect these threats. This tactic is known in military literature as forcing a stalemate. Ukraine is forcing Russian air defenses to make a decision. Either fire the missile and risk being destroyed by the Patriot MSE or remain silent and watch the strategic bridge collapse. The S400 battery did not fire in this 13:02 attack because if it had, it would have faced the risk of an out-ofrange intercept, i.e. missile loss or a patriot counterattack. Result: The bridge collapsed. This is a new nightmare for the Kremlin. Now it's not just about focusing on the target. They must also calculate the risk of exposing their systems, missile waste, and radar positions with every shot. Don't be surprised if new JDM images appear on your screens in the coming days because every explosion destroys not just a target but also a supply network that has been woven over weeks. Sometimes destroying a bridge is enough to immobilize an entire brigade. The carer crack pass was precisely that breaking point. How do you think Moscow will compensate for this blow? Will it open a new transit route, bring its air defense forward, or pursue a completely 13:48 different strategy? We look forward to your comments below. Don't forget to subscribe and turn on notifications because in this war, a single GPS coordinate can change the fate of an entire front. Thank you for watching.

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