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Date: 2025-08-21 Page is: DBtxt003.php txt00028896
RUSSIA
UKRAINE TAKES WAR INTO RUSSIA

The Military Show: Twin BLOW to Putin as Russian Airfield and Factory BURN BURN BURN


Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TolzT9Gwvds
Twin BLOW to Putin as Russian Airfield and Factory BURN BURN BURN...

The Military Show

Jul 7, 2025

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Ukraine has struck deep inside Russia, hitting a critical electronics factory and a key military airfield in a coordinated assault. The twin strikes disrupted guidance systems, destroyed valuable equipment, and exposed growing cracks in Russia’s war machine. These long-range attacks are part of a broader campaign to weaken Russia’s offensive capabilities at their source. As Ukraine’s drone warfare evolves, the strategic balance continues to shift—with serious implications for the war’s next phase.

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Peter Burgess COMMENTARY



Peter Burgess
Transcript
  • 0:00
  • Deep in the Chuvash (Choo-Vash) Republic sits the city of Cheboksary (Che-bok-sa-ree),
  • the home of the VNIIR-Progress factory Russia uses to produce vital electronic components
  • for its drones and other equipment. Hundreds of miles away, in the Voronezh (Vuh-Ro-Nesh) Oblast,
  • there is an airfield that is home to a stockpile of Russia’s devastating glide bombs,
  • as well as some of its most valuable fighter jets. Both are now in flames. The victims of a twin blow
  • to Vladimir Putin as both a Russian airfield and a vital factory burn, burn, burn. Ukraine just hit
  • Russia hard with a one-two punch that is going to have plenty of long-term effects on Putin’s
  • brutal invasion. We’ll start with the factory. On July 5, Militarnyi reported that Ukraine
  • had unleashed a horde of strike drones on the Chuvash Republic. Their target was simple – the
  • VNIIR Progress factory in the city of Cheboksary, which is responsible for manufacturing a range of
  • electronic components, including the vital Kometa antennas that Russia is incorporating into many of
  • its drones. Part of the ABS Electro Manufacturing Group, the factory builds both the antennas and

  • 1:01
  • Global Satellite Navigation System, or GNSS, receivers that work with satellite navigation
  • systems including GPS, Russia’s own GLONASS, and Galileo. It's the Kometa antennas that were
  • the key target here. We’ll dig into them in more detail later, but those antennas are packed into
  • Russia’s Shahed drones, as well as being used in its advanced glide bomb guidance kits and Russia’s
  • Iskander-M ballistic missiles. Kometa antennas protect these weapons from Ukraine’s electronic
  • jamming countermeasures. Without them, Russia’s aerial assaults become far less effective.
  • There’s more. According to Militarnyi, the factory Ukraine just hit also produces circuit breakers,
  • contactless modules, and relays, all of which are used by Russia’s Navy. The Yasen-M class nuclear
  • submarines Putin has patrolling the waters of the world need these components, meaning
  • Ukraine may have just caused Russia some serious naval problems. Add microelectronic components,
  • applied computer equipment, and both hardware and software solutions for shipbuilding, and the loss
  • of the VNIIR factory is a major blow to Putin. And Russia can’t deny this happened. How do we

  • 2:01
  • know? Footage shared to the Astra Telegram channel shows that authorities in Cheboksary have already
  • restricted access to the VNIIR-Progress factory as a cleanup operation is underway. As Astra reports,
  • “In Cheboksary, after a drone attack, police blocked the entrance to the territory of
  • JSC VNIIR-Progress, as evidenced by eyewitness footage. The enterprise produces Kometa antennas
  • for the Russian army, which protect the drones of the Russian Armed Forces from Ukrainian electronic
  • warfare systems. After the attack on June 9, it had already suspended operations.” That’s
  • an interesting point. July 5 wasn’t the first time that Ukraine struck the VNIIR-Progress facility.
  • It also hit the factory hard about a month earlier, targeting several of its key workshops
  • and causing the plant to cease operations. Russia, of course, claimed that the initial attack wasn’t
  • effective. Head of the Chuvash Republic, Oleg Nikolaev (Oh-Leg Nee-Kuh-LyEv), told reporters
  • that Russia’s air defenses had shot down the June drone horde and that the factory was only
  • on fire because it had been hit by drone debris. A common “explanation” from Russia. One that nobody
  • believes because fires of the magnitude seen at VNIIR-Progress don’t happen because a facility

  • 3:04
  • got hit with a little bit of debris. They happen because Ukraine’s drones score direct hits against
  • their targets. Astra provides more details in its Telegram post, adding, “As ASTRA reported,
  • on the morning of July 5, drones attacked the capital of the Chuvash Republic, Cheboksary. A
  • fire broke out in the area of ​​the Vutherm hot water boiler plant on Lapsarsky Proyezd
  • (Lap-sar-skee Pro-yeez-ed). It is unknown what exactly is burning. Local authorities have not yet
  • commented on the attack.” Footage of the strike was also shared on the Militarnyi YouTube channel,
  • courtesy of Astra. The 22 seconds of video doesn’t seem to show much at first. We hear what sounds
  • like drones or something similar whirring away in the background, but there’s no clear shot of the
  • weapons Ukraine used to strike the VNIIR-Progress plant. Then, the footage zooms in. And that allows
  • us to see that what previously appeared to be clouds in the distance is actually the smoke
  • rising from the Russian factory. The drones had already hit their targets and VNIIR-Progress was
  • in flames. This was a devastating one-two punch on a key Russian factory. In June, Ukraine forced

  • 4:01
  • that factory to close down temporarily with a devastating drone strike against some of its
  • workshops. July 5 brought with it another strike. And this one may have taken our VNIIR-Progress
  • forever. Speaking about one-two punches, that’s not the only one Ukraine has landed on Russia. In
  • addition to the factory attack, Ukraine has also devastated a key airfield in the Voronezh Oblast,
  • which is over 800 miles away from Cheboksary. Also on July 5, Newsweek reported that Ukraine’s
  • drones had hit home on the Borisoglebsk (Boh-Ree-So-glebsk) airfield. That airfield
  • is home to a large warehouse, which Newsweek says serves as a storage unit for Russian fighter jets,
  • devastating glide bombs, and several more of Putin’s military assets. Specifically,
  • Putin keeps some of Russia’s most advanced fighter jets at the facility, including its Su-34, Su-35s,
  • and Su-30SM jets. Newsweek adds that residents of Voronezh say that Ukraine hit the airfield hard
  • on July 5, causing up to 10 explosions starting from 2 am. Those strikes have been confirmed by
  • the NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System, which Astra says has reported a massive

  • 5:02
  • fire in the vicinity of the airfield. More details about the attack come from CNN,
  • which reports that Ukraine’s General Staff took to Facebook to confirm the strike on Borisoglebsk.
  • The staff pointed out that the airfield is home to training aircraft, likely meaning the various
  • Sukhoi fighter jets we mentioned earlier, along with glide bombs and “possibly other aircraft.”
  • that Ukraine’s target was a warehouse at the Borisoglebsk airfield. However, it adds that
  • Ukraine’s attack may have destroyed at least one of Russia’s training and combat aircraft, along
  • with a storage facility for Russia’s glide bombs. Russia has issued only limited comments, focusing
  • on drone interceptions rather than confirming any strike damage.. The Kyiv Independent reports
  • that all the Russian Defense Ministry has said is that it intercepted 42 of Ukraine’s drones during
  • a three-hour operation that saw Ukraine attack the Belgorod (Bell-Guh-Rod), Kursk (Koor-Sk), and
  • Bryansk (Bree-YAn-Sk) oblast. At least two of those drones were shot down near St. Petersburg,
  • the ministry says, forcing the closure of the nearby Pulkovo (Pool-Kuh-Voh) airport. Three more
  • were shot down over the Smolensk (Smo-Lensk) Oblast, according to the region’s governor,

  • 6:03
  • as were several over the Voronezh Oblast. As for direct hits… Russia isn’t saying anything.
  • And that’s par for the course when it comes to Russia’s responses to Ukraine’s drone strikes. It
  • always focuses on what it shot down while claiming that any damage caused happened due to debris. The
  • reality is much different. Both a vital factory and a key Russian airfield are now burning because
  • has left Russia reeling. And this assault matters for several reasons. First, there’s the potential
  • loss of the previously mentioned Kometa antennas to consider. In March, Forbes Senior Contributor
  • David Hambling wrote about these antennas, noting that they’re playing a key role in the electronic
  • warfare arms race that has emerged between Russia and Ukraine since Putin launched his invasion.
  • We’ve touched on what those antennas do already. They serve as vital components in the guidance
  • systems Russia builds into its glide bombs, drones, and some of its missiles. The Kometa lies
  • at the center of the arms race Hambling mentions. He talks about Russia’s Shahed drones and its

  • 7:00
  • glide bombs, noting that Russia launched 1,050 of the former and 1,300 of the latter at Ukraine
  • in just one week the previous February. “Both weapons use the Russian Kometa (“Comet”) satellite
  • guidance system,” Hambling reports. “Ukraine has deployed vast numbers of electronic jamming and
  • spoofing devices to make the weapons to miss their targets. Russia has responded by successively
  • upgrading Kometa, increasing the number of antenna elements from 4 to 8 to 12 and beyond to beat the
  • jammers.” Therein lies the problem for Ukraine. And the reason it targeted the VNIIR-Progress
  • plant. Hambling adds that this particular plant is the only one in Russia capable of manufacturing
  • Kometa antennas, which were introduced in 2017 with the unique selling point that it’s capable of
  • filtering out electronic jamming signals. Ukraine uses those signals to confuse the guidance systems
  • built into the aerial weapons Putin is launching at its cities and infrastructure. The same writer
  • also provides more details about how the Kometa antennas work. He says they’re technically
  • referred to as Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas, or CRPAs, and they use several antenna
  • elements capable of combining their signals. Amplification is made possible by this design.,

  • 8:04
  • though that’s not all the Kometa is capable of. “The most obvious approach is amplification:
  • adding two signals together to boost the amplification,” Hambling writes. “But it
  • can also be used for subtraction. By shifting the phase of a signal when it is combined,
  • a CRPA can selectively remove one signal from the output, effectively tuning it out.” That’s the
  • problem Ukraine has with weapons that are equipped with Kometa in a nutshell. The Kometa’s ability to
  • filter signals out means that Ukraine’s jamming efforts are practically useless. Kometa has
  • multiple antenna elements. One of those elements may get affected by Ukraine’s jamming, but that’s
  • not enough to send a bomb or missile off course. The other antenna elements, which aren’t affected,
  • override the corrupted signal picked up by the single antenna Ukraine can impact, subtracting it
  • from the equation so that jamming has no effect. Logically, that also means that the more antenna
  • elements that are built into a Kometa, the less effective Ukraine’s jamming efforts become. When
  • VNIIR-Progress introduced the Kometa, it had four antenna elements. Russia has been
  • upgrading it since then. In April, United24 Media reported that Russia is now equipping its glide

  • 9:02
  • bombs with Kometas that contain 12 elements, or “channels,” that make them practically impervious
  • to Ukraine’s jamming efforts. More elements mean more resistance, along with improved satellite
  • navigation for Russia’s aerial weapons. So, we see clear logic in the VNIIR-Progress assault.
  • most terrifying weapons. Fewer missiles, drones, and glide bombs hit their targets on Ukraine’s
  • territory. That means reduced pressure on the country’s stretched defenses. Speaking about
  • glide bombs, they were a key target in Ukraine’s other attack on the Borisoglebsk airfield. If
  • hitting VNIIR-Progress was about destroying the jamming-resistant guidance system those
  • bombs are now using, the Borisoglebsk was all about taking out as many of these weapons as
  • possible. And Ukraine needs to do that. Russia has been hitting it hard with glide bombs for much of
  • the war. Glide bombs came to prominence during the first half of 2024, when Putin started using
  • them in massive volumes to cause severe damage to Ukraine’s cities and infrastructure. The BBC

  • 10:00
  • reported on them in May of that year, providing the basic details. Russia creates glide bombs by
  • taking “dumb” bombs and equipping them with special GPS-navigated glide kits that allow
  • the bombs to be fired from behind the front lines before they glide to their targets using special
  • fold-out wings. These bombs are typically the FAB series of “dumb” bombs, which previously had no
  • form of guidance and were instead designed to be dropped from aircraft directly above a target.
  • Russia has thousands of these FAB bombs, with the heaviest of them weighing around 1.5 tons. For
  • context, a single Russian 152-millimeter artillery shell packs about 14.3 pounds of explosive
  • material. A FAB-1500 equipped with a glide kit weighs a little over 1,300 pounds. That’s almost
  • 93 times the explosive potential of an artillery shell, and Russia has been buffeting Ukraine with
  • these terrifying weapons for well over a year. In March 2024 alone, Russia launched 3,000 glide
  • bombs at Ukraine, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. It’s only gotten worse since.
  • In January 2025, Reuters reported that Russia had launched 51,000 glide bombs at Ukraine since Putin

  • 11:06
  • launched his invasion. If we assume that Russia was dropping these bombs from the start of the
  • war, that would amount to around 1,400 glide bombs per month. However, that’s not accurate. Russia
  • came up with glide bombs toward the end of 2023, with the vast majority launched up to January
  • hitting Ukraine in 2024. Reuters says that Ukraine was hit with 40,000 of Russia’s glide bombs in
  • 2024 alone, creating a monthly rate of around 3,300 – about what the Zelenskyy reported back
  • in March 2024. Back on April 3, The Ukraine Crisis Media Center noted that Russia hasn’t slowed down
  • with its glide bomb assaults. On Day 1,134 of the war, it says that Zelenskyy claimed that Russia
  • hit Ukraine’s Sumy (Soo-Me) region with nearly 50 glide bombs in a single day. That region is being
  • targeted because it’s key to Russia’s summer offensive. Hit Sumy hard with glide bombs,
  • Russia’s logic goes, and you tear down Ukraine’s defenses so that Russian troops on the ground can
  • take territory. It's a tactic that has worked for Putin plenty of times before, as Radio Free

  • 12:02
  • Europe/Radio Liberty said toward the end of April. It showcased several Ukrainian cities and towns,
  • all of which have become bombed-out shells of what they used to be. Chasiv Yar (Chas-Eev Yar),
  • Toretsk (Toh-Ret-Sk), Vovchansk (Vow-Chan-Sk), Bakhmut (Bak-Mutt), Maryinka (Mah-Reen-Kah),
  • and many others all bear the scars of Putin’s devastating aerial assaults. Ukraine’s one-two
  • punch on July 5 had a serious impact on Putin’s glide bombs. It took out both the factory Russia
  • used to make the Kometa antennas being packed into those bombs and a stockpile of the bombs
  • themselves. Russia certainly hasn’t run out of glide bombs. But from now on, those bombs may be
  • less accurate and, in the immediate sense, Russia won’t be able to send them from Borisoglebsk to
  • airfields that are closer to the front lines. And that’s not all that Ukraine achieved with its
  • Borisoglebsk strike. We mentioned earlier that The Kyiv Independent reported that Ukraine may have
  • taken out at least one of the trainer aircraft at that airfield. That’s another problem for Putin
  • because Russia has a problem with its pilots that the Kremlin doesn’t want to talk about:
  • It’s quickly running out of experienced pilots that would allow Russia to dominate Ukraine’s
  • airspace. This isn’t a new problem for Putin. In April 2023, Business Insider reported on a

  • 13:03
  • study that revealed years of inadequate pilot training may have been behind Russia’s initial
  • struggles to use its massive air force to gain air superiority in Ukraine. That study, published by
  • The Royal United Services Institute, claims, “Very few Russian fixed-wing pilots had significant
  • training or currency for very low-altitude close air support in contested airspace, since this
  • never formed part of their core training tasks before the invasion.” It also points out that,
  • prior to Putin’s invasion, Russia hadn’t invested heavily enough in the various sensors, weapons,
  • and training programs that Western air forces spend their money on, which is why so many of
  • Russia’s pilots were getting shot out of the skies during the early months of the invasion.
  • That revelation reveals why Putin relies so heavily on glide bombs today. He can’t risk
  • sending his aircraft into Ukraine because his pilots aren’t up for the job. That situation
  • hasn’t gotten any better for Russia. The quality of the country’s pilots has been diminishing
  • ever since the war began, with most successful takedowns of Russia’s aircraft also involving
  • the killing or capture of an experienced pilot. What does that leave Russia? Inexperienced pilots

  • 14:03
  • who can do little more than take off, hover, and launch glide bombs at Ukraine. And now, Putin may
  • not even be able to train as many of those types of pilots. With at least one of Russia’s trainer
  • aircraft gone thanks to the Borisoglebsk strike, Ukraine has shown that its long-range strikes
  • aren’t just about taking out Russia’s offensive capabilities directly. It’s also doing long-term
  • damage to Putin’s air force. A slowdown in pilot training ultimately leads to the same results as
  • the strikes against Kometa production and Russia’s glide bomb storage facilities – fewer bombs being
  • launched at Ukraine’s cities. There’s one more thing Ukraine achieved with its July 5 twin blow
  • to Russia. It’s something that Ukraine has been doing since 2024 – it took the war onto Russian
  • territory. Part of Ukraine’s strategy during the latter half of 2024 and into 2025 has been
  • to undermine Russia’s strike capabilities using long-range drone attacks. The idea,
  • according to Espreso Global, is twofold – to wear down Russia’s long-term capacity to wage
  • war against Ukraine while undermining the world’s view of Russia as a powerful military force.

  • 15:00
  • We’ve seen this many times before. Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb is an excellent example,
  • as it took out several of the nuclear-capable bombers Russia uses to launch bombs and missiles
  • at Ukraine. These types of operations are part of a wider Ukrainian strategy to chip away at
  • Russia’s ability to wage war. That’s what we saw on July 5. Taking out Kometas, glide bombs,
  • and even training aircraft diminished Russia’s military. Ukraine brings the war to Russia.
  • And in doing so, it limits Russia’s ability to escalate the war inside Ukraine. The Council on
  • Foreign Relations says that Ukraine’s long-range strikes also emphasize just how fruitless Putin’s
  • attempts to modernize the Russian military have been. “The Russian army reflects Russian society:
  • top-down control, indiscipline, and corruption. The war in Ukraine reveals the futility of Putin’s
  • ten-year investment program to modernize his army. Nothing has succeeded—not organizational reform,
  • the introduction of new equipment, or enhanced training. The Russians have failed on every
  • front,” the council says. Therein lies another problem for Putin. He wants the world to see
  • Russia as some sort of military monolith. And ironically, that’s exactly what he’s down. A

  • 16:02
  • monolith is defined as any sort of political structure that is believed to be indivisible,
  • which is what Putin wants the world to see. But monoliths are also slow to change. They can’t
  • adapt to the changing face of warfare, eventually rendering them obsolete. That’s what we’re seeing
  • now in so many areas of Russia’s military. The country’s reliance on outdated equipment combined
  • with Putin’s inability to modernize has made the monolith a source of humiliation time and
  • time again for Russia’s leader. July 5 only adds to that humiliation. Ukraine’s twin blow has put
  • Russia on the back foot as it loses some of its key weapons and components. Look for more of these
  • types of long-range attacks in the future. Ukraine is targeting Russia’s factories and airfields. If
  • it hits enough of both, it may just have found a pathway to victory against Putin’s marauding
  • forces. And as all of this is happening, Putin is running out of the money he needs to replenish
  • Russia’s military losses. Russia’s central bank is begging Putin to end his war as the country’s
  • economy teeters on the brink of total collapse. Find out more in our video and remember to
  • subscribe to The Military Show for more commentary on the latest developments in the Ukraine war.


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