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Date: 2025-07-03 Page is: DBtxt003.php txt00027394
THE UKRAINE WAR
ABOUT US IMPOSED LIMITS

William Spaniel: The U.S. Is Unlocking Long-Range Weapons for Ukraine. Here's How It Will Change the War.


Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3cgxeFNdqI
Peter Burgess COMMENTARY

Peter Burgess
The U.S. Is Unlocking Long-Range Weapons for Ukraine. Here's How It Will Change the War.

William Spaniel

Sep 14, 2024

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Over the last week, officials from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine met to strategize the next few months of the war. The central question was about long-range weapons use in Russia, specifically attacks using American ATACMS and British Storm Shadow missiles. This video discusses the outcome of those talks and how unlocking the new weapons will alter war dynamics.
  • 0:00 New Targets Available to Ukraine
  • 0:51 U.S./U.K./Ukraine Talks
  • 3:10 What Are ATACMS and Storm Shadow?
  • 4:44 Why Are There Restrictions?
  • 9:31 Stopping Glide Bombs
  • 11:50 Creating a Buffer Zone and Hurting Russian Logistics
  • 14:22 The Kursk Offensive
  • 16:40 Crimea
  • 19:40 #wheresbiden
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  • Transcript
  • New Targets Available to Ukraine
  • 0:00
  • There is a critical development happening in the war in Ukraine involving
  • some of the most important weapons in the theatre.
  • The systems in question are the American-made ATACMS
  • and British-made Storm Shadow missiles.
  • And the decision will have some wide-ranging implications,
  • including everything from what is happening with Ukraine’s Kursk offensive in Russia
  • to the big nuclear question.
  • So, today, we will cover the major news development,
  • what exactly those weapons are, why it has taken so long for Ukraine
  • to have access to them, and how valuable they
  • will be across four major use cases: stopping Russian glide bomb attacks,
  • creating a buffer zone and generally harm Russian logistics,
  • supporting the Kursk offensive, and attacking the Crimean Bridge.
  • U.S./U.K./Ukraine Talks
  • But let’s start with what is actually happening. Over the past week,
  • the United States had a series of meetings with the United Kingdom,
  • both at the executive level and inside of their cabinets. On the latter front,

  • 1:04
  • Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Foreign Secretary David Lammy took a
  • trip to Ukraine. It was the first joint visit to another country in a decade,
  • with the ultimate point being a meeting with President Zelensky
  • regarding the general long-term war strategy against Russia.
  • You can tell how much it matters because of how much of an investment it required. All
  • travel to Ukraine must be done via a train that departs from Poland.
  • Here they are boarding it Tuesday night, and once on, they had plenty of time
  • for a conversation —ten hours, in fact—
  • before finally arriving in Kyiv the next morning.
  • Then they had a bunch of meetings,
  • and another ten-hour train ride just to get back to Poland. Can’t say that I am jealous—
  • unlike Biden, who is intrinsically amused by just being on a train.
  • Anyway, much of the speculation about this trip
  • and the meeting between leaders in Washington a few days later

  • 2:03
  • was that they were really about finalizing the rules
  • regarding the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles on Russian territory,
  • and whether the United States would unlock all of the weapons or just approve the British models.
  • Ukraine has been asking for permission to aim at Russian soil for more than two years now,
  • and it looks like that it might finally be happening.
  • However, note that the meeting between the leaders came and went without an official announcement.
  • And though the prevailing consensus is that something
  • will be announced separately in the near future,
  • the most that we have now is this alert, not weapons flying over.
  • It seems that part of the ministerial visit was to ascertain what targets Ukraine had in mind to hit.
  • Being in the middle of the situation means that
  • Ukraine is paying closer attention to those things than anyone else,
  • so that extra information was helpful when it was relayed to the executives afterward.

  • 3:02
  • But whether they formulated a plan at that point or merely concepts of a plan to arm Ukraine
  • remains unclear.


  • What Are ATACMS and Storm Shadow?


  • Okay, so the next natural question to ask is what are these ATACMS and Storm Shadow missiles.
  • I want to keep this section short because I did a much deeper dive on the subject
  • way back in May 2023… which, I suppose,
  • speaks volumes about how drawn out of a process this has been.
  • The important points are that ATACMS are the longer-range firing option
  • that HIMARS launchers can use, featuring range of
  • 300 kilometers or 186 miles.
  • Meanwhile, the export version of Storm Shadow is a rough British equivalent,
  • except that it gets fired from a plane, has a slightly shorter range
  • of 250 kilometers or 155 miles,
  • and carries a heavier warhead.
  • Their main military purposes are similar to what the standard GMLRS missiles do when loaded up in

  • 4:05
  • a HIMARS launcher: step one is to
  • find stationary targets of high value and step two is to liquidate those targets—
  • though the aforementioned differences make ATACMS better suited for basic ground targets,
  • while Storm Shadow is better at hitting hardened targets.
  • In any case, Ukraine has access to both already and has used them to hit things
  • like roads and bridges to limit Russian movement,
  • supply depots to eliminate Russian arms and force resupply missions to take longer paths,
  • and to outright hit Russian tanks, ships, planes, and helicopters.


  • Why Are There Restrictions?


  • But that comes with one major caveat:
  • Ukraine is mostly limited to hitting targets on internationally-recognized Ukrainian soil.
  • And indeed, Kyiv has dutifully complied with that restriction,
  • not wanting to risk future arms shipments from its Western partners.

  • 5:04
  • It was not that big of a deal anyway. For the first couple of years or so of the war,
  • there were plenty of valid targets to hit, and so the restriction did not matter much.
  • However, now the war is all over the place. There is still the main Eastern theater,
  • but now there is also a Russian incursion in Kharkiv
  • and a Ukrainian offensive in Kursk.
  • In Kharkiv, Russia was exploiting how it could just park materiel on the other side of the
  • international border, without worrying about Western weapons targeting them.
  • To end that exploit, Biden (again seen here on a train) began permitting hitting
  • targets in Russia so long as they were a direct part of operations in Ukraine.
  • Nevertheless, ATACMS remained off of the table—ostensibly because targets
  • 300 kilometers over the border would not fit into that category.

  • 6:00
  • The restriction, of course, was due to Washington’s fears of escalation with Russia,
  • which is often attributed to National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.
  • Ukraine hawks have been very critical of the Biden Administration on this point,
  • as it has handicapped Kyiv’s ability to win the war.
  • Meanwhile, Blinken has been framing the reconsideration as a reply to
  • Iranian escalation, specifically in the form of a ballistic missile shipment to Russia.
  • On the other hand, steps that put the world one ladder rung closer
  • to nuclear annihilation should concern everyone.
  • Now, Russia would hardly be able to simply unsheathe its nuclear weapons in response
  • given that the United States has its own nuclear arsenal to counteract Russia’s nuclear arsenal.
  • There is also the slight problem that China is adamantly against use of nuclear weapons,
  • and Russia needs China’s support to maintain its conventional capacity in Ukraine.
  • But the problem with nukes is less of a deliberate

  • 7:02
  • attempt to use them and more the risk of a catastrophic accident,
  • which does increase every rung higher on the ladder,
  • even if it is hard to physically observe the difference.
  • Aside from that, Russia has ramped up sabotage operations in Europe this year—
  • and Western intelligence agencies are paying attention,
  • even if they are flying under the public’s radar.
  • These are the real drawbacks to escalation, as Russia is more likely
  • to use them as tit-for-tat against Western attacks inside of Russia,
  • rather than jumping straight to nuclear explosions.
  • Now, Putin has said that the approval of such weapons use
  • is equivalent to fighting Russia directly. And while I believe that the escalation
  • will go somewhere— again, like more drones
  • flying around Western airports, or drones crashing in the Baltics,
  • or attacks on Ukrainian ships near NATO waters— just remember that Russia’s incentive here

  • 8:00
  • is to overhype the threat to try to deter Washington.
  • As a general rule,
  • you should not listen to what leaders say. Instead, you should watch what they do.
  • All told, whatever the specific escalation fear was, this had kept the United States
  • from giving Kyiv the green light.
  • But that only explains what was happening with the lack of ATACMS use.
  • Remember, though, that Storm Shadow is a British design,
  • and the United Kingdom has been
  • a more ardent supporter of Ukraine throughout the war—perhaps because
  • proximity to the warzone makes the conflict feel more important.
  • So why has the United States been able to block Storm Shadow use on Russian territory?
  • Well, American technology is used in Storm Shadow’s targeting. As is standard in these
  • sorts of affairs, that gives Washington veto power on international transfers—
  • though there is some weird gossip that 10 Downing Street
  • never actually asked the White House for permission.

  • 9:02
  • Whether that was because successive prime ministers did not actually want to escalate,
  • or because they already knew that Washington’s answer would be
  • “no,” is unclear.
  • However, Russian advances in the East and the new operational challenges for
  • Ukraine in Kursk forced Washington to reconsider the restriction.
  • As such, we ought to examine some of the more obvious uses for the weapons,
  • and whether they will actually help Ukraine in its battle.


  • Stopping Glide Bombs


  • Let’s start with the glide bomb problem.
  • One of Russia’s key innovations over the course of
  • the war has been to fashion glide bombs out of existing explosives.
  • Basically, the idea is to take something that goes boom,
  • give that thing a pair of wings, attach it to a plane,
  • fly up to a high altitude, release it,
  • and let gravity and the airfoil do the rest.
  • This process cheap and easy.
  • Moreover, they deal a ton of damage to their targets,

  • 10:02
  • if you are willing to compromise on precision.
  • But what made this plan so attractive for the Kremlin is that Ukrainian
  • fighters could not engage Russian aircraft so far behind the borders,
  • and the planes relaxed afterward on runways that fell behind the
  • range of artillery that the West had approved.
  • However, upgrading from a 70 kilometer GMLRS missile
  • to a 300 kilometer ATACMS missile will put a whole bunch of extra
  • airfields inside of Ukraine’s crosshairs.
  • And while Kyiv will be happy about the new capacity, to be clear,
  • relaxing the restrictions will not be a game changer—
  • a fact that further undermines the idea that granting permission at
  • all would represent much an escalation.
  • Russia has been anticipating that Ukraine would get approval for long-range weapons for
  • a while now and has been moving its planes’ resting places further back accordingly.

  • 11:00
  • Heck, it is even possible that the United States
  • telegraphed its approval just to reduce escalation dynamics.
  • Nonetheless, the extra distance will provide some value here.
  • Even if they cannot strike the hangars that Russian planes are shifting to,
  • the fact that Russia must put more strain on the fighters to fly further is a win by itself.
  • Now, it is not much of a win, but it also comes at virtually no cost to Ukraine.
  • After all, the mere presence of ATACMS or Storm Shadow—not the use,
  • but the presence—forces Russia to keep its planes further back.
  • And that is extra helpful when indications are that supplies are running low in general.
  • Put differently, it is basically a free win for Ukraine, even if a minor one.


  • Creating a Buffer Zone and Hurting Russian Logistics


  • 11:50
  • Okay, the next item is to create a buffer zone and generally hurt Russian logistics.
  • This is where the bulk of the long-range work will be done. Given enough missiles,

  • 12:02
  • Ukraine can begin ravaging a wide band of territory.
  • Now, the effects on Kursk require special consideration,
  • so let’s table that for a second.
  • For the rest of the northern area,
  • Russia will have a hard time congregating any forces nearby.
  • Presumably, that would ease Ukraine’s defensive commitments in the region,
  • allowing for more soldiers to plug holes along the Eastern front.
  • Russian progress there appears to have slowed from the August highs,
  • in part perhaps because Russia is now starting to get serious in countering the Kursk offensive.
  • Hold that thought for a moment.
  • What we can say more definitively is that
  • Russia has moved away from its sprint to the city of Pokrovsk.
  • Following the capture of Avdiivka earlier this year, what Russia had been doing since along
  • the Donetsk front is aiming directly for this particular logistical hub.
  • But the formation of this salient risked giving Ukraine an opportunity to flank Russian soldiers.

  • 13:03
  • As a result, Russia has spent more time trying to shift the southern part of this front line.
  • After a couple of weeks, this was the result.
  • And thus the tables have turned, with Russia now a step away from encircling Ukrainian forces here.
  • Of course, slow rate or not, the gains still are a cause for concern in Kyiv.
  • ATACMS and Storm Shadow can help here by forcing Russia
  • to further pull back its logistical networks.
  • As a sample of this, take Rostov-on-Don.
  • It is Russia’s Southern Military District Headquarters, and thus
  • the de facto hub for the main thrust of efforts in Ukraine. You may also know it
  • as the starting point for the Wagner Group’s thunder run of 2023.
  • But back to more pressing concerns,
  • this is Russia’s territorial control over Ukraine near the eastern border,
  • with the previously discussed salient here approaching Pokrovsk.
  • Well, the distance from there to Rostov-on-Don is only 223 kilometers.

  • 14:04
  • In other words, Russia could soon find all of
  • its planning facilities and logistical hubs under fire.
  • None of that will doom Russia in the Donbas,
  • of course. But it is one more headache that Ukraine can create and then exploit—
  • or at least further stem the bleeding.


  • The Kursk Offensive


  • Alright, the next topic of discussion is Kursk,
  • and this is where things get complicated. Remember, Ukraine controls about
  • 1200 square kilometers of territory inside of that part of Russia.
  • In terms of verified information,
  • we still do not know exactly how the Kremlin is deciding to play this game.
  • Ordinarily, you would think that having ATACMS or Storm Shadow unlocked ahead
  • of any Russian counteroffensive would put Ukraine in the best position here.
  • And that may prove to be right.
  • But as alluded to earlier, suppose that the whispers are true that Russia is finally
  • redeploying significant forces to Kursk from the east, to deal with the invasion.

  • 15:05
  • Then one would expect that Ukraine is going to lose
  • some ground as a consequence of the West’s delay.
  • After all, Ukraine is loathe to risk many of
  • its HIMARS vehicles by driving them into the contested space,
  • and Ukraine’s advance perversely means that GMLRS have less value
  • coming from inside of the border.
  • The consequence is that Ukrainian soldiers cannot soften up the oncoming
  • Russian assault to the degree that Kyiv normally would want to.
  • Now, it will be all the more interesting if Russia is retaking ground on the western side,
  • which is where problems with bridge logistics were supposed to be leaving its soldiers vulnerable.
  • But regardless, Russia also faces a risk over in Kursk.
  • If Russia has predicated a counteroffensive
  • here on Ukraine not having access to the long-range weapons, then there is likely
  • an accumulation of supplies in the region to support the Russian soldiers.

  • 16:01
  • In turn, if Ukraine can find them,
  • then there may be larger targets available than would have otherwise been the case.
  • This draws an interesting parallel to how the Kursk offensive succeeded in the first place,
  • which we have covered before.
  • Russia strategized under the belief that Ukraine would be handcuffed in
  • a particular way—specifically about how border crossing might work—only
  • to find out that the initial assumption was wrong.
  • Thus, 1200 square kilometers were occupied.
  • That said, I would imagine that Ukraine still
  • feels uncomfortable about the entire situation. As a result,
  • Kursk is the place to watch over the next couple of weeks.


  • Crimea


  • Finally, we have the topic that everyone wants to ultimately come back to: Crimea,
  • and specifically, Russia’s bridge that spans the Kerch Strait.
  • Oh, that’s Kerch, not Kursk.
  • For two years, the structure has been Ukraine’s white whale—an oh
  • so tempting target but one that is not easily destroyed,

  • 17:02
  • despite multiple attempts.
  • Well, Ukraine’s situation is not getting much better here.
  • For the sake of argument, let’s overlook the feasibility of such an operation.
  • The distance between just across the Dnipro River
  • to the Kerch Strait is about 280 kilometers,
  • which is cutting it close for ATACMS and probably a bridge too far for Storm Shadow.
  • There is also the problem that missiles of these types would
  • have a hard time permanently damaging a bridge that size.
  • Let’s also overlook any possible political objections to this in Washington.
  • Crimea, after all, is “internationally recognized Ukraine,”
  • and indeed Kyiv has already been peppering the peninsula with ATACMS. Thus,
  • either Kyiv thinks that it is infeasible, or Washington is vetoing that specific target.
  • But for the sake of argument, suppose that Washington approves

  • 18:02
  • blasting the bridge and that the distance and damage are no issue.


  • What then?


  • Well, it would undoubtedly make for major headlines around the world.
  • But the time of the bridge’s strategic prominence is past.
  • After Ukraine failed to take much of anything during its 2023 offensive,
  • Russia solidified its control over the land bridge to Crimea.
  • Well, it turns out that the path from Rostov-on-Don to Sevastopol via the land bridge
  • is not much different than via the Crimean Bridge.
  • Besides that, Russia has transitioned
  • much of its resupply efforts to the ferries that run across the strait.
  • Now, those ferries have been on Ukraine’s list of targets along the Black Sea. And
  • indeed, ATACMS are a part of what is targeting the Crimean naval assets.
  • But for the metal bridge’s destruction to cause
  • serious pain, Ukraine would have to further step up those attacks
  • and also lay waste to the road networks along the land bridge.

  • 19:02
  • That, in turn, would require a massive commitment of GMLRS artillery,
  • which even then has a hard time getting the right distance.
  • Given that there are more pressing concerns in Donetsk,
  • it would be weird to see Ukraine make that effort.
  • But then again, who knows what Ukraine is brewing?
  • Meanwhile, if you care about what is brewing on my end,
  • don't buy me a coffee— but yourself a book about the war.
  • Check the video description for more information about them.
  • And if you enjoyed this video, please like,
  • share, and subscribe, and I will see you next time. Take care.
  • New Targets Available to Ukraine


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