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THE UKRAINE WAR A VERY MODERN WAR Silicon Curtain: Ben Hodges - Deep Strikes Using US Weapons Could be Authorized by New Trump Team - Putin in Trouble. PLAY YOUTUBE VIDEO Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W3aZ9EIMtw4 Peter Burgess COMMENTARY Peter Burgess
Ben Hodges - Deep Strikes Using US Weapons Could be Authorized by New Trump Team - Putin in Trouble. Silicon Curtain Jan 14, 2025 133K subscribers ... 147,822 views ... 7.4K likes At First Hand - Experiences of the War One of President Joe Biden's final decisions in office was to grant Ukraine permission to use ATACMS on Russian territory, but with geographical restrictions. One of then Trump teams first decision may be to allow long range, or deep strikes. Will this turn the tide of the war or force Putin to negotiate? Ben Hodges is a retired United States Army officer, who became commander of United States Army Europe in November 2014, and held that position for three years until retiring from the United States Army in January 2018. Until recently he was the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies, at the Centre for European Policy Analysis, specializing in NATO, Transatlantic relationship and international security. At relatively short notice, we're organizing two events in Ukraine in the last week of January. Lviv (part 2) and Kyiv. The event we ran in August 2023 was a huge success, and had a great impact. Now our aim is even more ambitious. Two cities. Two events. Multiple panels consisting of the best experts, and all filmed in high definition for the channel. https://buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurta... But it costs. Last time the overall cost was £3,500 for Live in Lviv, and we covered 80% of this through ticket sales. This time the costs are higher, and there's less opportunity to sell tickets at the available venues and studios, so I'm creating a campaign to raise £5,000 to make this trip a reality. We also have a much more ambitious programme to film interviews around Kyiv and Lviv for the channel. This project will have an impact, so please help if you can. https://buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurta... SILICON CURTAIN FILM FUNDRAISER A project to make a documentary film in Ukraine, to raise awareness of Ukraine's struggle and in supporting a team running aid convoys to Ukraine's front-line towns. https://buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurta... CHAPTERS: 00:02:10 Russia still does not have a joined-up command structure in Kursk. 00:05:14 Ukraine could still build up forces right under the noses of the Russians 00:07:37 The Trump team will have enormous leverage over Vladimir Putin. 00:11:15 Russian economy is in deep trouble. They'll never change until defeated. 00:15:18 Training officers at entry level up through brigade command must continue. 00:19:01 Putin has not changed his war aims despite the casualties and failures. 00:26:11 American president elect using same kind of language as Kremlin and Beijing. 00:32:16 Putin’s regime has been able to make people complicit in his criminality. 00:35:08 Centre of gravity in Europe is shifting east and north to Poland and Ukraine. 00:39:48 Having a grown-up conversation with electorates, has been lacking until now. 00:44:12 British Army and US Army are very good at scaling up training and learning. LINKS: / general_ben https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben_Hodges https://cepa.org/author/ben-hodges/ https://warsawsecurityforum.org/speak... Welcome to the Silicon Curtain podcast. Please like and subscribe if you like the content we produce. It will really help to increase the popularity of our content in YouTube’s algorithm. Our material is now being made available on popular podcasting platforms as well, such as Spotify and Apple Podcasts. At First Hand - Experiences of the War Transcript 0:00 One of President Joe Biden's final decisions in office was to grant Ukraine permission to 0:05 use atacms on Russian territory, but there were some geographical restrictions 0:10 placed on that, we believe. One of the Trump team's first decisions may be to allow long range or deep strikes and 0:17 remove these restrictions. Will this turn the tide of war or force Putin's hand to negotiate? 0:24 Today, I'm delighted once again to be joined by Ben Hodges, who is a retired United States Army officer who became commander of the United States Army Europe in November 2014 0:33 and held that position for three years until retiring from the Army in January 2018. 0:38 Until recently, he was the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the center for European Policy Analysis, specializing in NATO, transatlantic relationships, 0:46 and international security. I won't do a big, long, rambling intro because I thought, I'm sure many of you will have seen Ben's videos and fantastic interviews. 0:55 Before we jump in, I wanted to say thank you to everyone who is supporting our fundraiser. At the at the moment we are going to be filming in Ukraine, 1:02 in Lviv and Kiev. We're going to be doing some key interviews with civic society 1:07 leaders, politicians and various other interesting figures that is happening already. Next week we've got a last minute fundraiser to be able to hire film crews. 1:18 Film studios do everything professionally. Thank you to everybody who's helped out on that campaign, 1:24 and it is still open for a couple of days if you're able to. And if you're able to, it would be appreciated if you can chip in. 1:31 Ben, thank you so much for joining me once again. Well, thank you for the privilege. Let's start with the new Kursk incursions, because I think last time we spoke, 1:40 we were talking about the impact of Kursk and the fact that Russia had not been able to dislodge Ukraine. And at that point, the appearance of North Korean cannon fodder 1:51 was only just beginning on the battlefield. Now we have the first pose, we have the first deaths, 1:56 and we have a new Kursk incursion. What do you think is going on? What is the strategic purpose of Ukraine sort of pushing 2:05 once again to retake some of that territory they'd lost in Kursk? 2:10 Well, I think it's incredible that six months after the original Ukrainian counteroffensive 2:17 in the Kursk direction, the Russians have still not been able to eliminate that bridgehead, even though Putin has, 2:24 I think, issued two different time timelines, like get this done by 1st October or by 1st January. 2:31 And they've been unable to do that. And I think the fact that the Ukrainians were able to launch a second phase here a couple 2:39 of weeks ago, to which you just referenced, highlights the fact that Russia still does not have a joined up, um, command structure, 2:49 seemingly, that's responsible for what's happening in Kursk. I think there's, uh, some, uh. 2:57 Overlap. Between FSB and General staff. And so you don't have a, I think, a clear picture. 3:05 The Russians don't have a clear picture of what's going on inside that bridgehead and have not been able to, uh, form a concerted, 3:15 concentrated effort to eliminate it. I mean, my gosh, they would seemingly have plenty of resources to to do all of that. 3:24 So, um, I think these are the typically indicators of, 3:30 um, command structures that are not coherent. That's that's one of the things that I think about strategically. 3:37 Of course, this continues to be a problem for the Kremlin, because if, uh, the Trump administration is able to get people to agree to come some to 3:48 come to some sort of negotiations, this this is problematic for the Kremlin, 3:54 since they have said all along that the start point for negotiations will be what they 3:59 already control inside Ukraine. Well, if that's the case, you know Ukraine. 4:04 Ukrainians have control inside Russia. I don't I think that will be a problem. 4:10 And then finally, at the operational level, Russia is having to divert resources of 4:15 different types to deal with this bridgehead that perhaps they might, would prefer to use elsewhere. 4:21 And there are rumors, at least, that Ukraine has been deploying some interesting technological solutions, using electronic warfare to block Russian 4:32 positions, which enable them to push through and penetrate Russian defenses. Um, where do you see the war? 4:39 Because Zaluzhnyi, when he was still in place, did that famous article where he said that its technical innovation that is going to 4:47 determine who emerges triumphant from what is an intense war of attrition. 4:53 Yes, it's about resources, but innovation can potentially cause you to 4:58 make gains with fewer losses or improving that ratio of losses. How do you see this balance between innovation and Ukrainians deploying 5:07 innovation? And is it being deployed at the right kind of scale and the right consistency 5:12 of, say, quality and skill? Well, that was the right word, Jonathan scale. 5:18 Um, the Ukrainians, I think, are unsurpassed in terms of creativity and 5:24 innovation and, um, getting new technologies into the fight. Their ability. Their ability to do it at the scale necessary to have the sort of, 5:36 uh, real effect that they need is not there yet. 5:41 And this is where, of course, we should be helping, uh, in developing or providing what's needed to increase the scale of these innovations. 5:51 Uh, I have been impressed with what they've done with electronic warfare. I think this is how this is part of how they were able to achieve the surprise that they 5:59 did back in August. And here again, despite Russia presumably having thousands of 6:05 drones in the area, that Ukraine could still build up forces right under the noses of the 6:11 Russians and launched and launched his attacks without being hammered by Russian 6:18 artillery or Russian air power. So I hope that we are learning how the Ukrainians are doing this, 6:25 because certainly we've never, in my experience, have ever had that kind of quality and quantity of electronic warfare, 6:34 jamming and and so on. Let's turn to something I mentioned in the introduction. And that is deep strikes. 6:40 So atacms are now being used with some effect. It's I think it was said that in Bryansk it may have been a combination of Air Force and 6:48 Atacms, but it's not quite clear yet. But certainly they are being used regularly to the point now where even Russian 6:53 propagandists are kind of not even mentioning that they're focusing on other things, and the Western media isn't really paying attention despite, 7:00 uh, you know, oil refineries going up on a near daily basis, as well as other strategic facilities like factories, 7:06 drone factories and so on. Um, there has been some discussion or some statements, 7:12 at least, uh, in media interviews by people who are appointed with the Trump team that they would remove the geographical restrictions that are thought to be in place. 7:21 Um, this talks to two things. I mean, one, strategically, militarily. Is it a game changer? Um, and secondly, is it a very important set of 7:29 optics that actually the incoming administration is not going to be obsessing 7:35 about managing escalation. You know, things like geographical restrictions on certain type of weapons. 7:41 Those are those are policy decisions, uh, that the Biden administration made to to 7:50 avoid Elation, but they were not tethered to any strategic objective like helping Ukraine 7:56 win. I mean, that was always despite all the good intentions of many people in the Biden administration, they never clearly identified an objective of we want Ukraine to win 8:08 because it's in our interest, not because we like Ukrainians or out of charity, but because it's in our interest to for them to defeat Russia, 8:16 because that will help deter China. The Chinese Chinese will see, my goodness, the West really does have the political will to and the capacity to do all 8:24 this. So, um, for the Trump administration, I don't think even he knows exactly what the 8:33 strategic outcome should be or that he that he wants. But I do have a sense that there's a growing realization inside the Trump team that he 8:45 will have enormous leverage over Vladimir Putin that he did not have eight years ago. 8:51 I mean, Trump is coming in. He's inheriting a very good, strong US economy. 8:58 Contrary to what they say the facts are. He's inheriting a good, strong economy. 9:04 He has he's at the peak of his political power. He's got a willing and compliant Congress, I think, 9:10 at least initially. And so Trump could do several things, 9:16 like leaving in place the recent changes by the Biden administration about using Atacms 9:22 wherever they want without having to do or say anything. And he can they can communicate to the Kremlin that, 9:28 look, you're going to have to negotiate here. You're going to have to do some things, or we're just going to let these keep going 9:34 even better. There's another $2 billion worth of aid that had already been approved and 9:41 authorized by the Congress, that the Biden administration did not get out the door in time. It's it's that's on the table. 9:49 And so Trump doesn't have to lift a finger. And that's still $2 billion worth of stuff that's in the pipeline. 9:57 And and so these are the kind of things that he can tell the Russians, uh, that, uh, this is this is all going to happen unless you, 10:06 um, are a reliable negotiating partner. Of course, this could be wishful thinking on my part. 10:15 Uh, but I believe that, uh, I think I have a slightly higher bit of 10:22 optimism about what the Trump team will do than I did even 3 or 4 months ago. 10:27 And it seems also that oil sanctions are potentially ramping up in the final days of 10:34 the Biden administration. Um, when I read about new sanctions being imposed or sanctions being increased, 10:40 it does raise the question, well, why now? Why is that taken so long? 10:45 Um, it seems that, at least to least to my mind, looking at some of the economic data and some of the economic analysis coming out that 10:53 really punitive sanctions, closing the loopholes, not going in with half measures and half heartedly, 10:59 as we perhaps have done over the last three years, that real punitive sanctions could mean Putin is in real trouble. 11:08 What's your reading on this? What needs to be done to ramp up rather than reduce the pressure on Putin's regime? 11:15 Well, we it's the strategic objective of wanting Russia to lose, of wanting Ukraine to win. I mean, that's that's what has you have to get the 11:24 objective right. And then you can develop the policies that are implemented to achieve the 11:29 objective. And we've we've gone about it backwards now over the last few years. And with regards to Ukraine and by the way, also in Afghanistan, 11:38 we didn't have a clearly defined strategic objective in Afghanistan for 19 out of 20 11:44 years. So I do think that the Russian economy is in deep trouble. 11:50 I've seen what you've done here recently, and a lot of other people are talking more 11:55 and more about Russian economic troubles, how things are being propped up artificially. 12:01 Um, if we had shut down the Shadow fleet, um, 12:07 earlier, that would have prevented Russia from getting billions of euro that they need 12:13 desperately to keep their war effort going. So finally, the Biden administration, um, put in sanctions on something like 200 12:22 vessels. Why now? It's three years late, but it's never too late to start doing this. 12:29 And again, this is more leverage for Trump. He can leave these things in place or he can increase the pressure. 12:35 Um, I think Trump's motivation will be based on, uh, real hard power, um, and what he and his team see as best 12:45 advantage for the United States, even if if it improves or raises, 12:51 uh, opportunity for American oil companies, for example. I think this is all part of the mix. 12:57 Um, it certainly would be, um, a power that he would have and leverage 13:03 that he would have over China and India. Also, if he can shut down that, if he wants to. 13:09 That's that's the problem. I don't I don't know what they really want to do, but I do hope that they will use these economic tools to help crush the Russian 13:20 government that's in power now, not only to, um, help Ukraine win, but Russia and, you know, 13:28 Russia so much better than I do. But, I mean, they're never going to change until they're defeated. 13:34 If they're not defeated, you know, Putin will be replaced by another Putin. That's absolutely, absolutely correct. 13:40 Uh, reform in Russia historically has always come after a defeat. So we should look out for that. Well, we're going to get back onto geopolitics and 13:48 the Trump administration, because I think there's some significant stuff going on there around Canada and Greenland. We're going to get to that in a 13:53 minute. But another theme that's going to be emerging in some of the videos that I'm doing, and it's very much taken from consuming actually content that Ukrainians 14:03 are producing and that some of the better, I would say, dissident Russians are producing, where they discuss some of the systemic 14:10 weaknesses in the Ukrainian army. I think there are good reasons why, you know, we don't want to, you know, beat, beat them up, 14:17 but and certainly do it in a propagandistic fashion. But there are discussions happening that the persistence of the Soviet mindset, 14:26 um, is, is, is really causing some issues in various parts of the front. 14:32 It is causing poor decisions to be made. And indeed this this Soviet mindset is a is is a hangover. 14:38 You know, it's it's not necessarily a huge resurgence. Um, but it's there. And rooting it out is a is a problem, 14:44 including those officers who were trained, uh, slightly older, and they were trained during the Soviet period and are perhaps reverting 14:51 to some of those more hierarchical kind of methods. Um, what what do you feel about this? 14:57 How how important is it to tackle the Soviet mindset within the Ukrainian army? 15:02 Because it does seem to be stifling innovation, and it seems to be making certain battalions not open to training and new ways of 15:11 thinking. It can lead to wasteful and highly costly mistakes as well. 15:18 Well, uh, 2 or 3 things there, Jonathan. First of all, um, it is the responsibility of the the civilian authorities and the top 15:28 military leadership to make sure you have the best possible leaders at every level in 15:35 combat. And after after really 11 years of war, but specifically after the last three years, you know, 15:42 they can see who out there are the best young tactical leaders at company, 15:47 battalion, brigade level. I mean, they've had years to to demonstrate capability. 15:53 And so, um, very seldom does an army in the war with the same leaders that they had at 16:00 the beginning because of a variety of reasons. Um, and I think it will be appropriate for General Sikorski and the leadership to, 16:12 um, use this opportunity to weed out those who are not, um, uh, adaptive enough and who are not competent in combat. 16:24 Um, but there also is a requirement for training and education to continue even while 16:29 you are at war. Um, the training of officers at entry level up through brigade command has 16:37 to continue even while you're at war, which means you also have to have some 16:42 quality officers as part of the instruction, uh, the faculty, if you will. 16:49 Uh, so this this is a commitment that the Ukrainians have got to make to what we call 16:54 the institutional army, the part of the army that the overhead for training, educating, recruiting, etc.. 17:02 Um, I think that, you know, that look, this, 17:09 this there's no way I can say this, that it's not going to sound kind of harsh or callous, but every soldier, um, is going to complain about leadership. 17:21 You know, when you're in a really crappy situation. Um, so I, I always have to take this with a just a little bit of, 17:29 uh, of salt. The the complaints that there's still a Soviet mindset. 17:36 I mean, there are very, very, very few officers in Ukrainian armed our forces that were around when Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union. 17:44 So there aren't many that would have been trained in Soviet schools, only those guys that were at the very top level. 17:52 Having said that, I do think that you probably have, um, some, some leaders that are, um, in that mindset. 18:03 Uh, I spoke with a, a friend who is part of has the responsibility to help train 18:09 officers. And this person told me that there still are a lot of families that are 18:15 reluctant to send their son or daughter to the army because they still see it as a 18:20 Soviet style prison army. Um, and they're worried that their son or daughter would be wasted, 18:27 uh, sent to the front without proper training and equipment and etcetera. So so there is that. 18:34 The next era. We're getting back onto geopolitics here. Um, and of course, what is, uh, perhaps feared or rumored is that Putin 18:44 wants a summit with the US, possibly with Ukraine precluded from it. 18:49 Um, and of course, Putin wants peace on his terms. But in your view, is Putin's peace incompatible with the concept of a sovereign, 18:57 independent and secure Ukrainian state? Yeah. What you just described is the last thing that Putin wants. 19:05 Um, he he has not changed his war aims, uh, despite the casualties, 19:10 despite their inability to, uh, to achieve what they set out to achieve. 19:16 And in fact, I think Putin is in a weaker position now than he was a year ago. Um, not only because of the casualties and the losses and the damage to their economy, 19:25 um, the loss of, uh, Assad in Syria. I mean, that was as clear a demonstration as we're going to see of Russia's weakened 19:34 position that they could not save their ally in Syria, and now they're losing their navy base in Tartus and other air, 19:43 their air bases. You saw the picture last week of the Russian submarines sailing out 19:49 towards Gibraltar, because it was it couldn't stay in Syria. I mean, this is incredible. 19:56 Um, all of these are indicators of Putin's, um, weakening, in my view. 20:01 So but yet despite that, they have not changed their war aims. And I think he probably can't change his war aims, 20:09 um, and still stay in power. Not not in a significant, meaningful way. 20:15 Of course, it's not our responsibility to keep keep him in his job. Uh, it ought to. We prefer the opposite. 20:22 Um, but I think as long as he believes that the US, the UK and the rest of Europe will turn their back or happy to let just for the sake of 20:34 peace, some kind of negotiated outcome where Russia where the fighting stops. 20:40 Then I think he will continue doing what he's doing. Um, because again, he doesn't care about casualties. 20:47 But if he gets I think if he's made to understand that he's not going to be able to 20:52 keep Crimea or he's not going to be able to keep this 20% of Ukraine that he's taken, that we are committed, then I think things change. 21:01 And that leads back to the question we had earlier, in which the sort of title of the episode about Putin potentially being in real 21:08 trouble, especially if Trump decides to play hardball with him, especially if Trump realizes how much leverage he actually has. 21:15 Does Putin even need peace? Because surely peace is an existential threat to his regime's survival. 21:21 Think of the sort of army of 3 million who would be returning, and all the benefits and perks that they're currently getting. 21:28 Uh, that might sound odd, but certainly the financial inducements are huge. Um, going into Russia's provinces, there's more money than they have ever seen 21:36 in history. Going into communities and families. If the war ends, that gravy train ends. 21:43 For families, oligarchs, industrialists, the sort of middle class 21:48 who've stuck their heads in the sand. Um, it seems to me that that peace could be Kryptonite for, 21:55 uh, Putin's regime. Well, that's that's a interesting point, and I don't I don't disagree with it. 22:01 Um, but it you know, I have heard from others that, 22:07 uh, have inside knowledge there that there's a growing, um, discontent, uh, in because of the inflation, 22:18 uh, raising prices inside Russia. Um, uh, people are finally starting to, uh, complain about the number of casualties. 22:27 Um, so there and even inside Russia, there has to be some sort of sense of things 22:36 are not going well and as expected. 22:42 And so, you know, I, I'm reluctant to put a because I've been wrong several times on my 22:48 estimates of when things might happen or how long could something last. But, you know, it does seem that this year, 2025, 22:57 is a is a potentially, uh, one of the one of those years where like, 23:03 can they continue at the same level? Um, uh, especially if we don't do something to change the dynamic, 23:12 the external dynamics. Can the Russians really continue what they're doing with this propped up economy? 23:19 Um, it's interesting. Because, yes, a lot of the sources I see suggest that there are certainly amongst the 23:26 oligarchs and so on. There's a certain amount of disquiet. And even in the regions where, uh, the base or base interest rate is now, I now. 23:33 I think it was at 21 last time I looked. It could be already going up 23. And he checked those figures. But it's certainly a rate that's unsustainable long 23:40 term for businesses to thrive and invest. Um, same with the mortgage rates, which is killing the property market. 23:49 So there will be these signals, this this disquiet. But nobody wants to fall out of a window. 23:54 And if you look at Putin's public displays and the propagandists who amplify the sort of 24:01 discussion that must be going in the Kremlin, unfortunately there's a certain element of triumphalism in his words, 24:07 his manner, his tone. Do you think that is just for show, or does Putin genuinely believe he's winning? 24:14 And as long as he thinks he's winning, there's no real incentive to stop the war. 24:20 Well, that's right. And his sense of winning is based on whether or not he thinks that 24:26 Ukraine will get the support. Um, it's getting now from the West. 24:31 And I think if, uh, if, um, if he believes that Trump is more 24:40 interested in just getting a negotiated outcome so that they can turn away and focus 24:47 on other things, then I think he'll he'll wait. He'll wait us out on that. 24:54 So. So yes, I think he probably feels like he's in a good spot until he's not. 25:01 As we know with these regimes, they can be brittle. They can crumble very rapidly. So what is Putin holding out for? 25:08 Because it's not just some scraps of, uh, ruined and poisoned territory in Ukraine. 25:15 There seems to be far more behind his ambition, including reconstituting the Russian Empire. 25:21 Um, but also a global ambition, which we've talked about a number of times, it seems, from looking at these Russian dissident media that Putin is pushing for a 25:31 new Yalta, a Yalta of tyrants this time, and of autocrats and despots and those who 25:38 sign up to his vision of the world, which is the sort of informal power relations 25:44 which Russia thrives at, not the rules based order that we've lived under. He wants to carve up the world together with China and potentially with 25:54 Trump. Do you have fears that Trump will look at this and actually subscribe to this view, 26:00 rather than the rules based order that we are clinging to? And he will actually participate in Putin's game and in his new Yalta Conference. 26:11 Yes, I'm very, very concerned about that. And all the language that has come out of Trump and the Trump team over the last few 26:19 months points exactly towards that. Um, I don't I mean, you know, the the bizarre statements last week about 26:28 Greenland and Canada and Panama. I mean, they must have been, um, almost, uh, 26:36 in disbelief in the Kremlin and in Beijing that here's the American president elect 26:41 using the same kind of language and then having people come out to sort of justify it. Well, you know, Greenland has got so much mineral wealth, 26:49 it's really important. Right. Unbelievable. Um, so I do have a fear. 26:57 I used to kind of think, oh, come on, this is just Trump being Trump, you know, blah blah blah. But enough other people now have come out explaining it like, 27:07 holy shit, they're having they're having deep conversations and looking at maps and thinking about this. And he sends his son to Greenland and, 27:14 uh, and this incredible that they would even be having these sort of conversations. 27:20 And, you know, there was an excellent Wall Street Journal article that came out right after that press conference, and it kind of describes the, 27:29 You know, the outlines of what a Trump foreign policy might be, that it's and it's based on power and, uh, that's sort of, 27:37 uh, sphere of influence versus the international rules based order in which the 27:45 United States has benefited more than any other country on the planet. And yet he talks about it as if we're getting screwed over by everybody benefiting from 27:53 our, uh, benevolence and, uh, strong defense. You know, there is a lot of there is a lot of merit to that, 28:00 that there is a sense that, you know, other countries have, uh, taken advantage of American investment in defense so that they didn't have to. 28:10 Every president has complained about that since Truman, but nobody has benefited more from this entire arrangement than the United States. 28:19 And now he's going to, you know, jump over the the apple cart. 28:25 And, um, I worry about that because then the Chinese will say mm. 28:30 Okay, good. You know, we'll we'll take what we want. You have what you want. 28:36 And this phrase of Timothy Schneider obeying in advance. Well, we'll talk a little bit about, uh, you know, 28:42 America's oligarchs in a second. But if you look at this argument about Greenland and indeed the extension, 28:48 which is Canada and absorbing it, and then you do look at a map, it does make some strategic sense. 28:55 I mean, not to do it in this manner and to do it with this tone, but reinforcing American interests as global warming means that the Northwest Passage 29:04 opens up, um, China potentially putting restrictions or using its proxies and allies 29:10 to put pressure on the traditional maritime trade routes. There is some strategic logic of why this part of the world will become hugely 29:17 important. And then there's the point of view of extractive resources as well. 29:23 So is that the scary bit that actually there is some underlying geopolitical logic to 29:29 what's being discussed. Well, yes. I mean, you know, they're making arguments that in terms of 29:37 the, uh, the why, you know, why these places matter. It's like, yeah, of course they do. 29:44 But it's the how that is so concerning. I mean, we already have, uh, a base on Greenland, 29:51 thanks to, with the permission, obviously, of the Danish government and the people or the government of Greenland. 29:58 Um, not a lot of people are begging to be assigned there, as you can imagine. But nonetheless, we do have we have had that since, 30:05 uh, the Second World War. Um. So if we want if we're concerned for security reasons, 30:13 let's ask, can we grow the size of that base? Can we put more assets there? Air force? Navy. Et cetera. 30:20 Um, we've we have re, Invigorated our presence in Iceland. 30:29 You know, you remember from the Cold War days, the famous Giuk gap, Greenland, Iceland, UK gap where from which the the 30:37 alliance would watch and monitor Soviet submarines coming down from the Arctic down into the North Atlantic. 30:44 So this is this is becoming important again. Denmark has reinvigorated or restarted their radar stations in Faroe Islands for the same 30:54 reason. Um, and if if it's about access to wealth, 31:00 okay, then, you know, there's ways to do that. And I think Greenland has said they're open for business. 31:05 Uh, Canada, you know, Canada, uh, while not a huge population, 31:11 is a gigantic country with enormous, endless amounts of of wealth. 31:16 Um, and it's terrible that they have been such a poor investor in defence. 31:22 Um, and so I have no problem with the US government putting pressure on our Canadian 31:27 neighbors. Say, hey, look, you you know, you're part of the Atlantic and Pacific as well, just like us. 31:34 And you know, you're the most the biggest Arctic country, uh, next to Russia, maybe. 31:42 So do more or, you know, help us protect what we care about. 31:48 But to threaten them and talk about them as a 51st state and this all of these things, 31:54 um, you know, erode the cohesion of the alliance that it makes people question like, 32:02 what? What the hell? I mean, the cohesion inside NATO, despite the arguments we all have with each other all the time on different policy 32:08 things, that cohesion of NATO was always the secret sauce. And I think that that's at risk. 32:16 And this is an interesting point, isn't it? Because what Putin has been able to do through the course of his regime is progressively make people complicit in his 32:26 criminality. He doesn't necessarily require them to commit crimes immediately, 32:32 but some are on the line. If you're complicit with it, then you will be required to perform within 32:37 that system. He's done it with the elites. He's done it with the population. Now, I very much fear he's doing that by involving other powers in his games and his 32:47 crimes. Um, Serbia, Hungary and many others, uh, Slovakia and so on. If he can actually rope the US and make Trump's administration 32:58 complicit in his criminality, that that's my real fear is that that's the 33:05 end game here. It's to create a world of authoritarians and semi authoritarians, 33:11 um, and really diminish the so-called Democratic bloc, 33:17 which, you know, adheres to this idea that there are human rights, um, that these are, um, in perpetuity, uh, and that we're sort of 33:26 building this rules based order. Et cetera. Et cetera. It seems that he has a method to deconstruct this. 33:32 And there's a real risk of countries, not just the US, actually falling in and playing that game. 33:39 Well, look, this is, uh, where, um, some leaders are going to have to 33:47 rise to the to the challenge, uh, across Europe. Um, and you do see some, uh, people and in some countries that have 33:59 stepped up where you can see, uh, the possibility of, 34:05 um, not everybody's just going to get, uh, roll over for Trump or for Putin or for 34:10 XI. Uh, often these are from the very small Baltic countries, for example. Uh, but I'm impressed with, uh, 34:18 Alexander Stubb of Finland. I mean this guy, he is not confused about the threats and responsibilities, 34:25 and they demonstrated that by seizing this vessel, the one the Eagle S that was destroying dragging their anchor across the Baltic Sea, 34:32 the Finns go out and seize the vessel. I think more and more people will start feeling confident that they have to do the 34:38 same sort of thing. Uh, Prime Minister Meloni of Italy, she has, uh, she's got some brass. 34:45 I mean, really, uh, strong, clear messages. Um, we have an election here in Germany, uh, 34:52 coming up in just a few weeks. Um, that will see the a likely much stronger CDU led government with Friedrich Moritz as 35:03 the Bundeskanzler, um, Donald Tusk in Poland. It feels almost like the the center of gravity of power in Europe is shifting east 35:15 and north. And and these are people that are not confused about Russia as the threat. 35:21 And I have to say also that prime. Former Prime Minister Mark Rutte, the secretary general of NATO. 35:26 He's already doing better than I had anticipated. So, um, all is not lost, even though, um, you know, 35:36 the the American. The US government, the one that's coming in is going to be 35:42 problematic. And hopefully we'll we'll see them, um, understand better what they're going. 35:49 To do in the coming months. I have to say the UK seems to be on the sideline. Uh, I just, you know, each of us has our own internal issues, 35:58 but I don't. I don't feel that oomph coming from UK. 36:04 Uh, Macron in France, you know, has. Huge challenges of his own from the, uh, his opposition. 36:11 So this is, uh. Others are going to have to step up. 36:16 And this is what's been discussed. I mean, it leads very well into NATO being the next topic. Mark Rutter has said that if we don't want to be speaking Russian in the next five 36:25 years, then we need to step up. This is the strongest words I've heard coming out of NATO since the war began. 36:31 Indeed, since the Crimean invasion began more than ten years ago, the UK is currently has made an exceptional clause to put our GDP on defense up to 2.5%, 36:43 but potentially without further action that might drop down to 2% again next year. 36:48 Trump has been talking about 5% as the benchmark for this. But it's interesting, isn't it? All his words seem to indicate that 36:56 he doesn't really understand the concept of NATO as a mutual defense pact. 37:03 He sees it more as a racket, a protection racket. If you pay enough money, sure, you know, we'll defend you. 37:11 And he assumes his negotiating stance is 5%. Do you think this could get I say interesting is probably the one wrong word to use. 37:20 But if we see pressure to move GDP on defence up to three and a half to 5% in the Trump 37:27 administration, this is going to be a revolutionary change for many societies and 37:33 the kind of discussions of what they have to cut in terms of costs, 37:38 um, is, is kind of seismic in its implications. Well, um, I think that's, um, I don't know that I agree with the level 37:48 of drama that you just injected into that. Um, the United States is not at 5% right now. 37:55 So, I mean, that would require us to do more, uh, as well. I do think you're right that he sees NATO as some sort of protection racket. 38:05 You know, they're not paying their dues, paying their share. They be in Germany or or Canada or other countries. 38:12 Um, and every president since Truman has complained complain that our European allies 38:17 have not invested enough in their own defence. Um, so that's not new. 38:25 But the the number. I mean, during the height of the Cold War, Germany was at between 3.5 and 4% GDP. 38:32 So these numbers, um, are not unheard of in the past. 38:40 And I think most people, if they believe that there is a threat, 38:45 if the leadership speaks and say, hey, look, this, you know, we have to invest in defence because here's what's at stake. 38:52 This is what's at risk. And and I think if they can articulate that to the public, enough people will say, God damn, okay, okay. 39:00 But yes, we'll we'll have to do that. You know, I have to tell you, um, I don't see any decrease in the number of 39:08 people, uh, here in Europe that, um, go to Majorca for holiday or go to their 39:16 ski holidays or drive around in big, nice cars. I mean, I, I see no, no decrease in any of that. 39:24 So, um, there is a lot of room for people to be required to pay more, 39:33 um, for defense as well as the other things that governments are supposed to provide, infrastructure, etcetera. 39:40 But it it will require leaders saying, let me tell you why we have to do this. 39:45 And then that's always been the case. Having a grown up conversation with their electorates, 39:51 which has been distinctly lacking the last couple of years, unfortunately. Um, another area that may have to change. 39:58 I know we're going to come to the the end soon. Just a couple of sort of questions left. Another area which I think the Ukraine war is, 40:05 or the war in Ukraine is highlighting, is that there are some radical, uh, transformations and changes happening in the The military, 40:14 and they're driven by civic society. So firstly, there's this implication that unless you inject some form of civic society, 40:21 some form of, I would say, Silicon Valley agility into your military, then you're not going to be able to keep up with innovation and the sort of rapid 40:28 training and iteration cycles that are required for drones and so on. 40:34 I've talked to a lot of people who are involved in that sort of drone process, and they talk about cycles in terms of days and weeks, 40:42 not months and years, and this absolute obsession with driving down the unit cost. You know, you get it right, you iterate it, 40:50 you drive down the cost. You produce tons of them. But already a month later, you're on another generation of these. 40:57 Can Western military procurement innovation processes. 41:03 Are we at all geared up to to doing this? I think we could, of course. 41:09 Um, but it would require Addressing the various laws and policies that govern 41:18 procurement and production. I mean, um, it's not just a matter of a commander saying, 41:24 all right, troops, we're going to be the most innovative battalion, brigade, division in the US Army or the British Army. 41:31 Um. Yes, sir. Okay, get out of it. And somewhere somebody has got to buy the stuff you have to procure. 41:40 And of course, there. For good reason. Plenty of rules and regulations about where the money goes. 41:45 Accountability. And, uh, and then while something looks like a great idea for this particular situation, is it scalable that we can use everywhere? 41:55 Uh, or can it be. Can it be done safely? Can how do you train with it? I mean, I'm not making excuses. 42:00 These are the facts that govern how we do stuff. And of course, uh, the Congress, not one penny comes to the Department of 42:08 Defense without the Congress authorizing and appropriating it. Uh, and so we, we joke that in the the Pentagon has a board of directors with 535 42:19 members. Um, so, um, these are the kind of things and, 42:25 and obviously it'd be the same in UK, and it'll be the same in any European country. That's part of the European Union. 42:33 So if you want to be innovative, it's not just about do we have enough smart young people that can put shit together. It's also the rules that that would have to be 42:42 addressed, at least to get any sort of scale. And this is the interesting point. I think in Ukraine, yes, they're struggling to get out 42:51 of a Soviet mentality. So they have certain things they need to do, certain ways they need to do that are not an 42:57 exact analogy with the West. But when I speak to people in these battalions and so on, 43:02 it is yes, the central government is involved in some research and procurement processes, but it strikes me and it's very difficult to get any, 43:10 you know, actual empirical data on this, but it's civic society who is driving the 43:16 bulk of innovation. And then government sees what works and it comes in and does the scale. But without the civic society driving that innovation testing at the front, 43:28 it seems that this doesn't happen. And of course, they bypass the procurement processes you're talking about. 43:35 They have volunteers bringing a lot of this kit in by hand. They have people teaching themselves. 43:40 They have strong communication between the, you know, the home front, the cottage industry and the tech sector and, 43:50 and the lines of defense. And it seems that the government has has ceded control for a certain period and for 43:59 certain functions. Is it at all conceivable that we can sort of imitate this, 44:06 because it goes completely against the kind of procurement processes that you've described. 44:12 Yeah. I think, um, parts of it could be, uh, adopted by us. But I mean, you know, you're describing a situation, 44:22 and by the way, I'm envious of it. I, I, I am impressed with it. But they are in there. 44:28 They're fighting inside their own country. I mean, they're literally fighting for their life. And so there's a that's a different 44:35 sort of a scenario than when you're talking about, how can we do this in UK or Germany or the US for something that we're going to do on a 44:44 different continent, or that we would employ in the Middle East or whatever? So, um, it's, it's the, the scale aspect of it as well. 44:54 So yes, Ukrainians are coming up with incredible solutions for where where they're 45:00 doing it. I'd, I'd be interested. Maybe maybe you'll learn a lot next week when you're, uh, in Ukraine and have the chance to talk to people. 45:08 How? How do they share inside Ukrainian forces? 45:14 If the second Brigade has found this has developed a great technique for doing certain 45:20 things, how do they get that from what they've learned in Kursk down to Pokrovsk? 45:26 Is there a is there a mechanism inside? Uh, I think the British Army and the US Army are very good at this. 45:33 We when we found something that worked, it got blasted out. And it also was, uh, sent to our training base so that units could immediately start 45:43 training on the new thing before they deployed. Are the Ukrainians able to do that? I would like to know how they're doing that. 45:49 I rather suspect, speaking to a Canadian who's training that that does not happen again. It is very much reliant on these informal networks, 45:58 and it's reliant on the, I would say, how open battalion commanders are to innovation and how open they are to external influence. 46:06 And of course, um, there isn't necessarily the scale from central government or 46:11 externally of support, but I don't want to prejudice that question. I'm going to go and speak to a lot of people next week and see if I can sort of firm up my 46:19 my understanding of that. I think that's really important. Just two more relatively short questions. 46:25 Um, when Sir Richard Shirreff was on last week, I sort of asked him something. His answer was absolutely definitive and very, 46:32 very quick. Um, and see if you have the, um, same response. It does seem that a number of, 46:39 uh, war criminals who've actually gone through, uh, legal process in absentia in Ukraine and, 46:45 uh, reasonable evidence has been compiled. These individuals have been quite clearly assassinated in Moscow and around. 46:54 Um, as I say, there is demonstrable evidence of the criminality of these individuals, and they are serving members of the military. 47:01 So legally, technically, they are part of the war machine and they are targets. Do you agree that this kind of targeted assassination, 47:11 which Ukraine seems to have adopted? Is this the right way to go? If you cannot get justice by other means, and why are the media and politicians so 47:21 queasy about it? Because surely, you know, if you assassinated them through blowing up an entire block, as these rallies occasionally do, 47:31 or you carpet bomb a city to take out, that's surely far more destructive. You know, surgically taking out a single individual should be commended. 47:39 But there's something about it which, uh, it seems a lot of people do not find this, uh, at all palatable. 47:46 Well, first of all, I don't think of it as assassination. These are targeted strikes against serving military from the of the enemy. 47:53 Uh, and every single Russian officer at any level that is anywhere in the chain of command that launches, uh, attacks against civilian infrastructure 48:02 or is involved. Every one of them should be should be looking over their shoulder, checking under their car every single day. 48:09 Uh, this, in my mind, is no different than an attack them strike on a Russian brigade headquarters somewhere. 48:14 The, uh, the last, uh, the last question, really. And it harks back again to the themes, um, economic collapse. 48:23 Um, what do you want to see done, uh, in the Trump administration, 48:28 incoming Trump administration to tighten the economic pressure on Putin? 48:35 And what actually can the Europeans do, especially with regards to, say, the, uh, Grey Fleet that is passing through the Black Sea and passing through 48:44 rather the Baltic Sea, um, at risk of considerable ecological catastrophe. And we've seen, I think it's now 4 or 5 major incidents in 48:53 European waters, uh, in the last month, um, that any one of which could have risked a 48:59 huge, uh, environmental cataclysm. So, There are plenty of laws and rules in place that would authorize countries to stop 49:08 these vessels, to inspect them for compliance with safety and environmental code, 49:15 to check them for insurance, to check to make sure that the cargo they're carrying is in compliance with the sanctions. 49:23 But it takes Denmark, for example, and Germany and Poland and other Baltic countries to to have the confidence that when Russia reacts as they will, 49:34 that everybody else in the European Union and or NATO will back them up. So this requires concerted effort. 49:41 But, you know, the advantage of of dominating the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea with NATO 49:46 allies, where ship Russian ships have to pass out through the Turkish straits or the Danish 49:51 straits, is incredible leverage for us. And we should be doing that because that's how you choke off. 49:58 Russia's ability to keep fighting is stopping their ability to export oil and oil and gas to China and India. Ukraine has, you know, obviously stopped the Russian 50:08 transit of Russian gas across Ukraine. Slovakia and Hungary are still problematic in this regard, 50:15 but this is where the president of the United States should make it very clear that it is 50:21 our policy that Ukraine defeats Russia because it's in our strategic interest. 50:26 And we're going to lead and we're going to provide the cover for everybody else to to 50:31 join us in that effort. Ben, it's been such a tremendous pleasure speaking once again. 50:36 We've covered a lot of topics, but I think the core one is we need to keep the pressure up on Putin's regime, that it is brittle, 50:43 that it actually is struggling with the huge economic burden of the senseless war that 50:49 Putin has launched. And there are some very strong messages in there, which I hope people will appreciate and follow up on for today. 50:56 Thank you so much. Thank you. I always enjoy it and good luck with your trip next week.

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