Did British forces really bail out The Americans at the battle of Bulge during WWII?
Clay Reynolds
Clay Reynolds, studied History & Literature at The University of Texas at Austin (1971)
Answered 12h ago · Upvoted by Joseph A. Merrill III, former SFC USAR (Ret) at U.S. Army (1971-1998)
When the US entered the war, FDR and Churchill met and decided that the best approach to the global conflict was “Europe First.” This did not set well with all of the American high command and many of the American people who wanted to focus more on Japan, largely out of a reaction to the nefarious attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequently the loss of Wake Island and the attack on the Philippines. Nevertheless. George Marshall and other ranking generals and admirals were commissioned to focus on Europe, via Africa, as the first move. In the meantime, Stalin was already agitating for a second front to be opened in the western European theater, to relieve pressure on the USSR in the East.
The British felt that since they had been more or less standing alone on the western front since 1939, and since their troops were already present and committed in North Africa, and since their planes were already bombing Germany, that they should be in charge of the European Theater of War. Their field marshals and generals were more experienced in fighting Germans, they felt, and the sacrifices they had already made put them in the moral position of running operations. Marshall felt differently, though, and ultimately, so did FDR. By jumping Eisenhower up over a number of higher ranked officers and making him Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, they placed him in a position to run operations and have command over British forces from that point on.
Many in the British military, particularly in the Admiralty and also in the ground forces, disliked this arrangement and felt slighted. In particular, Montgomery felt slighted and diminished in his role, although his rank as field marshal gave him a good deal of status. He notoriously bridled under Eisenhower’s orders, although he followed them more or less. On the American side, George Patton was among a number of American general officers who had an active dislike of Monty and well as of other British generals, who they felt did not take an active enough part in operations. Eisenhower was also frequently at odds with the British high command. The competitiveness between the American and British commanders was a factor in Sicily, for example, and probably led to an escape of the German army from that island to the Italian mainland.
Churchill and Eisenhower also clashed over strategies, as well, particularly in Italy.
During the Battle of the Bulge, or the “Ardennes Offensive,” as the Germans called it, the Allied strategic philosophies were proven out. Eisenhower favored a “broad frontal” approach, advancing Allied forces along an extended line toward the German frontier, even though this meant that portions of the Allied front were thin, too thin to defend adequately against a major German offensive. Montgomery favored flanking approaches, designed to box the German army into tighter and tighter frontal defenses. Ike prevailed, though, and the result was a relatively weak line that the Germans exploited. In part, this was the result of bad intelligence, as the Allies, particularly Ike, believed that at that point (late fall and early winter, 1944) that the Germans were all but defeated. Montgomery thought differently.
When the offensive began and was briefly successful, Monty was vindicated to some extent, but the British line, that found its strongest point in Belgium and northern France, was not sufficient to stop the Germans attempt to push to the sea and capture the critical fuel depots along the coast. A gross miscalculation on the part of the German high command led to them literally running out of gas before they reached their goals. Additionally, after the initial shock of the offensive, American forces in the center of the line, rallied and offered sterner resistance than was anticipated by the Germans, who still had little respect for the fighting ability of the American GIs. In the meantime, Patton was able to do the near impossible by bringing his entire army group from near the central French western provinces to the line and throwing them into the battle just in time to drive the Germans back, leaving their northern units exposed. Patton felt vindicated over his many disputes with Montgomery and wasn’t shy about saying so. But in truth, the British also rallied and defended the northern areas with a great deal of energy, sufficient to halt the German advance, gas or no gas, and to drive them back.
Additional factors played into the outcome of the offensive, not the least of which was the weather, which turned off clear, finally, just after Christmas Day, allowing allied planes to attack the German line as well.
The war at sea was an entirely other matter. The Americans and British also clashed in the South Pacific, and many commonwealth troops from Australia and New Zealand felt continually slighted (and ill used) by MacArthur.
It’s safe to say that the British were a considerable ally to the Americans and without them the western advance into Europe and defense against the Ardennes Offensive would not have been effective. It’s too much to say that the British “bailed out” the Americans, though. The British felt the American troops were not sufficiently seasoned, were poorly disciplined and trained, inadequately lead, and lacked the commitment that they needed. Americans felt the British were already beaten by the time they arrived and tended to regard them as a secondary factor in most operations, more or less as support or reserve troops to be used as needed to help the American armies. They never doubted their abilities or their effectiveness, but they actively disliked Montgomery and bristled at his anti-American remarks.
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Peter Burgess
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John Geare
John Geare
12h ago · 15 upvotes
It should be mentioned that Eisenhower’s ascendancy to Supreme Commander was pursuant to the British approval of Operation Overlord as the primary invasion route into Europe. The British resisted this strategy, but ultimately Churchill went along with it, in exchange for British scientists being included in the American research of the atomic bomb. That trade-off was authored by Churchill and FDR personally, and, while known to very few, was a pivotal event in the Allied European strategy.
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Clay Reynolds
Clay Reynolds
Original Author · 11h ago · 12 upvotes
The whole affair involving the atomic bomb machinations hasn’t been fully revealed (or exposed), as yet. There is enough information about it to indicate that you are quite correct; although it has to be said that Churchill was dedicated to the idea of the invasion coming from southern Europe—via Italy and southern France, in particular. His notion was that the Vichy French would rally to the Allied side and provide assistance and manpower, a somewhat dubious possibility in Ike’s estimation. There was also the matter of the Alps being in the way, a lesson learned from WWI along the Italian/Austrian front, if nowhere else.
Churchill was eventually persuaded, particularly after the Anzio and Cassino debacles, that an Italian-route offensive might not be the best avenue to Germany. He also shared Montgomery’s doubts about American troops, at that point. A coastal landing in northwestern France became the obvious prospect. Ike was not shy about pointing out that the American Navy and Air Corps would be deciding factors in all of that, no matter what flag the ships and planes were flying. His need to be SC was obvious. The problem with the Brits was that they wanted revenge for the Blitz—and that’s fully understandable—and for the horrendous losses they’d sustained in Europe before and during Dunkirk and in North Africa—again, fully understandable. They saw it as “their” war to win, but they needed American help to do it. They just didn’t like the idea of the Americans taking the lead—and the headlines. Ultimately, though, they had little choice. But this would play out later.
When the Americans proved that their troops, however they might appear, were tenacious and vicious fighters, capable of winning major battles, Churchill began to soften his position. Montgomery never did.
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John Geare
John Geare
11h ago · 5 upvotes
Actually, it HAS been fully revealed, here:
...(more)
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Guy Selbert
Guy Selbert
3h ago · 5 upvotes
Thank you for the good writing. As Churchill once said, “The only thing worse than fighting a war with allies is fighting a war without allies.” I once heard a talk by General Gavin. When asked about closing the Falaise Gap, He said that Monty had bragged that he could close it in a couple days. ...(more)
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Donald Miller
Donald Miller
1h ago · 3 upvotes
McClellan might have done better than Montgomery.
Sending your armor single-file along elevated dike roads enfiladed by German artillery and dropping airborne troops on top of two SS panzer divisions don't qualify as superior tactical moves.
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