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Date: 2025-08-22 Page is: DBtxt003.php txt00027125
YEMEN
ABOUT ISRAEL AIR POWER

72H Global News: Surprise Counterattack! 20 Israeli F-35 fighters suddenly appear over Hothis largest base in Yemen!


Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fTW8J9wiRBk
Peter Burgess COMMENTARY

Peter Burgess
Surprise Counterattack! 20 Israeli F-35 fighters suddenly appear over Hothis largest base in Yemen! 72H Global News Jul 21, 2024 813K subscribers ... 300,766 views ... 6.1K likes Surprise Counterattack! 20 Israeli F-35 fighters suddenly appear over Hothis largest base in Yemen! Transcript
  • 0:00
  • [Music]
  • welcome to 72-hour Global News tensions
  • in the Middle East continue to rise with
  • Israel's struggle against pro-iranian
  • armed elements most recently the Iranian
  • backed houthis in Yemen attacked the
  • Israeli city of Tel Aviv with a
  • long-range unmanned aerial vehicle a
  • longrange drone hitting the center of
  • Tel Aviv killed one person and injured
  • four others the explosion news which
  • suggested that the images shared on
  • social media came from the sea and did
  • not trigger air rate alerts was shared
  • hours after the Israeli Army confirmed
  • that the iranian-backed Hezbollah
  • militia in southern Lebanon had killed a
  • senior Commander following this critical
  • attack the Israeli Army was expected to
  • mobilize against the
  • houthis but no one could have predicted
  • that Israel would respond so quickly a
  • little more than 24 hours after the

  • 1:00
  • houthis attacked Tel Aviv with drones
  • Israeli Air Force fighter jets shifted
  • their focus to the yemeni port of Hoda
  • and the pilots of the fighter jets
  • pressed the fire
  • button the iaf attack on the yemeni port
  • of Hoda was carried out by 20 fighter
  • 1:16
  • jets some of which were refueled in the
  • 1:18
  • air some 2,200 km from Israel and 200 km
  • 1:23
  • fur further from
  • 1:25
  • tyan this distance marked a new record
  • 1:28
  • for the duration of the war
  • 1:30
  • F35 and F-15 fighter jets reconnaissance
  • 1:34
  • and refueling aircraft participated in
  • 1:37
  • the Israeli attack in particular it is
  • 1:40
  • said that there were a large number of
  • 1:41
  • tanker aircraft refueling the f-35s and
  • 1:45
  • F15 SE such a huge air fleet reportedly
  • 1:49
  • hit arms Depot a power station and oil
  • 1:52
  • refinery facilities in Hoda this
  • 1:55
  • critical operation by the Israeli Air
  • 1:57
  • Force was a cumulative response to the

  • 2:00
  • attacks by drones and missiles numbering
  • some 220 in the last 9 months most of
  • which were intercepted and shot down by
  • us Central Command and the air defense
  • system in addition the Israeli strike
  • was widely reported around the world not
  • only because of the hthi Drone attack on
  • 2:18
  • Tel Aviv but also because it was the
  • 2:20
  • first time a houthi attack had crossed
  • 2:22
  • airspace and caused
  • 2:23
  • casualties the attack had been planned
  • 2:25
  • for a long time but was prepared for
  • 2:27
  • execution in a short period of time by
  • 2:30
  • the iaf and with the knowledge of the
  • 2:32
  • United States as of yesterday prior to
  • 2:35
  • the decision to attack Israel had
  • 2:37
  • recognized that the houthi appetite had
  • 2:39
  • increased after their success on Friday
  • 2:41
  • morning and were reluctant to be
  • 2:43
  • satisfied with the attack on Tel Aviv
  • 2:46
  • the fact that the attack could be
  • 2:47
  • carried out within 24 hours after these
  • 2:50
  • announcements was due to the preliminary
  • 2:52
  • preparations in the Air Force and a
  • 2:54
  • series of discussions on the subject in
  • 2:55
  • recent weeks the last meeting on the
  • 2:57
  • subject took place 10 days ago with gan
  • 2:59
  • hunt he commanded the operation from the

  • 3:02
  • Kira bunker in the presence of the chief
  • of the general staff and the commander
  • of the Air Force the Prime Minister and
  • the Minister of Defense with the success
  • of the command the yemeni port of Hoda
  • was virtually destroyed by fighter jets
  • of the Israeli Air Force it is very
  • critical that Israeli fighter jets hit
  • the port of Hoda in the attack
  • operation hod Port is one of the main
  • 3:25
  • routes through which military equipment
  • 3:26
  • and weapons from Iran enter Yemen about
  • 3:30
  • 70% of the goods that arrive there go to
  • 3:32
  • the houthis who blackmail them with
  • 3:34
  • protection for humanitarian Aid arriving
  • 3:37
  • in the region for all these reasons the
  • 3:40
  • attack damaged infrastructure that will
  • 3:42
  • affect its function as a Supply route
  • 3:44
  • for weapons launched at Israel it also
  • 3:47
  • targeted energy infrastructures that
  • 3:49
  • beyond their use are a source of income
  • 3:52
  • for pro-iranian militias in Yemen these
  • 3:55
  • militias have damaged dozens of ships
  • 3:58
  • seriously affecting global trade rout

  • 4:00
  • and the world
  • economy it is now rumored that it will
  • take a long time for the militias in
  • Yemen to recover from the Israeli attack
  • because it seems that Israel will not
  • give up its plans to attack the houthis
  • in Yemen experts stated that Israel was
  • given despite realizing that such an
  • action would lead to long-term blows
  • 4:19
  • because in Tel Aviv an assessment was
  • 4:22
  • made that not responding to the Drone
  • 4:24
  • would be heavier in terms of deterrence
  • 4:26
  • against Iran Hezbollah and the houthis
  • 4:30
  • therefore Israel did not want to leave
  • 4:31
  • the houthi Drone attack on Tel Aviv
  • 4:34
  • unanswered there are groups who think
  • 4:37
  • that Israel's silence on this issue will
  • 4:39
  • create significant advantages in the
  • 4:41
  • international diplomatic
  • 4:43
  • Arena however War experts and analysts
  • 4:46
  • who think differently on this issue
  • 4:48
  • think that the houthis will mobilize
  • 4:49
  • again with the support of Iran after
  • 4:52
  • Israel struck the Yemen Port of Hoda
  • 4:55
  • analysts are concerned that the houthis
  • 4:57
  • May Target Tel Aviv or another Israeli

  • 5:00
  • city again could the houthis launch air
  • strikes on Israeli territory again after
  • IDF Jets hit the port of HDA to answer
  • this question we will need to explore
  • the potential of the houthi weapons
  • Arsenal one of the most important
  • elements of the houthi military resource
  • potential is drones the Iranian backed
  • houthis have been using drones for a
  • decade starting with Yemen's Civil
  • War Iranian support for them increased
  • when Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen in
  • 5:31
  • 2015 to prevent the houthis from seizing
  • 5:34
  • Aiden and other key parts of the country
  • 5:37
  • this helped them develop a large arsenal
  • 5:39
  • of drones the houthis chose to develop
  • 5:42
  • drones because it was a cheap way to
  • 5:44
  • create a kind of instant Air Force the
  • 5:47
  • houthis in Yemen had no resources and
  • 5:50
  • their power came from their relatively
  • 5:52
  • poor supporters in the mountains of
  • 5:53
  • Yemen it therefore seemed logical for
  • 5:56
  • the houthis to choose Iha development in
  • 5:59
  • order to to carry out less costly and

  • 6:01
  • more effective
  • 6:02
  • attacks however with Iranian support the
  • 6:05
  • houthis in Yemen have built an
  • 6:07
  • impressive arsenal of missiles and
  • 6:09
  • drones after 2015 the houthis used these
  • 6:13
  • Iranian supplied military resources to
  • 6:15
  • terrorize Saudi Arabia in particular the
  • 6:19
  • houthis used kamikazi drones to attack
  • 6:22
  • air defense Radars the first houthi
  • 6:24
  • drones were simple and the houthi soon
  • 6:26
  • invested in kamakazi drones based on the
  • 6:29
  • Iranian ababel family of drones the cf1
  • 6:32
  • was the hou's first significant kamakazi
  • 6:35
  • drone as of July 2019 the houthis had
  • 6:39
  • developed at least eight types of drones
  • 6:41
  • which they displayed at an event these
  • 6:44
  • included the cf1 and its successor the
  • 6:47
  • kasf 2K the houthis also had several
  • 6:50
  • drones of the same OD family in their
  • 6:52
  • inventory including Cod 1 2 and three
  • 6:56
  • among the drones developed by the
  • 6:57
  • houthis the hoodhood rakib and rossed

  • 7:00
  • drones were also
  • 7:01
  • important to get an idea of the size and
  • 7:04
  • capabilities of these drones let's take
  • 7:06
  • a look at a few of them in terms of
  • 7:09
  • critical air strikes according to
  • 7:10
  • Israeli military sources houy
  • 7:13
  • surveillance drones such as hudood raked
  • 7:15
  • and rased are not that important because
  • 7:18
  • these drones are small and do not have a
  • 7:20
  • long
  • 7:21
  • range CF however had an initial range of
  • 7:24
  • about 160 km and was about 3 m long this
  • 7:29
  • drone had a a wingspan of 3 m the
  • 7:32
  • kamakazi Drone weighed up to 90 kg with
  • 7:34
  • the Warhead and flew at a speed of about
  • 7:36
  • 320
  • 7:38
  • kmph the CF has a strange design with
  • 7:41
  • long wings at the rear and short wings
  • 7:43
  • at the front in this respect this drone
  • 7:46
  • was similar to a cheap cruise missile
  • 7:48
  • the CF series of drones was soon
  • 7:51
  • supplemented by the Samad series which
  • 7:53
  • resembled a large model
  • 7:55
  • aircraft this drone has a simple long
  • 7:58
  • rectangular wing a v-shaped tail and a

  • 8:01
  • fuselage resembling a long tube the Iha
  • 8:04
  • can carry a warhead on its body and can
  • 8:07
  • also be used as a kamakazi drone this
  • 8:10
  • type of drone design is one that the
  • 8:12
  • houthis probably borrowed from other
  • 8:14
  • drone designs such as Israel's Hermes
  • 8:17
  • 450 samad's range was eventually
  • 8:20
  • extended to over 1,600 km these long
  • 8:24
  • range drones were not that heavy and
  • 8:26
  • usually weighed no more than 45 kg
  • 8:30
  • their Warheads contained about 9 to 18
  • 8:33
  • kilos of
  • 8:34
  • explosives these specifications could
  • 8:37
  • probably be modified to narrow down a
  • 8:39
  • longer
  • 8:40
  • range expert Fabian hins of The
  • 8:43
  • International Institute for strategic
  • 8:44
  • studies published a thread discussing
  • 8:47
  • what type of drone may have been used in
  • 8:49
  • the attack on Tel Aviv in X he
  • 8:52
  • established that it was probably a Samad
  • 8:54
  • drone on the other hand in late 2020 the
  • 8:57
  • yemen-based houthis also captured Iran's

  • 9:00
  • shaad 136 drone the wings of the
  • 9:04
  • kamikazi Drone are delta-shaped and
  • 9:06
  • basically resemble a flying
  • 9:08
  • triangle this Iha is not very large only
  • 9:11
  • 3 m long and weighing about 180
  • 9:15
  • kg taking all this into account it is
  • 9:18
  • clear that the threat from Yemen has a
  • 9:20
  • critical potential for
  • 9:21
  • Israel the houthi Drone Arsenal is
  • 9:24
  • impressive and they have terrorized
  • 9:26
  • shipping and their range seems to be
  • 9:28
  • expanding
  • 9:30
  • however drones do not have large
  • 9:32
  • warheads and the amount of Destruction
  • 9:34
  • they can cause has so far been
  • 9:36
  • limited nevertheless the drones in the
  • 9:39
  • houthi inventory can be programmed to
  • 9:41
  • deliver Precision strikes on a variety
  • 9:43
  • of targets this makes them very
  • 9:46
  • dangerous the houthis develop this drone
  • 9:48
  • Arsenal with Iranian assistance the
  • 9:51
  • yemeni houthis are expected to continue
  • 9:53
  • expanding their drone Arsenal in the
  • 9:55
  • meantime the houthis are expected to
  • 9:57
  • attack Israel with drones again
  • 9:59
  • although this situation causes great

  • 10:01
  • concern within the Israeli government
  • 10:04
  • and among the citizens of the country it
  • 10:06
  • is necessary to take into account the
  • 10:08
  • power of the Israeli Army against the
  • 10:10
  • military potential of the houthis if the
  • 10:13
  • houthis decide to attack again and
  • 10:15
  • Target any City in Israel the military
  • 10:18
  • power of the IDF will undoubtedly come
  • 10:20
  • into play for
  • 10:22
  • retaliation if Israel has one of the
  • 10:24
  • most powerful armies in the Middle East
  • 10:26
  • backed by billions of dollars in US
  • 10:28
  • military aid that Prov provides the
  • 10:29
  • country with the latest military
  • 10:31
  • technology including jet fighters and
  • 10:34
  • advanced
  • 10:34
  • drones the United States provides Israel
  • 10:37
  • with $3.8 billion in annual military aid
  • 10:41
  • and has provided billions more in arms
  • 10:43
  • purchases since the start of the war in
  • 10:45
  • Gaza in addition the Israeli Army has
  • 10:48
  • about
  • 10:49
  • 170,000 active personnel and 465,000
  • 10:54
  • reservists late last year the Army had
  • 10:57
  • more than 20 brigades and more than
  • 10:59
  • 60,000 soldiers deployed for the war in

  • 11:01
  • Gaza but has since reduced its footprint
  • 11:04
  • in The Enclave to one Brigade tens of
  • 11:07
  • thousands of troops have been deployed
  • 11:08
  • on Israel's northern border with Lebanon
  • 11:11
  • to deter Hezbollah attacks for a country
  • 11:14
  • with so many enemies this military
  • 11:16
  • strength is not
  • 11:17
  • surprising we have not even mentioned
  • 11:19
  • the country's level of air defense
  • 11:21
  • systems foremost among these is the Iron
  • 11:23
  • Dome one of the most important air
  • 11:25
  • defense systems Israel
  • 11:27
  • possesses iron Dome is an important
  • 11:30
  • system optimized to destroy small slow
  • 11:33
  • unguided targets such as short- range
  • 11:35
  • rockets and drones it was built to
  • 11:38
  • intercept lowtech Rockets fired by Hamas
  • 11:41
  • and Gaza developed by state-owned
  • 11:43
  • Raphael Advanced defense systems with us
  • 11:46
  • support the system became operational in
  • 11:49
  • 2011 each Lorry drawn unit can direct
  • 11:52
  • radar guided missiles against
  • 11:54
  • short-range threats such as Rockets
  • 11:56
  • mortars and drones an important
  • 11:59
  • important part of Iron Dome is the

  • 12:01
  • control system's ability to distinguish
  • 12:04
  • which incoming targets pose a threat if
  • 12:06
  • an enemy's rocket Falls harmlessly for
  • 12:09
  • example if it lands in a deserted area
  • 12:12
  • or at Sea the system will not intervene
  • 12:14
  • in such
  • 12:16
  • situations Uzi Rubin a senior researcher
  • 12:19
  • at the Jerusalem Institute for strategy
  • 12:21
  • and security argues that this makes it
  • 12:24
  • ideal for saturation scenarios in which
  • 12:27
  • an enemy is trying to fire so many
  • 12:29
  • missiles that it is unable to intercept
  • 12:31
  • them Iron Dome its radar and battle
  • 12:34
  • Management systems are designed to
  • 12:36
  • handle a large number of targets
  • 12:39
  • simultaneously each launcher can fire a
  • 12:41
  • full load of 20 interceptors in 10
  • 12:44
  • seconds when Hamas began attacking
  • 12:46
  • Israel in October 2023 it launched
  • 12:49
  • several thousand Rockets into Israel
  • 12:51
  • with a reported interception rate of
  • 12:52
  • about
  • 12:53
  • 90% the Iranian fact houthis will also
  • 12:56
  • have to take into account the stunning
  • 12:58
  • successes of these Israeli Iron Dome air

  • 13:01
  • defense
  • 13:02
  • systems Iron Dome was originally built
  • 13:05
  • to provide city-sized coverage against
  • 13:07
  • rockets with ranges of 4 to 70 km 2.5 to
  • 13:12
  • 43 Mi but experts say this has been
  • 13:15
  • expanded as the system has been
  • 13:16
  • developed over time the systems work to
  • 13:20
  • create a protective Zone above Israeli
  • 13:22
  • towns and
  • 13:23
  • settlements any incoming projectile
  • 13:26
  • identified as a threat can be targeted
  • 13:29
  • the task of hitting a large number of
  • 13:31
  • cheap lowquality threats means that iron
  • 13:33
  • Do's interceptors must also be cheap
  • 13:37
  • experts estimate that each Tamir missile
  • 13:39
  • costs about
  • 13:40
  • $50,000 which is low compared to a
  • 13:43
  • multi-million doll Patriot missile Anket
  • 13:45
  • Panda of the us-based Carnegie Endowment
  • 13:48
  • for International Peace believes that
  • 13:50
  • the cost of not stopping an incoming
  • 13:52
  • threat must also be taken into account
  • 13:55
  • for this reason Anket Panda states that
  • 13:57
  • Iron Dome is not very cheap deep however

  • 14:00
  • there are air defense systems within the
  • Israeli military that cost less than
  • Iron Dome some of them are designed to
  • intercept to ballistic missiles fired at
  • Israel the outer layers are the ar2 and
  • arrow 3 systems designed to intercept
  • ballistic missiles fired from thousands
  • of kilometers away the arrow 2 is
  • optimized to destroy missiles in the
  • atmosphere while the arrow 3 can shoot
  • them down while cruising in
  • space both are intended to minimize the
  • possibility of ground damage from
  • Warheads or payloads from destroyed
  • targets there are many other modern
  • military systems in the Israeli Army
  • such as air defense systems rockets and
  • many other modern military systems when
  • we look at the elements in the Army's
  • inventory the Iranian backed houthis do
  • not have much chance in the long term in
  • this competitive
  • Arena one of the reasons for this is the
  • advanced technology used by the Israeli
  • Army and another reason is the
  • continuous support of the United States

  • 15:01
  • for this
  • development with the support of the Us
  • and other allies Israel is a country
  • that can destroy the houthis in a short
  • period of time TS Jo even with the help
  • Iran instead of facing this reality the
  • houthis are currently behaving as if
  • they have lost everything and have
  • nothing else to lose but this strategy
  • could indeed to raise the houthis in
  • Yemen from history in the future thank
  • you for following us


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